Showing posts with label world economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label world economy. Show all posts

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Sagging GDP Slams Euro

The Euro is down nearly 1% this morning, which is a large move for the currency markets.


After trending gently higher for the first half of the week, the euro has been sold to new three week lows in response to the disappointing Q4 GDP figures. The GDP figures are of course backward looking and more recent data, such as the PMI figures and German factory orders suggest the regional economy is stabilizing here in early Q1.
There is a middle step to go from the GDP figures to the euro and that is the interest rate channel.  There has been some speculation that the passive tightening of the euro area financial conditions (including the shrinking of the ECB's balance sheet) and the strength of the euro would prompt the ECB to cut the refi rate later in Q1.  The poor GDP readings bolster such expectations and this can be seen in short-term interest rates.  The March Euribor futures contract is now implying 0.24% rate, having matched the lowest rate since Jan 23, or before the early repayment of LTRO I was announced.

Another way to see this is in the US-German 2-year interest rate differential, which continues to track the euro-dollar exchange rate.    Recall the sequence of events.  In early Dec 12, the US was offering about 32 bp more than Germany on 2-year obligations. By late January, the US was at a  2 bp discount.  However, this month it has been trending back toward the US and today, at 8 bp, the US premium is the largest since mid-Jan.  
The euro's drop today indicates the downside correction to the euro began earlier this month is not complete.  A break of $1.3310 signals a potentially quick move toward $1.3270.    Sterling's slide has been extended and it briefly dipped below $1.55 for the first time since August.  The unwinding of long euro-sterling positions is helping sterling steady against the greenback.
The day of disappointment actually began in Asia, where Japan reported a 0.1% contraction in Q4 GDP.  The consensus had called for a small increase.  It is the third consecutive quarterly contraction.  Exports, which fell for seven months through Dec was an obvious drag and business investment was also a drag.  The BOJ concluded its two day meeting, leaving policy unchanged.  It assessment was tweaked higher as it recognized that the "economy appears to have stopped weakening".   The yen is largely sidelined today as the dollar continues to consoldiate within Monday's range.
Fro the first time in more than a week, a Japanese official cited specific dollar-yen rates.  Iwata, who is thought to be vying for the BOJ governor position, suggested the JPY95 area was appropriate.  He opined that a correction of the yen's strength is vital to achieving the 2% inflation target and was sympathetic to changing the BOJ charter.  He has also been an advocate of foreign bond purchases.  While his comments may play well in Japan, they probably are not helpful in securing international standing, which was also a criteria cited by senior government officials. 
Some press reports are playing up comments by the Riksbank governor yesterday that seemed to accept the krona's strength and suggesting Sweden entering the "currency war" on the other side.  This seems to be an exaggeration. First, this is essentially what Weidmann and Draghi have said about the euro.  It is near long-term averages.  That means that the current rate is acceptable.  Second, about 7 months ago when the euro was at $1.20, the US did not complain about the dollar's strength. 
In fact, outside of one Fed official expressing some misgivings about what Japanese officials were saying about the yen, and Treasury Secretary designate Lew endorses of a strong dollar policy, the US has been as usual quiet about the exchange rate.   Easing monetary policy when one's inflation is low and the output gap is large is not a shot in currency war.
The euro zone area GDP contacted by 0.6% in Q4.  The market expected a 0.4% contraction.   Most countries, including Germany, France and Italy's contractions were more than expected.  Canada looks to be fastest growing in the G7 at the end of last year.  A combination of construction spending, retail sales, trade figures and the latest inventory data suggest that the contraction in Q4 US GDP may be revised to show a small uptick.  The revision is due Feb 28.

Friday, June 1, 2012

Stocks Close Below 200-Day MA

There was no relief to be found anywhere today. ISM manufacturing data disappointed in addition to a disappointing jobs report. Europe fared no better:

Saturday, May 26, 2012

Mauldin: State of Global Economy

Meanwhile, Back At the Ranch

It is simply hard to tear your eyes away from the slow-motion train wreck that is Europe. Historians will be writing about this moment in time for centuries, and with an ever-present media we see it unfold before our eyes. And yes, we need to tear our gaze away from Europe and look around at what is happening in the rest of the world. There is about to be an eerily near-simultaneous ending to the quantitative easing by the four major central banks while global growth is slowing down. And so, while the future of Europe is up for grabs, the true danger to global markets and growth may be elsewhere. But, let’s do start with the seemingly obligatory tour of Europe.

What If California Were Greece?

David Zervos is the managing director and chief market strategist of Jefferies and Company. He is an astute observer of Europe and brings a very interesting perspective to the trade, with his Greek heritage. I got an email this morning from him that I wish I had written. It is hard for many of us in the US to understand just how deeply flawed the structure of the European Monetary Union is (as opposed to the actual political union which, for all its flaws, seems to work quite well). David came up with a very fun analogy that makes the problem readily apparent. What if California behaved like Greece and the rest of the US was asked to pay for its debts and other obligations? What would ensue? So, rather than paraphrase what is already a very solid if short essay, let’s turn to David:

The Separation of Bank and State

“The euro monetary system is flawed. It is a system that was cobbled together for political purposes; and sadly it was set up in such a way that each member state retained significant sovereign powers – most importantly the ability to exit the system and default on debts in times of stress. There is virtually NO federal power in the Union, as witnessed by the complete breakdown of the Maastrict and Lisbon treaties. In fact, what we are seeing today is that the structure of the monetary system is so poorly designed, it actually creates perverse fiscal linkages across member states that incentivize strategic default and exit. Our new leader of the Greek revolt, Mr CHEpras, has figured this one out. And in turn he is holding Angie hostage as we head into June 17th!
[JFM note: CHEpras is David’s tongue-in-cheek name for the 37-year-old leader of the Syriza Party, Alexis Tsipras, whose rhetoric does indeed resemble Che Guevara’s from time to time.]
“To better understand these flaws in the Eurosystem, let's assume the European monetary system was in place in the US. And then imagine that a US ‘member state’ were to head towards a bankruptcy or a restructuring of its debts – for example, California.
“So let's suppose California promised its citizens huge pensions, free health care, all-you can-eat baklava at beachside state parks, subsidized education, retirement at age 45, all-you-can-drink ouzo in town squares, and paid 2-week vacations during retirement. And let’s assume the authorities never come after anyone who doesn’t pay property, sales, or income taxes.
“Now it's probably safe to further assume that the suckers who bought California state and municipal debt in the past (because it had a zero risk weight) would quickly figure out that the state’s finances were unsustainable. In turn, these investors would dump the debt and crash the system.
“So what would happen next in our US member-state financial crisis? Well, the governor of California would head to the US Congress to ask for money – a bailout. Although there is a ‘no-bailout’ clause in the US Constitution, it would be overrun by political forces, as California would be deemed systemically important. The bailout would be granted and future reforms would be exchanged for current cash. The other states would not want to pay unless California reformed its profligate policies. But the prospect of no free baklava and ouzo would then send Californians into the streets, and rioting and looting would ensue.
“Next, the reforms agreed by the Governor fail to pass the state legislature. And as the bailout money slows to a trickle, the fed-up Californians elect a militant left-wing radical, Alexis (aka Alec) Baldwin, to lead them out of the mess!
“When Alexis takes office, US officials in DC get very worried. They cut off all California banks from funding at the Fed. But luckily, the "Central Bank of California" has an Emergency Liquidity Assistance Program. This gives the member-state central bank access to uncollaterized lending from the Fed – and the dollars and the ouzo keep flowing. But the Central Bank of California starts to run a huge deficit with the other US regional central banks in the Fed's Target2 system. As the crisis deepens, retail depositors begin to question the credit quality of California banks; and everyone starts to worry that the Fed might turn off the ELA for the Central Bank of California.
“Californians worry that their banks will not be able to access dollars, so they start to pull their funds and send them to internet banks based in ‘safe’ shale-gas towns up in North Dakota. Because, in this imaginary world, there is no FDIC insurance and resolution authority (just as in Europe), the California banks can only go to the Central Bank of California for dollars, and it obligingly continues to lend dollars to an insolvent banking system to pay out depositors. In order to reassure depositors, California announces a deposit-guarantee program; but with the state's credit rating at CCC, the guarantee does nothing to stem the deposit outflow.
“In this nightmare monetary scenario, with the other regional central banks, ELA, and Target2 unable to stop the bleeding – and no FDIC – the prospect of a California default FORCES a nationwide bank default. The banks automatically fall when the state plunges into financial turmoil, because of the built-in financial structure. A bank run is the only way to get to equilibrium in this system.
“There is sadly no separation of member-state financials and bank financials in our imaginary European-like financial system. So what's the end game? Well, after Californians take all their US dollars out of California banks, Alexis realizes that if the Central Bank of California defaults, along with the state itself and the rest of its banks, the long-suffering citizens can still preserve their dollar wealth and the state can start all over again by issuing new dollars with Mr. Baldwin's picture on them (or maybe Che's picture). This California competitive devaluation/default would leave a multi-trillion-dollar hole in the Fed’s balance sheet, and the remaining, more-responsible US states would have to pick up the tab. So Alexis goes back to Washington and threatens to exit unless the dollars and ouzo and baklava keep coming.
“And that’s where we stand with the current fracas in Europe!
“Can anyone in the US imagine ever designing a system so fundamentally flawed? It’s insane! Without some form of FDIC insurance and national banking resolution authority, the European Monetary System will surely tear itself to shreds. In fact, as Target2 imbalances rise, it is clear that Germany is already being placed on the hook for Greek and other peripheral deposits. The system has de facto insurance, and no one in the south is even paying a fee for it. Crazy!
“In the last couple days I have spent a bit of time trying to find any legal construct which would allow the ELA to be turned off for a member country. I can't. That doesn't mean it won't be done (as the Irish were threatened with this 18 months ago), but we are entering the twilight zone of the ECB legal department. Who knows what happens next?
“The reality is that European Monetary System was broken from the start. It just took a crisis to expose the flaws. Because the member nations failed to federalize early on, they created a structure that allows strategic default and exit to tear apart the entire financial system. If the Greek people get their euros out of the system, then there is very little pain of exit. With the banks and government insolvent, repudiating the debt and reintroducing the drachma is a winning strategy! The fact that this is even possible is amazing. The Greeks have nothing to lose if they can keep their deposits in euros and exit!
“Let's thank our lucky stars that US leaders were smart enough to federalize the banking system, thereby not allowing any individual state to threaten the integrity of our entire financial system. There is good reason for the separation of the banking system and the member states. And Europe will NEVER be a successful union until it converts to a state-independent, federalized bank structure. The good news is that our radical Greek friend Mr CHEpras will probably force a federalised structure very quickly. The bad news (for him) is that he will likely not be part of it! I suspect this Greek bank run will be just the ticket to precipiate a federalized, socialized, stabilized Europe. Then maybe we can get back to the recovery and growth path everyone in the US is so desperately seeking.
“Good luck trading.”

Coming Together or Flying Apart?

The debate among very knowledgeable individuals and institutions as to the future of Europe is intense. There are those who argue that the cost of breaking up the eurozone, even allowing Greece to leave, is so high that it will not be permitted to happen. Estimates abound of a cost of €1 trillion to European banks, governments, and businesses, just for the exit of Greece. And that does not include the cost of contagion as the markets wonder who is next. Keeping Spanish and Italian interest-rate costs at levels that can be sustained will cost even more trillions, as not just government debt but the entire banking system is at stake. Not to mention the pension and insurance funds. If the cost of Greece leaving is €1 trillion, then who can guess the cost of Spain or Italy?
A total Greek default wipes out more than twice the ECB balance sheet. That means the remaining countries will have to put twice as much into the ECB as their present commitment, just to get the ECB back to where it technically stands today (because theassumption is still that Greek debt is good, and so the ECB is still lending money to the Greek Central Bank).
Then there are those who argue there is no way Greece can stay in the eurozone. The political costs are just too high, not only to the Greek people but to the rest of Europe. How long can Greece demand that Europe cover its government deficits, when its own citizens are not diligent in paying taxes? Listen to Alexis Tsipras, the leader of Syriza, at a campaign rally:
“There's one real choice in these elections: the bailout or your dignity…
“We want all the peoples of Europe to hear us, and we want their leaders to hear us when we say that no [country] chooses to become servile, to lose their dignity or commit suicide... We are the political party that with the help of the people will fulfill our campaign promises and cancel this bankrupt bailout deal.”
The Syriza Party appears to be ahead in the polls as I write, but that has shifted several times this week. Not only do European leaders not know what will happen, apparently even the Greeks cannot make up their minds, if we are to believe the polls. They want to stay in the eurozone but don’t want to have to endure the cuts in spending that simply moving toward a balanced budget will requirs. This is a classic case of wanting to have your cake and eat it too.
I simply don’t know what the eurozone will do in the next year, or even the next month. If Syriza wins the elections and forms the government, how can Europe back down and give them what Tsipras is demanding? And if the Greeks continue to pull their money from Greek banks (and it is now billions a week), then it will not be very long before they have their euros everywhere but in Greece, and they will in fact have little reason to stay in the eurozone, as Zervos points out.
This latter fact will not be lost on Spanish and Italian voters. If there is not that great a cost to Greece for leaving; and especially if Greece, after a period of severe recession/depression, starts to rebound; then voters all over Europe will be paying close attention. Some will ask why they should not default as well, and others will wonder why they are paying taxes to support other countries that might leave.
Even if European leaders have no real idea what will actually happen, there are some things that are more likely than others. I think the whole idea of eurobonds is dead on arrival. Who would be responsible for paying that bond structure, which would soon be in the trillions of euros? Some European authority? The EU itself, which would then need to levy taxes and set national budgets? I can’t really see any country giving up control of its budget to Brussels, let alone give the EU the power to raise taxes. And if the eurozone has a problem raising a relatively paltry €400 billion for the ESM, etc., from the various governments, how can it expect to get the authority to raise trillions? Does anyone really think the German Bundestag will agree to their share of that?
That then leaves the options of either designating the ESM or some other entity as a bank that can borrow relatively unlimited amounts from the ECB, or having the ECB monetize the debts of various governments in trouble and saddling them with a program of budgetary reforms (which are clearly not popular if you are the one being reformed!).
I still think it is likely that Greece will leave the eurozone. It makes sense if you are Greece; and even though it will cost the other eurozone members huge sums of money, I think they are getting “Greek fatigue.” But let’s stay tuned, as they say.

Europe in Recession

Germany was able to sell €4.56 billion ($5.8 billion) of two-year bonds at a 0% coupon interest rate on Wednesday. That was not a typo. Why would people give Germany money to use for two years at no cost?
I can think of several reasons, but the one I think is most likely – and the one that will not be admitted in polite circles – is that it is basically a very low-cost call option on the possibility of Germany leaving the eurozone. If Germany left, they would likely denominate their bonds in Deutsche marks, which would rise in value over those of the countries that remained in the euro.
But this also points up the fact that Germany is falling into recession, hard on the heels of the rest of Europe, which is mostly already there – some countries severely so. Leading economic indicators as well as purchasing-manager indexes are down all across Europe. But the saddest statistic is that of youth unemployment. Below is a chart from Reuters (courtesy of Frank Holmes at US Global). Only Germany is seeing its youth unemployment rate fall below 10%.

Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch

This letter is translated into Chinese, Spanish, and Italian; so I have to write with an international audience in mind, and also remember that I am of a certain age. Some concepts may not translate well, either to other languages or across generations. So let me set up the theme for younger readers and those not familiar with early 20th-century American culture. In the dawn of film, cowboy movies were all the rage. These were typically low-budget, and most were shot on the same set and ranch in southern California. The same saloons, jails, large rocks, and dirt roads kept showing up in movie after movie; but no one much noticed, back then. The magic of movies was still fresh.
You would watch your hero (you knew he was the good guy, because he wore a white hat) chase bank robbers and cattle rustlers and duke it out with gunslingers; and there was usually at least one pretty girl involved. In the era of silent movies, there would literally be a title graphic that said, “Meanwhile, Back at the Ranch” when there was a segue between the action involving the hero and the bad guys and the doings of the people back home on the ranch.

So then, “meanwhile, back at the global economy,” let’s look at a few graphs and some data to see what is happening in the rest of the world.
First of all, China is really beginning to slow down from its torrid pace of growth. Thr growth of their manufacturing output has fallen for seven straight months, and it is now contracting. Media reports everywhere are talking about actual statistics or anecdotal stories from Chinese merchants and businesses. Construction is under real pressure, as are real estate prices. Just as in the US or Europe, when construction starts to slow it affects all sorts of smaller businesses that supply products to people building or remodeling their homes.
A few data points. Deposit growth in China is slowing rapidly, and money supply suggests a decelerating economy. The ratio of M1 to M2 growth suggests an even weaker economy than the contracting purchasing manager’s index. The M1-M2 ratio is now back to where it was in the last financial crisis.
Let’s look at two charts from Credit Suisse. I have long been concerned about the very high percentage of GDP growth in China that is attributable to direct investment, bank loans, and infrastructure spending. While all of those are good things, the levels in China are without precedent anywhere in the world that I am familiar with, and have been there a long time.
What happens when you have to slow down investment and try to become a more consumer-driven economy? The transition is generally not smooth. And what happens when you try and do that when your largest customer (Europe) is in recession? And when the bank lending from Europe that finances the spending of many of the developing nations you sell to begins to dramatically shrink?

Reports from around the world show South African and Australian mines with lower sales, growth in Taiwan slowing and Great Britain in recession. The MSCI World Index, which tracks equity markets around the globe, is down more than 9% since mid-March.

A Slowing US Economy

The US economy is also starting to slow. Job growth is getting weaker. Food stamps are at an all-time high. The effects from stimulus spending have just about gone away, and there are large numbers of people falling off extended unemployment benefits. Lakshman Achuthan, of the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI), has recently reaffirmed his belief that a return to economic contraction is likely in 2012, noting that the coincident data used to officially define economic-cycle boundaries continue to signal slowing growth. Achuthan is a very sober fellow, and you have to pay attention when he makes these calls. ECRI does not make them lightly.
Let’s also look at a couple charts from my friend Rich Yamarone, the chief economist at Bloomberg. (We will be together at a symposium at the University of Texas in Austin, on June 7, along with David Rosenberg.) Rich has also been stating that he believes the US economy is headed for recession, for a different set of reasons.
At our dinner meeting last week (as indeed he has been for months) he was talking about the fall in real disposable personal income. It is hard to get growth when incomes are not rising .

And he too is worried about the fact that government stimulus (transfer payments, unemployment benefits, welfare, food stamps, etc.) has had a major effect on consumer spending, but as people fall off extended unemployment benefits (and they are, by the hundreds of thousands each month) personal income could actually drop.

Where’s My Quantitative Easing?

The recent round of global quantitative easing is beginning to ebb. Europe, Great Britain, and the US are all wrapping up their stimulus and have not announced plans for any more. China is more or less on hold until the leadership changes in October (or that is what most observers I read seem to think).
The recent QE had provided a clear boost to commodity prices and stocks, and the anticipation of withdrawal seems to be having a depressive effect on market prices. This was the third round of global QE, and each round has resulted in less real benefit than the previous one. There is reason to believe that another round would continue that trend. While it is probable that the ECB will soon take action, as Europe is clearly in recession, there seems to be no such consensus as yet in the US. And with an election coming in November, if the Fed is going to do anything, they have just two meetings left (on June19-20 and August 1) before September, at which point the economy would have to be in very serious trouble for them to do anything before the election – which then takes us out to the December meeting.
Since the recent most QE will still be in effect at the time of the June meeting, that would leave August 1 for an announcement. We will only have two unemployment reports between now and that meeting. They will therefore be of more than usual importance. We will be watching.

Wednesday, May 2, 2012

Global PMI: Disastrous Data

No need for much commentary here, suffice to say that those who thought Italy's massive drop in PMI from 47.9 to 43.9 in April was bad, apparently have not seen Hungary, Australia, Norway or Switzerland. The good news? Turkey is doing well to quite well... which likely explains why they are trying to confiscate the people's gold.

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

Stocks Explode on Bad News

Europe news is awful.
Even U.S. economic news is bad.

Sunday, January 15, 2012

Bill Hester: Five Risks to the Global Economy in 2012

As we're all a bit forecast weary by this point in the year, here's a list - not of prognostications - but rather of potential risks that may come into even greater focus this year. These risks – whether they intensify or pass – will likely play an important role in driving the performance of global stock markets in 2012.

1) The Persistence of Wide Spreads Among European Debt – Even if Bond Holders are ‘Rescued'
There are two components of the European credit crisis - debt levels and economic growth prospects. While the conversations to this point have leaned mostly toward reducing debt levels, economic growth prospects and the overall viability of a common currency will likely get a closer look this year, especially as Europe heads for recession.
During this two-year crisis investors have continually called on the ECB and euro area leaders to ‘fix' the debt issue: by wiping out half of Greece's debt, by protecting Italy's access to debt markets through bond purchases, or by suggesting a levered EFSF, the euro area's rescue vehicle.
But even if the ECB does bend to the will of the bond markets this year, and begins to buy sovereign debt directly, the single currency is left with all of the same weaknesses that existed prior to the crisis: the inability to tailor interest rate policy for each individual economy, the lack of foreign currency adjustment needed to offset differences in competitiveness, and growth-limiting trade dynamics throughout the area.
Martin Feldstein, a long-time euro skeptic, in this month's Foreign Affairs magazine made the point this way: “During the past year, Germany had a trade surplus of nearly $200 billion, whereas the other members of the eurozone had trade deficits totaling $200 billion. A more comprehensive measure that factors in net investment income reveals that Germany has a current account surplus of nearly five percent of GDP, whereas Greece has a current account deficit of nearly ten percent of GDP. Put another way, Germany can invest in the rest of the world an amount equal to five percent of its GDP, whereas Greece must borrow an amount equal to nearly ten percent of its GDP to pay for its current level of imports”.
One of the strongest benefits at the introduction of the common currency was that investors priced government debt similarly across the euro area. During this period investors thought of the euro area as a group of countries that would not only share a currency, but also share economic performance and long-term outcomes. Smaller countries and those of southern Europe experienced the greatest amount of benefit from converging yields. Yield on Greek debt fell by more than half in less than 10 years. Even stock market valuation ratios converged. The spread between the countries with the highest and lowest PE ratios dropped by more than half during the period.
While this period could have been used to improve some of the issues surrounding productivity, competitiveness, and trade dynamics among countries, what occurred instead was that governments took on larger amounts of liabilities, and as interest rates fell, housing bubbles formed. With that period passed, it's difficult to imagine that investors will soon return to the mindset that Portugal, Ireland, or even Italy, will soon again converge materially – in either economic performance or level of credit risk - with Germany.
I highlighted this risk and the graph below early in the European credit crisis ( The Great Divergence ). At that point the sovereign debt of Portugal was priced at 200 basis points above German bunds, compared with 1100 basis points today. Here is an updated graph.
There is a long history prior to the period of the shared currency where spreads among countries and with Germany were dramatically and persistently wider than even today. This was because expected economic growth rates, inflation expectations, and the real rates required by investors differed. Now that investors have been reminded of the structural weaknesses of a common currency – even outside of the discussion of high debt loads - persistently high spreads may be here to stay. Those spreads will surely play a role in the potential long-term growth rates of economies and euro area stock market valuations.
2) Sovereign Debt Rollover Risks
When the history of the European Credit Crisis is written, it'll likely be in two parts. The first part will cover the debt crisis of the smaller European countries – mainly the woes of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland. It will cover Greece's admission that its accounting didn't add up. And how Ireland's bad bank debt was turned into sovereign debt – which tripled its debt to GDP ratio in just three years. It will also cover the trajectory of peripheral sovereign bond yields in the face of investor uncertainty, where yields were first pushed above seven percent, and then eventually to much higher levels, forcing a rescue program.
The second part of the story will be about Italy and Spain, and potentially France, and how they were either pulled into the fiscal debt maelstrom or whether the ECB and euro area leaders were able to ring-fence them from the more troubled smaller euro countries. It will cover whether investors pushed these core countries from liquidity concerns to solvency concerns. While these chapters are still being written, the outcome may very well be available to historians (and investors) much sooner than many are expecting. One reason is because of the vast amount of sovereign and bank debt that is due to mature this year, all of which will needed to be rolled over because of existing budget deficits. The two countries that pose the greatest risks for rolling over this debt are Italy and Spain.
The chart below gives some sense of the relative importance of Italy – and to a slightly lesser degree Spain – in meeting its rollover demands this year versus the smaller euro area countries. The graph shows the cumulative amount of debt that will mature this year in the countries listed. (These totals count all government debt coming due – including shorter term notes – and are therefore larger than estimates of only long-term debt.) The graph shows the limited bond market needs (and therefore rescue funds needed) of Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, relative to those of Italy. Also, notice how steep the line is for Italy's maturing debt during the first four months of the year – when almost half of this year's total debt will mature.
It will be important to watch bond auction demand in Italy and Spain in the beginning of the year. The recent bid to cover ratio – a measure of the eagerness of bond investor to participate in an auction – for Italy's 10-year notes has mostly been in line with results from early last year. Of course, the level of yield will also matter. The chart below shows the weighted coupon of the existing debt outstanding for each country (in blue) versus the current yield (using the weighted maturity of existing debt) of its bonds (in red). For many years during the Euro's first decade, borrowing costs continued to fall versus the average cost of the existing debt of these countries. This trend has now changed for most of Europe, except Germany and France. This will likely continue to further widen economic divergences among countries.
This is one more benefit Germany is deriving from the crisis. In addition to a weaker euro, which helps fuel its export-oriented economy, the cost of financing its sovereign debt relative to its existing debt continues to fall while the smaller countries struggle with rising financing costs.
3) The Depth of Italy's Recession
It would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of Italy retaining access to the bond markets, and mitigating further losses in its sovereign bonds. According to the Bank for International Settlements, foreign claims on Italian debt total $936 Billion – that's larger than the combined foreign claims on the debt of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. And core Europe is long a mountain of Italian debt. French banks, for example, hold 45 percent of Italy's liabilities. Much more is at stake than France losing its Triple-A rating if Italy moves from a liquidity concern to a solvency concern.
What eventually would force that shift is if investors come to believe that the country's ability to handle its debt load over the long term is compromised. Those concerns can be partly alleviated if Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti delivers a balanced budget by 2013, which he promised this week. Unfortunately, near-term economic risks could make these goals difficult to meet in practice.
This year economists expect the Italian economy to contract only slightly – by 0.3%. The graph below shows the year-over-year change in the OECD composite leading indicator for Italy (lagged by six months) versus the year-over-year change in Italian GDP. The change in the leading indicator is currently -9.8 percent. That's suggesting a much deeper contraction in the Italian economy than current forecasts. Following any decline of greater than 5 percent in the year-over-year change of the leading indicator has led to an average contraction in the Italian economy of about 3 percent six months later.
Even assuming austerity measures might ease some of the country's debt load, it would be difficult to offset this steep of a decline in output. Hold debt levels static, and that rate of economic decline would force Italy's debt to GDP ratio to rise to 122% from 118% – clearly the wrong direction if the hope is to ease long-term solvency concerns.
Investors in Italian stocks may have moved some distance toward pricing in a deeper recession than what is currently expected by economists. The FTSE MIB Index declined 40 percent peak to trough last year (the index fell 25 percent on a calendar basis). But a deeper decline in Italy's economy this year that pushed debt to GDP ratios materially higher would likely catch bond investors' attention, and then ultimately the attention of global stock investors.
4) The ECB, LTROs and European Bank Funding
Will the ECB's three-year long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) work as a stealth quantitative easing program? Will banks borrow long-term funds from the ECB and turn around and buy sovereign debt? That's the hope. But there are strong tides of data pushing back against this idea.
While there was much fanfare last month after the ECB loaned 523 banks 489 billion euros, the actual amount of new funds was a more modest number. This is because two earlier loan programs expired on the same day as the three-year LTRO was held, and banks probably rolled these funds into the three-year operation. The earlier operations included a 3-month loan of 141 billion euros offered in September, and a net 112 billion euros of overnight loans. The ECB also allowed banks to shift 45 billion euros from an October operation into the 3-year LTRO. Of the 489 billion Euros operation, that left about 191 billion euros of fresh loans. (See this link for ECB euro operation results.)
Will this smaller figure be used by banks to buy sovereign debt? Any purchases will probably not in be in large amounts. That's because, as Bloomberg Economist David Powell recently pointed out, the 191 billion euros of new loans are less than the value of bank debt scheduled to come due this quarter alone. And with the unsecured debt markets essentially closed to many of these banks, the ECB loans will be needed to fund existing assets.
Up to 700 billion euros of European bank debt comes due this year, with about 200 billion euros coming due the first quarter, according to Bloomberg data. The financing needs coming due in the first quarter “imply that euro area banks will not have extra money as a result of the three-year auction to purchase European sovereign bonds, using a carry-trade strategy, because the amount of fresh cash is less than the amount of bank debt that will mature during the quarter”, Powell wrote recently.
Meanwhile, the ECB's balance sheet continues to grow. At 2.7 trillion euros, it's now levered 33 times to its own capital, versus a leverage ratio of 25 back in September. For investors holding out hope that the ECB becomes more involved in the debt crisis, it's clear that the central bank is already deeply involved.
As the size of the ECB's balance sheet grows, the quality of its collateral is declining. Open Europe, a Brussels-based think tank, estimates that through government bond purchases and liquidity provisions to banks, the ECB's exposure to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain has reached 705 billion euros, up from 444 billion euros in early summer - a 50 percent increase in six months (their note was published prior to the December 21 three-year LTRO, which likely further boosted lower quality collateral). They also remarked, “the number of banks which are becoming reliant on the ECB is alarming and hopes that the functioning of the European financial markets will ever return to normal are diminishing – creating a long-term threat to Europe's economy.”
5) Widespread Global Slowdown
Risks exist outside of Europe, too. Leading indicators suggest that the risks of a synchronized global downturn are building. (See John Hussman's recent discussion on this topic: When "Positive Surprises" Are Surprisingly Meaningless . ) The year-over-year changes in the OECD's Composite Leading Indexes for the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Europe have all turned negative to varying degrees. Of these, the OECD's index that tracks Europe's major economies is declining at the fastest pace (-6.5), with the 12-month change in the US index falling just below zero in the latest release of the data.
Now that negative leading indicator readings for these four major regions of the world are in place, stock market risks have climbed considerably. The graph below is one way to show the typical outcome when all of these leading indicators are negative. The red bars (right scale) represent drawdown – or the decline from each prior peak - in the MSCI World Index. The blue bars (left scale) are just a sum total of the number of regions where the year-over-year change in the OECD leading indicator is positive. The large blocks of blue areas reaching the top of the graph represent periods of widespread economic growth, such as the late-1980's and -1990's, when the leading indicators for all four regions were positive. The large blocks of white space represent those periods where economic contraction was widespread – such as in 1974, the early 1980's, in 2000, and in 2008. Importantly, the sum of positive leading indexes has dropped to zero once again.
Probably the best way to summarize this chart is that when the majority of developed economies have negative leading indicators on a year-over-year basis, investors should at least allow for large stock market declines. The declines beginning in 1974, 1990, 2000, and 2007 all began from periods when the leading indicators of all four regions had – or were about to - turn negative. The worst of those - 1974, 2000, and 2007 also began from very rich market valuations. The stock market collapse in 1987 is the only example of a large decline without at least some notification from the OECD's leading indicators of oncoming weakness. The 1980-1982 period, where global stocks fell more modestly, can be explained by the extremely low levels of valuation during that period, unlike today's higher levels.
The above global composite of OECD leading indicators also does a surprisingly good job of providing a coincident signal of US recession. Here are the dates where all four indicators first turned negative along with the actual month a US recession began in parenthesis: December 1973 (November 1973), February 1980 (January 1980), December 1990 (July 1990), December 2000 (March 2001), and November 2007 (December 2007). The indicator warned 5 months into the 1990 recession, and 3 months early in 2001, but within a month of each other recession (missing only the 1981 recession). This composite indicator turned negative with the October data.
Debt loads and economic growth vulnerability probably sum up this list of risks best. While these were topics investors focused on in 2011, this year will raise the stakes. Large quantities of debt will need to be rolled over and coincident indicators are likely to follow the currently downbeat leading ones. Both will need to be watched closely.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Mauldin: "No Good Choices"

"Happy New Year. We enter 2012 with a great deal of hope, but our hopes are not for more bailouts, or money printing, or any of the myriad policies that investors seem to hope will save bad investments and sustain elevated valuations. Instead, our hope is that in 2012, the market will finally "clear," in the sense that bad debt around the world will be recognized as bad and restructured; that overleveraged financials will be taken into receivership instead of forcing austerity on every corner of the global economy in order to make them flush again; that rates of return will rise enough to compensate and encourage saving – and high enough to encourage borrowers and other users of capital to allocate the funds productively. Of course, in order to restructure bad debt, someone has to accept a loss. In order for rates of return to rise, valuations must decline. In short, our hope is for events that will unchain the global economy from an irresponsible past and open the gates toward a prosperous future. Maybe that is too hopeful, but we are not entirely convinced that bailouts and 'big bazooka' will be as easily procured in the year ahead as a confused public has allowed in recent years."

– John P. Hussman, Ph.D. ( hussmanfunds.com
 
) 2012 will the year that the consequences of the choices made by nations of the so-called developed world will begin to truly manifest themselves in the economic realm. We are in the closing chapters of the current Debt Supercycle, with different countries strewn out along the path, some at more advanced stages than others but all headed for a destination that will force major decisions if politically painful actions are not taken. The longer that process takes, the fewer options that are available and the more painful the outcomes. Some countries (think Greece, et al.) have a choice between dire economic circumstances and disastrous. The option for merely difficult choices was passed long ago, and the rules are such that there is no going back to where you started without a different but equally painful outcome.
This is the time of year I think about the future, and foolishly opt to make predictions. This year I have decided to be especially foolish and to think about the next five years, especially for the US. Why five? Because I think by then the consequences of our past and immediate future choices will have been realized, the "reset button" as it were will have been pushed, and the economies of the developed world will be ready to move on to a brighter future. The question is, from what level will that new upward journey begin? It will be very different for different countries, depending on the paths they choose.
Let me presage my thoughts. Most countries are being faced with dual choices, which differ according to their own particulars, but all deal with what to do about the need to deleverage, both in the public and private sectors. The end of the Debt Supercycle is a tectonic plate shift of massive global economic proportions, unlike anything the world has seen for 70-80 years. It will cause all sorts of economic earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanoes. While the choices each country makes are their own, the consequences of their choices will have a much larger effect upon the world, as global interconnectedness has landed us in a world where isolating the impact of a problematic country is no longer possible. The need for global cooperation is most paramount at a time when politicians will be more and more restrained by the exigencies of their local problems and voter angst.
Jumping ahead and, by way of example, taking a peek at the Greek newspapers, one would not think that the current Greek crisis is at root a problem of their own making. The culprits are those nasty Germans. Political cartoons depict Germans as saying they have finally won WW2. Not exactly the climate in which Greek politicians are able to make calm decisions or explain the need to accept a great deal of pain. And the German editorials and columns are awash with the question of why Germans should work longer and harder to pay for Greek retirements and "lavish" benefits while Greeks don't pay their own taxes.
But choices must be made to proactively deal with the problems, or have the market force a severe solution. It is not a choice between pain or no pain, but exactly which pain do we prefer and how much? And anesthetics are not available on the pain menu. This is pain that will be felt from head to toe of the various national economic bodies, worldwide.
The US, Europe (including most of Eastern Europe), Japan (a bug which will soon find that windshield!), and even (especially) China must all deal with the problems that come with deleveraging. To fully understand the nature of the choices and their consequences, we are going to start somewhat far afield with some thoughts about choices and path dependence, then look back at history to see if we can get some clues about what deleveraging looks like (warning: it is not pretty), then examine the choices faced by specific countries and make some guesses as to outcomes, where possible.
I should note that in spite of the rather dark tone of this introduction, I remain an unabashed long-term optimist. History shows that these periods end and new periods of growth and prosperity emerge. While for the moment the situation is stressful, the trick for individuals is to make the best possible choices, given the circumstances, with a view to that moment in the future when risk will once again be something to be wooed and willingly accepted, rather than avoided as much as possible. For nations, it is preferable to make the choices that will bring about a new equilibrium, even if doing so requires some pain. The longer that difficult choices are avoided, the greater the pain will be when the choices are either taken or forced upon us.
That being said, so many choices are made by people and nations who happily blunder forward into what proves to be a disaster, swept along by the tides of emotion and rationalization, thinking that by avoiding the consequences of the real problems, things will somehow turn out OK. I am reminded of the times when I told my children to clean their rooms before they went out to play, and was cheerfully told, "I did," as they poured out the door, only to have Dad find that they'd stuffed all the detritus that was on their floors into the closets, drawers, and under the bed. The appearance is that there is order and calm, while in the shadows and cubbyholes lurks the sad reality.
To be able to make wise choices means understanding and dealing with the real problems and not just the symptoms. In the US, the old joke was that doctors routinely told their patients to "Take two aspirin and see me in the morning" (which simply shows that I am old enough to remember an era when everyone had their doctor's home phone). And that was often the best advice, as most things do eventually take care of themselves, one way or another.
But if you are lying in a ditch bleeding on the side of the road, you need more than aspirin. The European interbank credit markets are screaming that the system is at risk of a cataclysmic failure. Think Bear Stearns and Lehman. On steroids. We are rapidly coming to the point where we can no longer stuff the dirty clothes and toys under the bed. There is no more room. We are going to be forced to actually deal with the mess. That means that we will have to put "playtime" off for a little bit, but Mr. Market is going to stand over us and force us to clean the room. Better to get on with it.

The Consequences of Path Dependency

Breathes there a parent who has not lectured his teenage children on the consequences of making good and bad choices? Who has not tried to help them learn to figure out their own path in life?
We make choices every day. What do we eat? What color shirt today? Do we take a new job, or ask for a raise? Almost everything is a choice or the result of a previous choice. There are whole genres of academic literature on choices and what drives us human beings to choose and do the things we do. Behavioral psychology and in particular behavioral economics is a topic oft discussed in this letter. But today I want to briefly focus on what might be thought of as the opposite of behavioral studies, and that is path dependency. These are not the choices that we think we make or that we would like to make, but the limited choices we have because of past choices and circumstances.
The classic studies of path dependence try to explain how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstance is limited by the decisions one has made in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. (I would encourage those interested to Google "path dependence" and spend an afternoon [or night] reading some of the research.) But now, let me dismay the academics among my readers and resort to anecdotes and analogies to set the stage for our analysis of the end of the Debt Supercycle and to open a view on what awaits us as we journey down that path.
There are several different types of path dependency. The simplest analogy is that we go down a path, come to a fork in the road, choose one direction, and go down that path until we are presented with another fork. If we decide we don't like that path we can always go back to some previous fork and take another path. Our only loss is the time we took and the energy (or money) we spent on that path, while we did gain some knowledge of the path we left, even if we ultimately decided not to go on.
How many of us went to school to study one topic and perhaps even got a degree that we now don't use? Or started all over again in a different course of study? How often do voters elect a different group of politicians, hoping for change or a new direction, only for a majority to become disenchanted with the changes and opt for yet another change, or go back to the old political party? We fall in love with a stock or investment and then lose that love over time, and either stick it out or find a newer, more interesting investment.
We can't change the past, but we often tell ourselves that we can change things back if we want to – we can always turn around and try again, we assure ourselves.
Often there are things that are somewhat in our control. We can change. We can decide to eat healthy and exercise, or to change careers if we are unhappy. Sometimes those changes are positive and sometimes we act, even though the new path is not an easy one or one that makes everyone else happy.

There's No Going Back

The problem is that there is another type of path, one that we cannot retrace. After we choose that sort of path, the way back is blocked, and we must go on dealing with the consequences of our chosen path. We may come to forks in the road and vary our directions on the path, but we can't turn back, no matter how much we would like to. We can choose other paths into the future, but the past will always be there.
If we make a bad investment, we will lose money. I can't ask the market to give me back my money if the stock I picked goes down. If I own a business that is dependent on one customer and I lose that customer, I am out of business. If a bank lends money to someone who can't pay the money back, it is going to take a loss (unless it is a subprime mortgage and they can find some pension fund in Europe to buy it because Moody's say a whole bunch of bad loans are now suddenly AAA).
If you are eight months pregnant, you can't go back to being just four months pregnant. It is better to make the wise, if harder, choice as soon as you can.
And then there is yet another category of paths, the ones that are chosen for us, whether by family, circumstances, or fate; and once on them we don't know what we may have missed on alternative ones. Parents move to a different town and take the kids with them. A "chance" meeting becomes a new business endeavor. A torn muscle forces a promising athlete into another career. War erupts and changes the plans of young men. Accidents happen.
Let's look at an example of a seemingly small choice that had large consequences much later. In 1953 some CIA types, with the blessing of senior US and British administrators, decided it would be a good idea to replace the elected prime minister of Iran with the Shah, who would more or less do what we asked and keep Iran from turning communist, which was a big deal in Western government circles at the time. And who really cared? We were focused on the Korean War and Russia and China, nuclear threats, and all sorts of other "distractions." It was a different time and culture. We trusted our government to do what was right to keep us safe. There was barely a mention of Iran in the papers.
And eventually (1979) we got the Iranian revolution and the rise of the Islamist parties, with Iranian support, throughout the Mideast. Fearing that an Islamist revolution might develop in some of its republics, Russia panicked and invaded Afghanistan. An otherwise low-profile Democratic Congressman from Texas named Charlie "Good Time" Wilson (he did like to party) decided to make the Afghanistan rebels his personal cause, and "traded" all sorts of favors to get what became massive secret funding for the Afghanis, who not only succeeded but turned into the Taliban and helped train and arm a young Saudi named Osama bin Laden. And then along came 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Could any of that have been foreseen in 1953? Is there a path-dependent link? You be the judge. What would have happened if we had not meddled? Perhaps things would have been better, or they might have been worse. We will never know. All we know is what did happen (or at least what we have been told).
We all have a lot of stories about the paths that we chose or the limits of our choices. The good choices we take credit for and the bad choices we blame on circumstances or find some way to rationalize them.
The "invisible hand" of the market is millions of people making their own individual choices. Do we choose to rent or buy a house because one choice is better for the national economy? Why do some companies or unions support trade barriers and tariffs? Because they know that given a free choice individuals will buy the products of companies from "foreign" sources, and they persuade politicians to limit the choices of consumers to protect their own incomes, either by forcing them to pay more for foreign products or to buy inferior, locally made products. "We need to protect our jobs, don't we?" Even if it means we all pay more for products.
And our choices add up. They become cumulative and create an economic tide. Policies and practices that initially seem small in the grand scheme of things can become much more significant when taken together and given a little time.

The End of the Debt Supercycle

And that brings us to the Debt Supercycle. Let me quote a few paragraphs from my book Endgame:
"When we mention The Endgame, you'll immediately want to know what is ending. What we think is ending for a significant number of countries in the "developed" world is the Debt Supercycle. The concept of the Debt Supercycle was originally developed by the Bank Credit Analyst. It was Hamilton Bolton, the BCA founder, who used the word Supercycle, and he was referring generally to a lot of things, including money velocity, bank liquidity, and interest rates. Tony Boeckh changed the concept to the simpler "Debt Supercycle" back in the early 1970s, as he believed the problem was spiraling private-sector debt. The current editor of the BCA, Martin Barnes, has greatly expanded on the concept. (And of course Irving Fisher talked about the long debt cycle in his famous 1933 article.)
"Essentially, the Debt Supercycle is the decades-long growth of debt from small and manageable levels, to a point where bond markets rebel and the debt has to be restructured or reduced. A program of austerity must be undertaken in order to bring the debt back to acceptable levels. While the focus of BCA has primarily been on the Debt Supercycle in the US, many of the countries in the developed world are at various stages in their own Debt Supercycle."
A Debt Supercycle is not some new thing. Rogoff and Reinhart write about 266 such events in the past few centuries in their epic work This Time Is Different. It seems to be part of the human condition. We increase the amount of debt in a system until there is too much debt. Each and every time, the people and leaders in a country convince themselves that "this time is different" and the debt is not a problem to worry about. And that is true until some moment in time when the markets lose confidence in the ability of governments or businesses to service the debt.
Professor John Cochrane of the University of Chicago has written a series of brilliant papers and articles on this problem, forcefully demonstrating the math that interest rates are partially a reflection of the risk that investors perceive concerning the potential for returns on their money. When they begin to lose confidence that a government (or business) will be able to raise enough revenue to pay off the debt at some point in the future, interest rates begin to rise. At first, there are all sorts of reasons given. Then there is a moment when the bond market simply walks away. Rogoff and Reinhart call it the "Bang Moment."
Once that confidence has been lost, it is not easily regained. "A program of austerity must be undertaken in order to bring the debt back to acceptable levels." Governments or businesses have to demonstrate that they can get their budgets under control in order to get renewed access to the bond market. And make no mistake, austerity is a path for slow growth and/or recessions.
We are used to countries like Argentina having their problems. But in the 1990s we saw what happened to both Canada and Sweden as they had to deal with that lack of confidence. While they had different answers, they came through their respective crises, although there were clearly economic costs, higher unemployment, losses, and very difficult decisions made. It is not just "banana republics" that have debt problems.
Only a few years ago, European regulators were allowing European banks to leverage as much as 40 to 1, gorging themselves on sovereign debt, because everyone "knew" that sovereign nations in a modern world would not – indeed could not! – default; so why worry about leverage on government debt? Until Greece and then Ireland and then Portugal and now Italy, etc. I was writing early last year that Greek bonds would lose 90% of their value. This week we read that Greece indeed wants private investors to agree to a 90% write-off. Soon it will be public bond holders like the ECB that will take haircuts.
No country starts borrowing money with the thought that they will keep on borrowing until there is an economic collapse. It all starts with good intentions. No bank lends money not expecting to have it returned. Then things change over time. Since there seemed to be no problem with the current level of debt (and spending), why can't we increase it a little more?
There are countries that can keep their budgets and debt under control (like Switzerland and others). But politicians like to promise benefits today and pay for them with debt that future generations must incur (like the US and countries all over Europe). Or they try to spend their way to prosperity and growth (like Japan).
And of course they promise that "in the very near future" they will get the deficits under control. "We will grow our way out of the problem. We will limit the growth of spending next year, when the economy is better. We can always raise taxes on the rich. Or increase consumption taxes. Or create some taxes somewhere." Whatever it takes to convince the bond market to keep on funding their spending.
And so the choices to provide this benefit and that program, each justified by some reason and desired by some group of voters, add up over time. Everything goes well until there is a recession. Then revenues go down and costs go up, because unemployment benefits rise. But because the natural business cycle leads to recovery and growth, things soon get better and the game continues.
But then the accumulated debt becomes too much to handle when the next recession comes along. And bond investors lose confidence and the Bang Moment has arrived. Cochrane shows that there is no magic number or formula, no way to know in advance when that moment will be. Unless a country chooses to deal with the pain of cutting spending and raising revenues, eventually there is a true crisis, resulting in massive dislocations and losses. Bond holders lose a large percentage (if not all) of their investments. That moment is often precipitated by a credit or banking crisis. And when the banking system freezes up, businesses lose access to capital, and the recession can turn into a depression if not dealt with aggressively. But that means pain.
Let's jump ahead to an illustration we will refer to again later. In the late '70s, inflation in the US rose to over 14%. I remember borrowing money at 18%. The stock market lost about 40% in just 18 months. Unemployment was high and rising.

It was the single largest failure of US monetary policy since 1950. While some blamed it on high oil prices, or speculators, or greedy businesses or unions, the fact was that the Fed printed money to allow the government to run large deficits. And US politicians supported the policy because it allowed them to spend money.
And then came Paul Volcker. He is now credited with almost singlehandedly forcing the inflation genie back in the bottle. He is everyone's hero. But back then there were plenty of people who did not like what he was doing, because he precipitated two major, back-to-back recessions, in 1980 and 1982 (as bad or worse than what we just went through). Unemployment climbed above 10%. The stock market got hammered even further. We look back now and say "It had to be done." That is great with hindsight, when we are long past the recessions. But it was tough in the middle of the recessions to explain just why we needed a tighter monetary policy in the face of 10% unemployment.
What if there had been no Volcker? No one to stand at the door of the Fed and say "No more!" What if the Fed had continued to print? Then inflation would have risen even more. 25%? Bank loans of 35%? Higher? Who knows?
At some point, the math, even for the US, does not work. There is a limit to what a government can borrow and a central bank can print without a total collapse of the economy. There would have been another depression at some point. There would have been no Reagan Revolution, because to cut taxes when inflation was 25% and deficits were higher would have been unthinkable. We would have stumbled from crisis to crisis, cutting spending and programs only to have revenues fall and costs rise. It becomes a debt spiral that always ends badly. Would Reagan have tried, anyway? I think so, as that was part and parcel of his philosophy. But he would have been blamed for the recessions, and not Volcker. And in the midst of a crisis, how do you get Congress (or any politician) to make the right decisions?
Volcker chose a hard path. But it was a better path than the one we'd been going down. He hit the reset button. But did it seem like a better path at the time to anyone who could not find a job? To those on a fixed income? To the business owners who lost everything? To investors who gave up faith in the stock market?

The Time for Hard Choices

Most nations in the "developed world" are coming to, or are already at, the end of their Debt Supercycle. They will soon lose their ability to borrow money at low rates, absent a demonstrated ability to control their budgets. An abilitythat almost none has shown. And when you look at the cost of the promises made to an aging population for healthcare and retirement benefits, the future costs are staggering. There is no way such promises can be kept. And one by one, with increasing frequency, countries will find their interest rates, the cost of servicing their debt, of getting people to buy their bonds, will rise to the point where, absent a central bank willing to print money in massive quantities, their budget and economy will collapse. Banks that have "invested" in huge amounts of sovereign debt will see their capital wiped out, seemingly overnight.
In Europe in the past few weeks, almost €500 billion has been deposited at the ECB for a return of 0.25%. The interbank market, when it functions, will pay 0.40%. Why would a bank take less money from the ECB? Because they can't get other banks to lend them the money. Banks no longer trust the ability of other banks to pay them back. UniCredit in Italy is raising money at a 40% discount to their already depressed stock price. They will not be the last to be forced into such choices. The credit markets are telling us there is a crisis in the making, on the scale of Bear Stearns or Lehman in 2008, except that now governments have less ability to step in and salvage the banks. Now, government debt is the problem.
Just as you can't solve the problem of being drunk with more whiskey, you can't solve a debt problem with more debt.
But that means hard choices. And the choice right now, is how long should this letter be? I think we are at a good breaking point, so next week we will look at why the choice in Europe is between recession now or depression later. We will take a look at periods of deleveraging in the US in the 19th century, and see what happened. While there were indeed massive dislocations of the economy and huge investor losses, a few good lessons were learned and applied, until recently. We will look at what choices countries can make. Some, like the US, still have a viable path to control their bond markets and avoid a depression or major recession; but there will be pain. Think Volcker. Others simply will get to choose between what type of depression they want: short and deep or long and exhausting.
Will the Greeks become debt slaves, working for an entire generation at reduced wages to pay their debt and remain in the eurozone, or will they leave and suffer very large currency losses and the loss of access to the credit markets? Not a very good set of choices, but that's all they have, unless they can convince German taxpayers to fund their deficits and rising costs ad infinitum. Good luck on that one.
We will find that the European crisis will create serious problems for the rest of the world. Global growth is set to slow rapidly. By the end of this year, we may be happy that there was any growth.
And next week we must address Japan, China, and the US. So much for the quick, easy forecast. But those you can get anywhere. Google "economic forecast 2012." There are 2.8 million hits. I'm sure you can find several that fit whatever mood you're in.
We will take the longer path, but when we finish we will have some idea of where we're going. Stay with me.

Tuesday, January 3, 2012

Eurozone Economy Contracts Five Straight Months

...but stocks are higher in the new year. Yup! Makes perfect sense... to the delusional! 

from Marketwatch:

The final December reading of the Markit purchasing-managers index for the manufacturing sector rose to 46.9 from a 28-month low of 46.4 in November, matching an earlier estimate.

“Euro-zone manufacturing is clearly undergoing another recession,” said Chris Williamson, chief economist at Markit. “Despite the rate of decline easing slightly in December, production appears to have been collapsing across the single-currency area at a quarterly rate of approximately 1.5% in the final quarter of 2011.”

For the second month in a row, all nations covered by the survey reported a decline in output.

Williamson said it was particularly worrying to see new orders falling at a far faster rate than output. That indicates firms have relied on orders placed earlier in the year to sustain current production levels, he said.

Hussman: Hope for Change in 2012

Happy New Year. We enter 2012 with a great deal of hope, but our hopes are not for more bailouts, or money printing, or any of the myriad policies that investors seem to hope will save bad investments and sustain elevated valuations. Instead, our hope is that in 2012, the market will finally "clear," in the sense that bad debt will be recognized as bad and restructured; that overleveraged financials will be taken into receivership instead of forcing austerity on every corner of the economy in order to make them flush again; that rates of return will rise enough to compensate and encourage saving - and high enough to encourage borrowers and other users of capital to allocate the funds productively. Of course, in order to restructure bad debt, someone has to accept a loss. In order for rates of return to rise, valuations must decline. In short, our hope is for events that will unchain the global economy from an irresponsible past and open the gates toward a prosperous future. Maybe that is too hopeful, but we are not entirely convinced that bailouts and "big bazookas" will be as easily procured in the year ahead as a confused public has allowed in recent years.

We begin 2012 with the S&P 500 priced at valuations from which we estimate 10-year total returns of just 4.9% annually. This figure would be less discouraging if it were not for the fact that valuations - properly normalized for the cyclicality of earnings - have been tightly related to subsequent returns as far back as one cares to look, and as recently as the past decade. It is true that rich valuations did not prevent the late 1990's bubble (corresponding to late 1980's 10-year total return projections), but the ultimate and predictable outcome of that bubble has been more than a decade of stagnant returns. Back in 2000, it seemed inconceivable that we could be projecting negative 10-year total returns, but that outcome was the natural result of the valuations we observed at the time. Weak returns over the coming decade (hopefully front loaded as a few years of negative returns, followed by normal or above-average returns in the out-years) are likely to be an equally natural result of present conditions.
With 10-year Treasury yields below 2%, 30-year yields below 3%, corporate bond yields below 4%, and S&P 500 projected 10-year total returns below 5%, we presently have one of the worst menus of prospective return that long-term investors have ever faced. The outcome of this situation will not be surprisingly pleasant for any sustained period of time, but promises to be difficult, volatile, and unrewarding. The proper response is to accept risk in proportion to the compensation available for taking that risk. Presently, that compensation is very thin. This will change, and much better opportunities to accept risk will emerge. The key is for investors to avoid the allure of excessive short-term speculation in a market that promises - bends to its knees, stares straight into investors' eyes, and promises - to treat them terribly over the long-term.
Again, we enter the year with great hope. But our hope is not for continued speculation and the maintenance of rich valuations (that only look reasonable because long-term cyclical profit margins are at a short-term peak about 50% above their historical norms). At present, we have a situation where saving is discouraged by desperately low interest rates, where unproductive uses of capital are not discouraged because the bar is so low, and where central banks recklessly facilitate economic stagnation by bridging the gap between a puddle of unrewarding savings and a mountain of unproductive speculations. So our hope this year is for a return to a proper investment opportunity set - where saving is encouraged and rewarded by sufficiently high prospective returns, and the cost of capital is high enough to discourage high-risk, low-return investments and unsustainable fiscal deficits. The longer policy makers wait to begin the orderly restructuring of bad debt and overleveraged financial institutions, the greater the risk of a disorderly restructuring.
Europe Update
The Eurozone Purchasing Managers Index (Markit) is already well into recessionary territory. Notably, production and new orders continued to hit fresh lows in the latest report - the slight uptick in the index reflects only a slowing in the rate of decline. The accompanying commentary observed "Production declined for the fifth consecutive month. The fall was less sharp than the 29-month record seen in November, though it remained steep compared with previous downturns prior to the financial crisis. Output and new business fell across the consumer, investment and intermediate goods sectors, with the latter reporting the strongest declines in both cases. For the second consecutive month, all of the nations covered by the survey reported lower levels of output... the fall in production at euro area manufacturers reflected a seventh successive monthly decline in new orders received." Markit's chief economist noted that the latest data "suggests that operating capacity will be slashed in coming months unless demand revives."
Meanwhile, the European Central Bank is more tapped out than we suspect investors recognize. The balance sheet of the ECB now stands at about $3.55 trillion (2.73 trillion euros), compared with EU GDP of about $16 trillion. This puts the European monetary base at about 22% of EU GDP, which is even greater relative to the economy than the Fed's balance sheet ($2.97 trillion on $15 trillion of GDP as of December 28, which works out to 21 cents for every dollar of GDP). Forget the "zero bound" - given the bloated size of the ECB balance sheet, combined with the lack of credible safe-havens in Europe, distrust of the banking system, and an apparent aversion to cash-stuffed mattresses, German 3-month debt is now sporting a yield of -0.17%, which means that investors pay the German government for holding their money.
As noted in Why the ECB Won't, and Shouldn't Just Print (see the section on inflation and the value of fiat currencies), this expansion in the central bank's balance sheet is not necessarily inflationary provided that market participants are firmly convinced that it is temporary. The value of one unit of currency stems from the stream of transactional and value-storage "services" that the currency unit is expected to throw off over time (as measured against the marginal value of other goods and services). If a large volume of new currency is created, but only for a short period of time, the expected long-term value of the existing currency stock is not seriously diluted, and you shouldn't expect to see inflation. It's when the currency creation is effectively permanent that you see large dilution of the value of existing currency units, which is another name for inflation. The ECB will not purchase unlimited amounts of distressed European debt precisely because nobody would expect the ECB to have the ability to reverse the transaction, and worse, if the debt were to default, the result would be immediate and rapid inflation because the money stock would suddenly be viewed as permanently high.
In lieu of printing euros to buy distressed debt, the ECB initiated a massive round of 3-year loans to European banks last month, taking securities from those banks as collateral. It's important to recognize that the ECB does not take credit risk by doing this. Regardless of how the collateral fluctuates in value, the ECB has a claim to repayment of the original loan, plus interest, and that claim stands ahead of the claims of existing bank bondholders and certainly stockholders.
While some observers hope that the massive round of ECB loans to European banks will spur bank purchases of distressed European debt in an attempt to "arbitrage" the higher interest rate on that debt against the 1% rate charged by the ECB, this really isn't what investors should expect. What's actually happening here is that European banks, already spectacularly over-leveraged against their own capital, can no longer successfully access the commercial paper markets for funds, so have had to turn to the ECB for this liquidity. The sheer size of the recent operation was not an indication of potential new bank demand for distressed European debt, but instead was an indication of how strapped the market for short-term and unsecured funding has become for European banks. Moreover, the whole "arbitrage" idea is flawed in the sense that it implies that the capital shortfall of European banks can reliably be bridged out of the pockets of the most distressed EU member countries.
Let's be clear about this - if European banks were to use the funds from the ECB to make significant new purchases of European debt, their capital ratios would become further strained, their portfolios would become more unbalanced, the market for new short-term and long-term bank funding would become even more deserted, and the timeline for European bank receivership and restructuring (a phrase that we prefer to "failure") would simply be accelerated.
I expect that we will see some further progress toward a "fiscal union" among European member states, but without explicit changes to the EU Treaties ratified by all of its members, we will not see any move toward unlimited ECB buying of European debt. At best, the ECB will act as a collateral-taking intermediary in an attempt to ease increasingly frequent liquidity strains in the banking system. On fiscal union, the real issue is credibility - how do you really impose fines and other penalties against countries who are already unable to pay their bills? In the end, hopefully sooner than later, it would be best for European member states to begin adding convertibility clauses into their debt, giving them the option to convert the debt from the euro into their legacy currencies. This would substitute credible market discipline for ineffective political sticks, and given that the average maturity of European debt is only about 7 years, much of it front-loaded, it would also remove the specter of massive sovereign defaults within a fairly short period of time.
That said, it is important to remember that the attempt to rescue distressed European debt by imposing heavy austerity on European people is largely driven by the desire to rescue bank bondholders from losses. Had banks not taken on spectacular amounts of leverage (encouraged by a misguided regulatory environment that required zero capital to be held against sovereign debt), European budget imbalances would have bit far sooner, and would have provoked corrective action years ago. The global economy has not been well-served by the financial companies that leaders are trying so desperately to protect. Our vote is for receivership and restructuring so that losses can be taken by those who willingly accepted the risk of loss, and the legacy of bad investments and poor capital allocation doesn't have to be converted into a future of suppressed economic growth.

Saturday, October 29, 2011

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Monday, September 26, 2011

Threat to Bailout

Thursday, September 22, 2011

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Stocks Leap on Greek Denial of Imminent Default, Fall Back Following Sharp IMF Economic Downgrade of U.S., Europe

WASHINGTON (AP) -- The International Monetary Fund has sharply downgraded its outlook for the U.S. economy through 2012 because of weak growth and concern that Europe won't be able to solve its debt crisis.

The international lending organization expects the U.S. economy to grow just 1.5 percent this year and 1.8 percent in 2012. That's down from its June forecast of 2.5 percent in 2011 and 2.7 percent next year.

The IMF has also lowered its outlook for the 17 countries that use the euro. It predicts 1.6 percent growth this year and 1.1 percent next year, down from its June projections of 2 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively.

Monday, August 15, 2011

Stocks Climb the Wall of Worry

Bring it on!