Bad Collateral in Europe

Zero Hedge has been warning of this also. Dow down 130.

The Nightmare After Christmas

By Detlev Schlichter of The Cobden Center

The pathetic state of the global financial system was again on display this week. Stocks around the world go up when a major central bank pumps money into the financial system. They go down when the flow of money slows and when the intoxicating influence of the latest money injection wears off. Can anybody really take this seriously?
On Tuesday, the prospect of another gigantic cash infusion from the ECB’s printing press into Europe’s banking sector, which is in large part terminally ill but institutionally protected from dying, was enough to trigger the established Pavlovian reflexes among portfolio managers and traders.
None of this has anything to do with capitalism properly understood. None of this has anything to do with efficient capital allocation, with channelling savings into productive capital, or with evaluating entrepreneurship and rewarding innovation. This is the make-believe, get-rich-quick (or, increasingly, pretend-you-are-still-rich) world of state-managed fiat-money-socialism. The free market is dead. We just pretend it is still alive.
There are, of course those who are still under the illusion that this can go on forever. Or even that what we need is some shock-and-awe Über-money injection that will finally put an end to all that unhelpful worrying about excessive debt levels and overstretched balance sheets. Let’s print ourselves a merry little recovery.
How did Mr. Bernanke, the United States’ money-printer-in-chief put it in 2002? “Under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending…” (Italics mine.)
Well, I think governments and central banks will get even more determined in 2012. And it is going to end in a proper disaster.
Lender of all resorts
Last week in one of their articles on the euro-mess, the Wall Street Journal Europe repeated a widely shared myth about the ECB: “With Germany’s backing, the ECB has so far refused to become a lender of last resort, …” This is, of course, nonsense. Even the laziest of 2011 year-end reviews will show that the ECB is precisely that: A committed funder of states and banks. Like all other central banks, the ECB has one overriding objective: to create a constant flow of new fiat money and thus cheap credit to an overstretched banking sector and an out-of-control welfare state that can no longer be funded by the private sector. That is what the ECB’s role is. The ECB is lender of last resort, first resort, and soon every resort.
Let’s look at the facts. The ECB started 2011 with record low policy rates. In the spring it thought it appropriate to consider an exit strategy. The ECB conducted a number of moderate rate hikes that have by now all been reversed. By the beginning of 2012 the ECB’s policy rates are again where they were at the beginning of 2011, at record low levels.
So why was the springtime attempt at “rate normalization” aborted? Because of deflationary risks? Hardly. Inflation is at 3 percent and thus not only higher than at the start of the year but also above the ECB’s official target.
The reason was simply this: states and banks needed a lender of last resort. The private market had lost confidence in the ability (willingness?) of certain euro-zone governments to ever repay their massive and constantly growing debt load. Certain states were thus cut off from cheap funding. The resulting re-pricing of sovereign bonds hit the banks and made it more challenging for them to finance their excessive balance sheets with money from their usual sources, not least U.S. money market funds.
So, in true lender-of-last resort fashion, the ECB had to conduct a U-turn and put those printing presses into high gear to fund states and banks at more convenient rates. While in a free market, lending rates are the result of the bargaining between lenders and borrowers, in the state-managed fiat money system, politicians and bureaucrats define what constitutes “sustainable” and “appropriate” interest rates for states and banks. The central bank has to deliver.
The ECB has not only helped with lower rates. Its balance sheet has expanded over the year by at least €490 billion, and is thus 24% larger than at the start of the year. This does not even include this week’s cash binge. The ECB is funding ever more European banks and is accepting weaker collateral against its loans. Many of these banks would be bust by now were it not for the constant subsidy of cheap and unlimited ECB credit. If that does not define a lender of last resort, what does?
And as I pointed out recently, the ECB’s self-imposed limit of €20 billion in weekly government bond purchases (an exercise in market manipulation and subsidization of spendthrift governments but shamelessly masked as an operation to allow for smooth transmission of monetary policy) is hardly a severe restriction. It would allow the ECB to expand its balance sheet by another €1 trillion a year. (The ECB is presently keeping its bond purchases well below €20 billion per week.)
Deflation? What deflation?
It is noteworthy that there still seems to be a widespread belief that all this money-printing will not lead to higher inflation because of the offsetting deflationary forces emanating from private bank deleveraging and fiscal austerity.
This is an argument I came across a lot when I had the chance in recent weeks to present the ideas behind my book to investors and hedge fund managers in London, Edinburgh and Milan. Indeed, even some of the people who share my outlook about the endgame of the fiat money system do believe that we could go through a period of falling prices first, at least for certain financial assets and real estate, before central bankers open the flood-gates completely and implement the type of no holds barred policy I mentioned above. Then, and only then will we see a dramatic rise in inflation expectations, a rise in money velocity and a sharp rise in official inflation readings.
Maybe. But I don’t think so. I consider it more likely that we go straight to higher inflation.
The deleveraging in the banking sector is the equivalent of austerity in the public sector: it is an idea. A promise. The reflationary policy of the central bank is a fact. And that policy actively works against private bank deleveraging and public sector debt reduction.
Consider this: The present credit crisis started in 2007. Yet, none of the major economies registered deflation. All are experiencing inflation, often above target levels and often rising. In the euro-area, over the past twelve months, the official inflation rate increased from 2 percent to 3 percent.
From the start of 2011 to the beginning of this month, the U.S. Federal Reserve boosted the monetary base by USD 560 billion, or 27 percent. So far this year, M1 increased by 17.5 percent and M2 by 9.5 percent.
Below is the so-called “true money supply” for the U.S. calculated by the Mises Institute.

As the Mises-Institute’s Doug French pointed out, total assets held by the six biggest banks in the U.S. increased by 39% over the past 5 years. Maybe this is not surprising given that in our brave new world of limitless fiat money, credit contraction is strictly verboten.
In the UK the official inflation reading is at around 5 percent, but nevertheless in October the Bank of England embarked on another round of “quantitative easing”. It has so far expanded its balance sheet by another £50 billion in not even three months, which constitutes balance sheet growth of about 20 percent.
What we have experienced in the UK in 2011 provides a good forecast in my view for the entire Western world for 2012: rising unemployment, weak or no growth, failure of the government to rein in spending, growing public debt, further expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet, rising inflation.
Death of a safe haven
And what about Switzerland? Here the central bank expanded its balance sheet by 40 percent over just the first three quarters of the year, and almost tripled the monetary base over the same period of time. Most of this even occurred before the 6^th of September, the day on which Mr. Hildebrand, the President of the Swiss National Bank, told the world and his fellow Swiss countrymen and women that the whole safe-haven idea was rubbish and that Switzerland was now joining the global fiat money race to the bottom.
Deflation has become the bogeyman of the policy establishment. It must be avoided at all cost! Of course for most of us regular folks deflation would simply mean a tendency toward lower prices. It would mean that the capacity of the capitalist economy to increase the productivity of labour through the accumulation of capital and to thus make things more affordable over time (a true measure of rising general wealth) would accurately be reflected in falling nominal prices. The purchasing power of money would increase over time. This, however, would require a form of hard and apolitical money. Instead we are constantly told that our economy needs never-ending monetary debasement in order to function properly. We are constantly told to fear nothing more than deflation, which can only be averted by a determined government and a determined central bank. And the never-ending supply of new fiat money.
Appropriately, there is no talk of exit strategies any longer.
Given the size of the already accumulated imbalances I think a stop to this madness of fiat money creation would be painful at first but hugely beneficial in the long run. I am the last to say that no risk of a very painful deflationary correction exists. But a correction is now unavoidable in any case, and every other policy option will make the endgame only worse. Even if I am wrong on the near-term outlook on inflation and even if all this money-printing does not lead to higher inflation readings imminently, it will still be a hugely disruptive policy. Money injections obstruct the dissolution of imbalances and invariably add new imbalances to the economy, including new debt and capital misallocations, that will make even more aggressive money printing necessary in the future.
The nationalization of money and credit
Herein lies a fundamental contradiction in our present system: The desire for constant inflation and constant credit expansion requires that the banks be shielded from the effects of their own business errors. Allowing capitalism’s most efficient regulators, profit and loss, to do the regulating, would mean that banks could face the risk of bankruptcy – this is, of course, the ultimate disciplinary force in capitalism. This could then lead to balance sheet correction and thus periods of deflation. Ergo, banks cannot be capitalist enterprises at full risk of bankruptcy as long as constant credit growth and inflation are the overriding policy goals. The constant growth of the banking sector must be guaranteed by the state through the unlimited provision of bank reserves from a lender-of-last resort central bank.
That banks get ever bigger, that they routinely hand out multi-million dollar bonuses, and that they frequently get bailed out, is not a result of the greed of the bankers – a stupid explanation anyway, only satisfactory to the intellectually challenged and perennially envious – but is integral to the fiat money system.
Banking under state protection ultimately means banking under state control. In the end it means state banking. And this is where we are going.
Last week the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England announced plans to tighten the control over the balance sheet management and the risk-taking of private banks. This is just the beginning, believe me. The nationalization of money and credit will intensify in 2012 and beyond. More regulation, more restriction, more control. Not only in defence of the bankrupt banks but also the bankrupt state. We will see curbs on trading, short-selling restrictions and various forms of capital controls.
A system of state fiat money is incompatible with capitalism. As the end of the present fiat money system is fast approaching the political class and the policy bureaucracy will try and defend it with everything at their disposal. For the foreseeable future, capitalism will, sadly, be the loser.
The conclusion from everything we have seen in 2011 is unquestionably that the global monetary system is on thin ice. Whether the house of cards will come tumbling down in 2012 nobody can say. When concerns about the fundability of the state and the soundness of fiat money, fully justified albeit still strangely subdued, finally lead to demands for higher risk premiums, upward pressure on interest rates will build. This will threaten the overextended credit edifice and will probably be countered with more aggressive central bank intervention. That is when it will get really interesting.
We live in dangerous times. Stay safe and enjoy the holidays.
In the meantime, the debasement of paper money continues.

Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis "Is Here to Stay"

by Felix Salmon at Reuters:

“By this time next week,” says Simone Foxman, “the euro crisis could be over”; she obviously doesn’t think much of Fitch’s analysis, which concludes that “a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the eurozone crisis is technically and politically beyond reach”.
I’m with Fitch on this one. But it’s worth looking at the bull case for the eurozone, as spelled out by the likes of Foxman and Tyler Cowen. At heart, it’s pretty simple:

1. The way to solve the euro crisis, at least for the next couple of years, is for the ECB to act as a lender of last resort.
2. The ECB is, quietly, doing just that — specifically by lending money for as long as three years against a much wider range of collateral than it accepted in the past.
3. Even though that money is going to banks rather than sovereigns, the banks will borrow as much as they can, at interest rates of about 1%, and invest the proceeds in Spanish and Italian debt yielding more like 6%, in a massive carry trade.
4. Which means that the ECB is, effectively, printing hundreds of billions of euros and lending it to distressed European sovereigns after all.

This, at least, is how Nicolas Sarkozy has been spinning things:

“Italian banks will be able to borrow [from the ECB] at 1 per cent, while the Italian state is borrowing at 6-7 per cent. It doesn’t take a finance specialist to see that the Italian state will be able to ask Italian banks to finance part of the government debt at a much lower rate.”

But look at the headline of the article that quote appears in: “EU banks slash sovereign holdings”. Here’s a taster:

Europe’s banks have slashed their holdings of sovereign debt issued by the peripheral nations of the eurozone, selling €65bn of it in just nine months…
BNP Paribas cut its holdings by the most, shedding nearly €7bn of the sovereign debt of Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain and leaving it with €28.7bn as at end-September. Deutsche Bank’s €6bn reduction was by far the biggest in percentage terms (66 per cent) and left the bank with just €3.2bn of GIIPS exposure.

My feeling is that, at the margin, banks are going to continue to reduce their holdings of PIIGS debt, rather than decide to follow in the footsteps of MF Global. But don’t take my word for it:

Senior bankers say they will cut further, despite pressure to use newly available, longer-term ECB loans to buy government debt as part of an officially-sanctioned carry trade.
“When investors are constantly asking what you have on your books and the board is asking you to reduce your exposure, it doesn’t really matter about the economics of the trade,” said the treasurer of one of Europe’s biggest banks. “Am I going to buy Italian bonds? No.”
That view echoes comments from UniCredit chief executive Federico Ghizzoni, who this week told reporters at a banking conference that using ECB money to buy government debt “wouldn’t be logical”. The bank had traditionally been one of the biggest buyers of Italian government bonds, with almost €50bn on its books.

Cowen says that “public choice mechanisms will operate so that desperate governments commandeer their banks to make this move, whether the banks ideally would wish to or not” — and normally I’d be inclined to agree with him. Sovereign borrowing always crowds out other forms of bank lending, when a national government decides it really needs the money.
But in this case, it’s not going to happen. Why? For one thing, the main tool that governments can use has already been deployed: if banks load up on sovereign debt, it carries a lower risk weighting under Basel rules and therefore makes their risk-adjusted capital ratios look more attractive. But that’s been the case for decades now, and it can’t be beefed up at all. Meanwhile, bank regulators and investors are looking at a lot of other ratios too, like total leverage. And as we saw with MF Global, they’re hyper-aware of European sovereign exposures these days. Any bank wanting to be considered healthy will stay well away from Spanish and Italian debt.
On top of that, the financing needs of Spain and Italy are much bigger than their respective national banks can fill — especially in the context of those banks trying to deleverage, and seeing their deposit bases move steadily to safer European countries. While national governments are reasonably good at twisting the arms of their own domestic banks and forcing those banks to lend to their sovereigns, they’re much less good at twisting the arms of foreign banks and getting them to do the same thing. Is there any way at all for the Italian government to persuade French banks to lend to it? No.
And more generally, the national debt of big European sovereigns like Italy and Spain is so enormous that it has to be held broadly, in bonded form, by individuals and institutions. Banks alone won’t suffice. Greece is small enough that most of its debt can be held by banks. Italy, not so much.
There’s an argument that it doesn’t really matter whether the banks buy Italian and Spanish debt or not: the main thing that matters is that the ECB is printing money, which is entering the system via the banking system, and which will ultimately find its way into sovereign coffers one way or another, especially since there’s precious little demand for commercial bank loans these days. But I don’t buy it: there’s a virtually infinite number of potential investment opportunities around the world, and there’s no good reason to believe that the ECB’s cash is going to wind up funding Italy’s deficit rather than, say, getting invested in Facebook stock.
If Europe’s banks use ECB cash to deleverage and buy back their own high-yielding debt securities, the investors getting that money are not going to automatically buy sovereign bonds with the proceeds. Especially since those investors don’t care at all about Basel risk weightings.
So much as I’d love Sarko’s dream to come true, I don’t think it’s going to happen. The eurozone’s sovereign crisis is here to stay.

ECB Pours Cold Water on Stocks

It's All About Europe

Germany Just Says "No" to More EU Bailouts

Germany stiffened its opposition to expanding government-financed aid for debt-plagued euro nations, leaving the European Central Bank to shoulder the bulk of the burden of fighting the crisis.
With Chancellor Angela Merkel ruling out an increase in the euro area’s 750 billion-euro ($1 trillion) emergency fund, Germany yesterday put the spotlight on the ECB by endorsing a possible boost in its capital.
Discord between Merkel and ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet and Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker on the eve of a European Union summit evokes the tensions during the first phase of the debt crisis, when Germany held out for more than two months before consenting to a loan package for Greece.
“The consequence is a stalemate that leaves us with a familiar sense of déjà vu,” Ken Wattret, chief euro-area economist at BNP Paribas SA in London, said in a note to investors. “Market tensions are likely to resurface, as governments remain very publicly divided on the appropriate way forward.”
The euro weakened after Moody’s Investors Service said today it may cut Spain’s Aa1 credit rating. The country lost its top rating in September. The currency declined 0.4 percent to $1.3321 at 12:32 p.m. in Berlin.
The review is “not good for spreads or the euro,” Charles Diebel, head of market strategy at Lloyds TSB Corporate Bank in London, wrote in an e-mailed note.
Spreading Contagion
Evidence that core countries in Europe are also at risk mounted yesterday when Standard & Poor’s cut the debt outlook for Belgium, which is stuck with a caretaker government six months after inconclusive elections. Belgian bonds fell, pushing the risk premium against comparable German notes up 2 basis points to 102 basis points.
“The main risk to economic recovery and the main risk to market performance in 2011 is the euro zone,” Andrew Popper, chief investment officer at SG Hambros Bank Ltd., said on Bloomberg Television’s “On The Move” with Francine Lacqua. “The euro zone will be the dominant problem.”
Merkel, in a speech laying out Germany’s position for the EU summit, said that “strict conditions” will be tied to aid for distressed countries under a planned permanent rescue system that leaders are set to discuss.
‘Last Resort’
“For me it’s important that financial aid will, also in the future, be granted only as a last resort,” Merkel told lower-house lawmakers in Berlin today.
EU leaders start a two-day summit at 5 p.m. in Brussels tomorrow with the focus on the permanent crisis-fighting system to be launched in 2013.
Proposals facing German resistance include using EU money to buy distressed governments’ bonds directly or in the secondary market, boosting the fund’s size or redrafting guarantee rules to make more of the money available.
The need for a cash buffer to maintain an AAA credit rating puts the bailout fund’s effective lending capacity as low as 230 billion euros. Abandoning the top rating isn’t up for discussion, an EU official said yesterday.
Leaders of the 16 euro governments continue to be prodded by Trichet and the International Monetary Fund, contributor of 250 billion euros to the European rescue packages.
Trichet said euro-area governments need to put more money on the table to halt the crisis instead of depending on the central bank to soothe markets by buying the bonds of distressed governments.
‘Maximum Flexibility’
“We’re calling for maximum flexibility and maximum capacity, quantitatively and qualitatively,” Trichet told reporters in Frankfurt in remarks released yesterday.
The ECB settled 2.667 billion euros of bond purchases last week, a 23-week high for a program without unanimous support on the bank’s council. With 72 billion euros of potentially loss- making bonds now on its books, the ECB may ask national central banks for more capital, an official with knowledge of the situation said yesterday.
The ECB’s other main crisis-fighting step is to provide unlimited liquidity for commercial banks, a policy it extended on Dec. 2 into the second quarter of 2011.
Germany, Europe’s largest economy and biggest contributor to aid packages for Greece and Ireland, is against tinkering with the 440 billion-euro European Financial Stability Facility, set up in May and underwritten by euro-area governments, a German official told reporters in Berlin yesterday.
Irish Banks
Ireland on Nov. 28 borrowed 17.7 billion euros from the facility as part of an 85 billion-euro package to plug the fiscal holes from the bursting of its property bubble and near- collapse of its banking system.
“These instruments are far from exhausted,” European Commission President Jose Barroso told the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France yesterday. “If need be, they can be improved and adapted much more quickly than any alternative.”
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn told euro-area finance ministers on Dec. 6 that they should disburse aid preemptively instead of waiting for a last-ditch request as happened with Ireland, an official familiar with the debate said yesterday.
In a side battle with a onetime ally, Merkel is also trying to muzzle proposals by Juncker for joint euro-region bond sales to create a more liquid market.
Juncker, head of the panel of euro-area finance ministers, called for European governments to pool borrowing for debt up to 40 percent of gross domestic product.
To provide an incentive to keep debt down, each country would have to finance borrowing above that limit on its own, incurring penalty interest rates, Juncker and Italian Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti proposed last week.
Merkel reiterated her opposition to euro-area bonds today, saying they “are not the answer” to Europe’s debt challenges.

ECB Initiates New Program of Quantitative Easing (Monetization of Eurozone Debt)

If the Eurozone Central Bank is so "confident" of growth as they say, then why would this be necessary at all? These are not the actions of confidence, but of desperation!

from EuroIntelligence.com:

So much for phasing out the bond purchasing programme. The latest weekly ECB data suggest that the ECB bought €237m worth sovereign bonds last week, the highest since the middle of August, according to the FT. Still small in absolute size, the paper notes, it is a sign of continuing problems in eurozone bond markets. Irish traders last week reported that the ECB had been in the market to support Irish bonds, whose yield spread to German bunds rose to new record levels. The article suggested that the ECB was also buying Greek and Portuguese bonds.

About that ECB’s exit strategy

Ralph Atkins and David Oakley have an excellent analysis in the FT about the change in the ECB’s exit strategy. While a year ago it was the conventional wisdom inside the ECB that the banking support policy would have to be phased out, and only then could interest rates rise. That is no longer so. As banks have become dependent on generous ECB liquidity support, it is possible that the monetary tightening occurs while the liquidity policies are still in place.

European Commission optimistic about eurozone

The European Commission published its autumn forecast and, as ever, the news coverage is taking a national angle on this. El Pais is worrying about increasing growth divergences in the eurozone, with Spain falling far behind Germany with its 3.4% growth rate. The Portuguese newspaper Negocios didn’t even bother to report about any other country but Portugal, reporting that the European Commission said that Portugal has “an opportunity to recover” but that it must “intensify consolidation”.    For the eurozone as a whole GDP is forecasted to rise 1.7% this year (rather than  a previously projected 0.9%). La Repubblica picks on the Commission’s warning that labour market dynamics are still fragile.

US Dollar: Fresh New Lows

The US Dollar today has once again sunk to fresh new lows, both as an all-time low and a new closing all-time low. There has been some tough talk this week by the Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank about intervening in the currency markets to prop up the Dollar, but with the tame CPI report earlier today, renewed certainty of fresh Fed rate cuts has resulted in the market ignoring threats, and the USD sinking to new lows today.