Gaping Hole In Europe's Deficit Expectations

The Eurozone's Constitution requires countries to keep their deficits below 3% of GDP. Nearly all of them have deficits higher than this amount. Spain's is more than 2 1/2 times that amount!

U.S. Debt and Where We Are Headed

by David Galland at Casey Research:

Tune into CNBC or click onto any of the dozens of mainstream financial news sites, and you’ll find an endless array of opinions on the latest wiggle in equity, bond and commodities markets. As often as not, you'll find those opinions nestled side by side with authoritative analysis on the outlook for the economy, complete with the author’s carefully studied judgment on the best way forward.
Lost in all the noise, however, is any recognition that the US monetary system – and by extension, that of much of the developed world – may very well be on the verge of collapse. Falling back on metaphor, while the world’s many financial experts and economists sit around arguing about the direction of the ship of state, most are missing the point that the ship has already hit an iceberg and is taking on water fast.
Yet if you were to raise your hand to ask 99% of the financial intelligentsia whether we might be on the verge of a failure of the dollar-based world monetary system, the response would be thinly veiled derision. Because, as we all know, such a thing is unimaginable!
Think again.

Monetary Madness

Honestly describing the current monetary system of the United States in just a few words, you could do far worse than stating that it is“money from nothing, cash ex nihilo.”
That’s because for the last 40 years – since Nixon canceled the dollar’s gold convertibility in 1971 – the global monetary system has been based on nothing more tangible than politicians' promises not to print too much.
Unconstrained, the politicians used the gift of being able to create money out of nothing to launch a parade of politically popular programs, each employing fresh brigades of bureaucrats, with no regard to affordability.
Such programs invariably surged during political campaigns and on downward slopes in the business cycle when politicians hearing the cries of the constituency to “do something” tossed any concern about balancing budgets out the window of expediency. After all, the power to print up the funds for debt service whenever needed makes moot any concern over deficit spending.
Former VP Cheney, who fashions himself a fiscal conservative, let the mask drop when, in 2002, he stated that “Reagan proved deficits don’t matter.”
Those words were echoed just a few weeks ago, when both former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and Obama economic advisor Larry Summers, in separate interviews, said almost the same, paraphrased as, “There is no chance of the US defaulting on its bonds, not when our government can borrow dollars and print new dollars to meet any future obligations.”
Of course, Greenspan and Summers were referring to an overt default – of just not paying – and not to a covert default engineered by inflation. Unfortunately, like virtually all of the power elite, both miss the point that the mountain of debt that has been heaped up since 1971 is fast reaching the point of collapsing like a too-big tailings pile and taking the monetary system down with it.

Importantly, the debt shown in this chart whistles past the government's unfunded liabilities, in particular for the Social Security and Medicare systems. Adding those would more than triple the US government’s acknowledged obligations – to over $60 trillion.
Given the role the US dollar plays as the world’s de facto reserve currency – with all major commodities priced in dollars, and dollars forming the bulk of reserves held by foreign central banks –the dismal shape of the US monetary system spells trouble for the global monetary system.
Making matters worse, following the lead of the United States, governments around the world long ago adopted similar fiat monetary systems. You can see the deficit contagion in this next chart. It is worth noting that the dire condition of the United States now leaves it in the same muddy wallow as Europe’s desperate PIIGS.

In a recent article

 

in The Telegraph, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard referenced a paper out of the BIS that paints the picture using appropriately stark terms. Stephen Cecchetti and his team at the Bank for International Settlements have written the definitive paper rebutting the pied pipers of ever-escalating credit.
“The debt problems facing advanced economies are even worse than we thought.”
The basic facts are that combined debt in the rich club has risen from 165pc of GDP thirty years ago to 310pc today, led by Japan at 456pc and Portugal at 363pc.
“Debt is rising to points that are above anything we have seen, except during major wars. Public debt ratios are currently on an explosive path in a number of countries. These countries will need to implement drastic policy changes. Stabilization might not be enough.”
Viewing the situation from another perspective, we turn to the work of Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, who studied the factors contributing to 29 past sovereign defaults. They found that default or debt restructuring occurred, on average, when external debt reached 73% of gross national product (GNP) and 239% of exports. Using the Reinhart/Rogoff findings, Casey Research Chief Economist Bud Conrad prepared the following chart showing that the US government is already far along on the path to bankruptcy.

It’s hard to argue against the contention that the situation is, to be polite, precarious. Given that the obligations of the US government, as well as most of the world’s other large economies, are now impossible to repay and that their reserves are just IOUs backed by nothing, the stage is set for a highly disruptive but entirely necessary do-over of the fiat monetary system.
“Preposterous!” say the lords of finance and masters of all.
Is it?
Of course, these very same mavens completely missed the looming housing crash and the depth and duration of the subsequent crisis – a crisis that is still far from over. In other words, listen to them at your peril, because in our view it’s essential in calibrating your financial affairs to understand that, if history is any guide, we are now well down the road to a collapse in the monetary system.
In fact, over its relatively short history, the US monetary system has come unglued time and time again thanks to politically expedient attempts to interfere with the workings of a free market in order to reward constituents or kick the can on the economic problems of the day down the road.
Thus it is our contention that while the mainstream media focus on the daily gyrations of equity markets or the futile political charade that is Washington, they overlook powerful tectonic rumblings indicating the world’s prevailing monetary system is about to fracture.

A Brief Timeline of US Monetary System Failures

Here’s a brief history of past disruptions here in the United States. Importantly, with the US dollar now the de facto reserve currency of the world, this time around it’s global.
1861 –When the Civil War begins, the dollar is convertible into gold and silver.
1862 –Congress passes the Legal Tender Act and authorizes the issuance of non-redeemable "Greenback" currency. Convertibility into gold and silver is suspended for all US currency.
1863 –National Banking Act authorizes the chartering of banks by the federal government.
1865 – A 10% tax is levied on the issuance of bank notes by state-chartered banks, effectively ending that practice.
1879 –The US Treasury resumes redeeming dollars for gold and silver.

1900 – Passage of the Gold Standard Act, adopting the gold standard by the United States and demonetizing silver.
Specifically, the act provided for "...the dollar consisting of twenty-five and eight-tenths grains (1.67 g) of gold nine-tenths fine, as established by section thirty-five hundred and eleven of the Revised Statutes of the United States, shall be the standard unit of value, and all forms of money issued or coined by the United States shall be maintained at a parity of value with this standard..."
But 33 years later, to gain the power to inflate the currency and collect the profit from doing so…
1933 – By executive order, Franklin Roosevelt prohibits the private ownership of gold. Congress passes the Gold Reserve Act, which enacts Roosevelt's executive order, abrogates all gold clauses in all contracts public or private, past or future (which cancels the convertibility of Federal Reserve notes into gold), though it confirms the convertibility of US Treasury notes held by foreigners into gold. Eleven years later, the US government takes its show on the road…
1944 – Bretton Woods system adopted with signature countries agreeing to tie the exchange rates of their currencies to the US dollar, which itself is linked to a fixed price of gold. Foreign trading partners retained the right to swap dollars for gold, imposing a de facto restraint on printing more dollars. For all intents and purposes, the US dollar becomes the world’s reserve currency. But 27 years later…
1971 – Nixon abruptly closes the “gold window,” unilaterally reneging on the Treasury's promise to allow foreign governments to redeem dollars for gold. Bretton Woods collapses. With no remaining tie to a tangible, the dollar is reduced to a paper token. The transition to a global fiat monetary system is complete.
Until 40 years go by and the inevitable consequences of giving politicians free rein over money creation become untenable…
Present day – Sovereign debt crisis. Desperate, debt-laden governments around the globe – the bulk of their reserves composed of fiat US dollars and euros at risk of going up in smoke – turn to the only thing they know, printing more money and issuing yet more debt. The global monetary system cracks and heads toward failure with no workable alternative on the horizon.
Governments, corporations and investors alike are caught unprepared in the downward spiral of failing fiat currencies and are wiped out by a combination of frantic currency debasements, higher taxation, exchange controls and worse. Social unrest spreads, with the public paradoxically demanding that governments do more, not less.
That’s because all the world’s major currencies are at risk, simultaneously, as the issuers engage in a dangerous race to the bottom. As the monetary system moves inexorably toward terminal debasement and collapse, the results will be catastrophic for the unprepared.
Importantly, while the list of historical attempts to re-jigger the US monetary system have, to this point, more or less succeeded in kicking the can a bit further down the road, the sheer scale of today’s government obligations has driven us into a box canyon, with no way out. As the government’s debt and spending obligations are mathematically impossible to resolve, it is now a certainty that a lot of people are going to wake up one morning to the reality that they are a lot poorer than they thought.
Fortunately for those now paying attention, the collapse of a monetary system doesn't happen in a flash. It is a progression, like the spiral of water down a drain. Thus, while no one can predict exactly when the downward spiral will accelerate out of control, there is still time to prepare.

Three Competing Economic Theories

By Lacy Hunt, Hoisington Asset Management
The three competing theories for economic contractions are: 1) the Keynesian, 2) the Friedmanite, and 3) the Fisherian. The Keynesian view is that normal economic contractions are caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand (or total spending). This problem is to be solved by deficit spending. The Friedmanite view, one shared by our current Federal Reserve Chairman, is that protracted economic slumps are also caused by an insufficiency of aggregate demand, but are preventable or ameliorated by increasing the money stock. Both economic theories are consistent with the widely-held view that the economy experiences three to seven years of growth, followed by one to two years of decline. The slumps are worrisome, but not too daunting since two years lapse fairly quickly and then the economy is off to the races again. This normal business cycle framework has been the standard since World War II until now.
The Fisherian theory is that an excessive buildup of debt relative to GDP is the key factor in causing major contractions, as opposed to the typical business cycle slumps (Chart 1). Only a time consuming and difficult process of deleveraging corrects this economic circumstance. Symptoms of the excessive indebtedness are: weakness in aggregate demand; slow money growth; falling velocity; sustained underperformance of the labor markets; low levels of confidence; and possibly even a decline in the birth rate and household formation. In other words, the normal business cycle models of the Keynesian and Friedmanite theories are overwhelmed in such extreme, overindebted situations.

Economists are aware of Fisher’s views, but until the onset of the present economic circumstances they have been largely ignored, even though Friedman called Irving Fisher “America’s greatest economist.” Part of that oversight results from the fact that Fisher’s position was not spelled out in one complete work. The bulk of his ideas are reflected in an article and book written in 1933, but he made important revisions in a series of letters later written to FDR, which currently reside in the Presidential Library at Hyde Park. In 1933, Fisher held out some hope that fiscal policy might be helpful in dealing with excessive debt, but within several years he had completely rejected the Keynesian view. By 1940, Fisher had firmly stated to FDR in several letters that government spending of borrowed funds was counterproductive to stimulating economic growth. Significantly, by 2011, Fisher’s seven decade-old ideas have been supported by thorough, comprehensive and robust econometric and empirical analysis. It is now evident that the actions of monetary and fiscal authorities since 2008 have made economic conditions worse, just as Fisher suggested. In other words, we are painfully re-learning a lesson that a truly great economist gave us a road map to avoid.

High Dollar Policy Failures

If governmental financial transactions, advocated by following Keynesian and Friedmanite policies, were the keys to prosperity, the U.S. should be in an unparalleled boom. For instance, on the monetary side, since 2007 excess reserves of depository institutions have increased from $1.8 billion to more than $1.5 trillion, an amazing gain of more than 83,000%. The fiscal response is equally unparalleled. Combining 2009, 2010, and 2011 the U.S. budget deficit will total 28.3% of GDP, the highest three year total since World War II, and up from 6.3% of GDP in the three years ending 2008 (Chart 2). Importantly, the massive advance in the deficit was primarily due to a surge in outlays that was more than double the fall in revenues. In the current three years, spending was an astounding $2.2 trillion more than in the three years ending 2008. The fiscal and monetary actions combined have had no meaningful impact on improving the standard of living of the average American family (Chart 3).

Why Has Fiscal Policy Failed?

Four considerations, all drawn from contemporary economic analysis, explain the underlying cause of the fiscal policy failures and clearly show that continuing to repeat such programs will generate even more unsatisfactory results.
First, the government expenditure multiplier is zero, and quite possibly slightly negative. Depending on the initial conditions, deficit spending can increase economic activity, but only for a mere three to five quarters. Within twelve quarters these early gains are fully reversed. Thus, if the economy starts with $15 trillion in GDP and deficit spending is increased, then it will end with $15 trillion of GDP within three years. Reflecting the deficit spending, the government sector takes over a larger share of economic activity, reducing the private sector share while saddling the same-sized economy with a higher level of indebtedness. However, the resources to cover the interest expense associated with the rise in debt must be generated from a diminished private sector.
The problem is not the size or the timing of the actions, but the inherent flaws in the approach. Indeed, rigorous, independently produced statistical studies by Robert Barro of Harvard University in the United States and Roberto Perotti of Universita Bocconi in Italy were uncannily accurate in suggesting the path of failure that these programs would take. From 1955 to 2006, Dr. Barro estimates the expenditure multiplier at -0.1 (p. 206 Macroeconomics: A Modern Approach, Southwestern 2009). Perotti, a MIT Ph.D., found a low but positive multiplier in the U.S., U.K., Japan, Germany, Australia and Canada. Worsening the problem, most of those who took college economic courses assume that propositions learned decades ago are still valid. Unfortunately, new tests and the availability of more and longer streams of macroeconomic statistics have rendered many of the well-schooled propositions of the past five decades invalid.Second, temporary tax cuts enlarge budget deficits but they do not change behavior, providing no meaningful boost to economic activity. Transitory tax cuts have been enacted under Presidents Ford, Carter, Bush (41), Bush (43), and Obama. No meaningful difference in the outcome was observable, regardless of whether transitory tax cuts were in the form of rebate checks, earned income tax credits, or short-term changes in tax rates like the one year reduction in FICA taxes or the two year extension of the 2001/2003 tax cuts, both of which are currently in effect. Long run studies of consumer spending habits (the consumption function in academic circles), as well as detailed examinations of these separate episodes indicate that such efforts are a waste of borrowed funds. This is because while consumers will respond strongly to permanent or sustained increases in income, the response to transitory gains is insignificant. The cut in FICA taxes appears to have been a futile effort since there was no acceleration in economic growth, and the unfunded liabilities in the Social Security system are now even greater. Cutting payroll taxes for a year, as former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers advocates, would be no more successful, while further adding to the unfunded Social Security liability.
Third, when private sector tax rates are changed permanently behavior is altered, and according to the best evidence available, the response of the private sector is quite large. For permanent tax changes, the tax multiplier is between minus 2 and minus 3. If higher taxes are used to redress the deficit because of the seemingly rational need to have“shared sacrifice,” growth will be impaired even further. Thus, attempting to reduce the budget deficit by hiking marginal tax rates will be counterproductive since economic activity will deteriorate and revenues will be lost.
Fourth, existing programs suggest that more of the federal budget will go for basic income maintenance and interest expense; therefore the government expenditure multiplier may become more negative. Positive multiplier expenditures such as military hardware, space exploration and infrastructure programs will all become a smaller part of future budgets. Even the multiplier of such meritorious programs may be much less than anticipated since the expended funds for such programs have to come from somewhere, and it is never possible to identify precisely what private sector program will be sacrificed so that more funds would be available for federal spending. Clearly, some programs like the first-time home buyers program and cash for clunkers had highly negative side effects. Both programs only further exacerbated the problems in the auto and housing markets.

Permanent Fiscal Solutions Versus Quick Fixes

While the fiscal steps have been debilitating, new programs could improve business considerably over time. A federal tax code with rates of 15%, 20%, and 25% for both the household and corporate sectors, but without deductions, would serve several worthwhile purposes. Such measures would be revenue neutral, but at the same time they would lower the marginal tax rates permanently which, over time, would provide a considerable boost for economic growth. Moreover, the private sector would save $400-$500 billion of tax preparation expenses that could then be channeled to other uses. Admittedly, the path to such changes would entail a long and difficult political debate.
In the 2011 IMF working paper, “An Analysis of U.S. Fiscal and Generational Imbalances,” authored by Nicoletta Batini, Giovanni Callegari, and Julia Guerreiro, the options to correct the problem are identified thoroughly. These authors enumerate the ways to close the gaps under different scenarios in what they call “Menu of Pain.” Rather than lacking the knowledge to improve the economic situation, there may not be the political will to deal with the problems because of their enormity and the huge numbers of Americans who would be required to share in the sacrifices. If this assessment is correct, the U.S. government will not act until a major emergency arises.

The Debt Bomb

The two major U.S. government debt to GDP statistics commonly referred to in budget discussions are shown in Chart 4. The first is the ratio of U.S. debt held by the public to GDP, which excludes federal debt held in various government entities such as Social Security and the Federal Reserve banks. The second is the ratio of gross U.S. debt to GDP. Historically, the debt held by the public ratio was the more useful, but now the gross debt ratio is more relevant. By 2015, according to the CBO, debt held by the public will jump to more than 75% of GDP, while gross debt will exceed 104% of GDP. The CBO figures may be too optimistic. The IMF estimates that gross debt will amount to 110% of GDP by 2015, and others have even higher numbers. The gross debt ratio, however, does not capture the magnitude of the approaching problem.

According to a recent report in USA Today, the unfunded liabilities in the Social Security and Medicare programs now total $59.1 trillion. This amounts to almost four times current GDP. Modern accrual accounting requires corporations to record expenses at the time the liability is incurred, even when payment will be made later. But this is not the case for the federal government. By modern private sector accounting standards, gross federal debt is already 500% of GDP.

Federal Debt – the End Game

Economic research on U.S. Treasury credit worthiness is of significant interest to Hoisington Management because it is possible that if nothing is politically accomplished in reducing our long-term debt liabilities, a large risk premium could be established in Treasury securities. It is not possible to predict whether this will occur in five years, twenty years, or longer. However, John H. Cochrane of the University of Chicago, and currently President of the American Finance Association, spells out the end game if the deficits and debt are not contained. Dr. Cochrane observes that real, or inflation adjusted Federal government debt, plus the liabilities of the Federal Reserve (which are just another form of federal debt) must be equal to the present value of future government surpluses (Table 1). In plain language, you owe a certain amount of money so your income in the future should equal that figure on a present value basis. Federal Reserve liabilities are also known as high powered money (the sum of deposits at the Federal Reserve banks plus currency in circulation). This proposition is critical because it means that when the Fed buys government securities it has merely substituted one type of federal debt for another. In quantitative easing (QE), the Fed purchases Treasury securities with an average maturity of about four years and replaces it with federal obligations with zero maturity. Federal Reserve deposits and currency are due on demand, and as economists say, they are zero maturity money. Thus, QE shortens the maturity of the federal debt but, as Dr. Cochrane points out, the operation has merely substituted one type for another. The sum of the two different types of liabilities must equal the present value of future governmental surpluses since both the Treasury and Fed are components of the federal government.

Calculating the present value of the stream of future surpluses requires federal outlays and expenditures and the discount rate at which the dollar value of that stream is expressed in today’s real dollars. The formula where all future liabilities must equal future surpluses must always hold. At the point that investors lose confidence in the dollar stream of future surpluses, the interest rate, or discount rate on that stream, will soar in order to keep the present value equation in balance. The surge in the discount rate is likely to result in a severe crisis like those that occurred in the past and that currently exist in Europe. In such a crisis the U.S. will be forced to make extremely difficult decisions in a very short period of time, possibly without much input from the political will of American citizens. Dr. Cochrane does not believe this point is at hand, and observes that Japan has avoided this day of reckoning for two decades. The U.S. may also be able to avoid this, but not if the deficits and debt problem are not corrected. Our interpretation of Dr. Cochrane’s analysis is that, although the U.S. has time, not to urgently redress these imbalances is irresponsible and begs for an eventual crisis.

Monetary Policy’s Numerous Misadventures

Fed policy has aggravated, rather than ameliorated our basic problems because it has encouraged an unwise and debilitating buildup of debt, while also pursuing short term policies that have increased inflation, weakened economic growth, and decreased the standard of living. No objective evidence exists that QE has improved economic conditions. Even before the Japanese earthquake and weather related problems arose this spring, real economic growth was worse than prior to QE2. Some measures of nominal activity improved, but these gains were more than eroded by the higher commodity inflation. Clearly, the median standard of living has deteriorated.
When the Fed diverts attention with QE, it is possible to lose sight of the important deficit spending, tax and regulatory barriers that are restraining the economy’s ability to grow. Raising expectations that Fed actions can make things better is a disservice since these hopes are bound to be dashed. There is ample evidence that such a treadmill serves to make consumers even more cynical and depressed. To quote Dr. Cochrane, “Mostly, it is dangerous for the Fed to claim immense power, and for us to trust that power when it is basically helpless. If Bernanke had admitted to Congress, ‘There’s nothing the Fed can do. You’d better clean this mess up fast,’ he might have a much more salutary effect.” Instead, Bernanke wrote newspaper editorials, gave speeches, and appeared on national television taking credit for improved economic conditions. In all instances these claims about the Fed’s power were greatly exaggerated.

Summary and Outlook

In the broadest sense, monetary and fiscal policies have failed because government financial transactions are not the key to prosperity. Instead, the economic well-being of a country is determined by the creativity, inventiveness and hard work of its households and individuals.
A meaningful risk exists that the economy could turn down prior to the general election in 2012, even though this would be highly unusual for presidential election years. The econometric studies that indicate the government expenditure multiplier is zero are evidenced by the prevailing, dismal business conditions. In essence, the massive federal budget deficits have not produced economic gain, but have left the country with a massively inflated level of debt and the prospect of higher interest expense for decades to come. This will be the case even if interest rates remain extremely low for the foreseeable future. The flow of state and local tax revenues will be unreliable in an environment of weak labor markets that will produce little opportunity for full time employment. Thus, state and local governments will continue to constrain the pace of economic expansion. Unemployment will remain unacceptably high and further increases should not be ruled out. The weak labor markets could in turn force home prices lower, another problematic development in current circumstances. Inflationary forces should turn tranquil, thereby contributing to an elongated period of low bond yields. The Fed may resort to another round of quantitative easing, or some other untested gimmick with a new name. Such undertakings will be no more successful than previous efforts that increased over-indebtedness or raised transitory inflation, which in turn weakened the economy by directly, or indirectly, intensifying financial pressures on households of modest and moderate means.
While the massive budget deficits and the buildup of federal debt, if not addressed, may someday result in a substantial increase in interest rates, that day is not at hand. The U.S. economy is too fragile to sustain higher interest rates except for interim, transitory periods that have been recurring in recent years. As it stands, deflation is our largest concern, therefore we remain fully committed to the long end of the Treasury bond market.

Stagflation: Slowing Growth, High Inflation! Make Sure to Thank the Fed!

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – Economic growth braked sharply in the first quarter as higher food and gasoline prices dampened consumer spending and sent inflation rising at its fastest pace in 2-1/2 years.
Another report on Thursday showed a surprise jump in the number of Americans claiming unemployment benefits last week, which could cast a shadow on expectations for a significant pick-up in output in the second quarter.
Growth in gross domestic product slowed to a 1.8 percent annual rate after a 3.1 percent fourth-quarter pace, the Commerce Department said. Economists had expected a 2 percent pace.
With much of the pull back traced back to sharp cuts in defense spending and harsh winter weather, analysts were hopeful the economy would regain speed in the second quarter. The drop in defense spending was seen as temporary.
"Growth was disappointing given the momentum of the economy heading into the year. We are still of the belief that the economy will improve out of the soft patch through this quarter into the second half of the year," said Brian Levitt, an economist at OppenheimerFunds in New York.
Economists were encouraged that details of the report, in particular consumer spending and business outlays on software and equipment, were not as weak as they had feared and said this suggested a foundation for stronger growth was in place.
Consumer spending accounts for about 70 percent of U.S. economic activity.
LABOR MARKET WEAKNESS?
While a 25,000 rise in claims for state jobless benefits to 429,000 last week hinted at some weakening in the labor market, analysts cautioned against reading too much into the gain. They said severe weather in some parts of the country and the Easter holiday could have distorted the figure.
Still, the data suggested improvements in the labor market were still only coming grudgingly.
"The underlying downtrend in initial claims that had been in place since late last year has flattened out," said Omair Sharif, an economist at RBS in Stamford, Connecticut. But he added: "It seems a little too early to suggest that the underlying pace of layoffs has picked up."
Hiring accelerated in March and a report next week is expected to show job creation remained relatively robust in April.
MODERATE PACE
The weak GDP report and the Federal Reserve's stated commitment to a loose monetary policy stance after a two-day meeting on Wednesday drove the dollar to a three-year low against a basket of currencies.
But investors on Wall Street largely brushed it aside and pushed stocks higher. Prices for U.S. government debt rose.
The Fed on Wednesday trimmed its growth estimate for 2011 to between 3.1 and 3.3 percent from a 3.4 to 3.9 percent January projection.
Some economists felt the U.S. central bank's estimates might be a little optimistic, given the poor start to the year even though most agreed growth would soon strengthen.
Optimism the economy would find a firmer footing in the second quarter was bolstered by a report showing pending sales of previously owned homes rose 5.1 percent in March. Housing is struggling to recover and is one of the headwinds facing the economy.
Growth in the first quarter was curtailed by a sharp pull back in consumer spending, which expanded at a rate of 2.7 percent after a strong 4 percent rise in the fourth quarter.
Rising commodity prices meant consumers had less money to spend on other items. Gasoline prices remain a concern, even though they are expected to stabilize somewhat.
INFLATION RISING
The GDP report underscored the pain that strong food and gasoline prices are inflicting on households.
A inflation gauge contained in the report rose at a 3.8 percent rate -- the fastest pace since the third quarter of 2008 -- after increasing 1.7 percent in the fourth quarter.
A core price gauge, which excludes food and energy costs, accelerated to a 1.5 percent rate -- the fastest since the fourth quarter of 2009 -- from 0.4 percent in the fourth quarter. The core gauge is closely watched by Fed officials, who would like to see it closer to 2 percent.
In the first quarter, restocking by businesses picked up, with inventories increasing $43.8 billion after a $16.2 billion rise in the fourth quarter. However, the buildup was less than economists had expected and some said they looked for further inventory building to bolster growth in the second quarter.
Inventories added 0.93 percentage point to first-quarter GDP growth. Excluding inventories, the economy grew at a pedestrian 0.8 percent pace after a brisk 6.7 percent rate in the fourth quarter.
Business spending on equipment and software gained pace, but government spending suffered its deepest contraction since the fourth quarter of 1983.
Home building made no contribution, while investment in nonresidential structures dropped at its quickest pace since the fourth quarter of 2009, likely the result of bad weather.

Graham Summers: The U.S. Debt Spiral

As the mortgage foreclosure scandal spreads like wild-fire it is now clear that the alleged housing boom which made us all rich was in fact backed by nothing but loose monetary policy, systemic fraud, and rampant corruption.

Indeed, it now appears that banks were not only signing foreclosure notices without bothering to even verify the information ON the foreclosure (including WHO owns the house), but that some institutions were actually COUNTERFEITING paperwork if they couldn’t come up with legitimate documents.

While most of the mainstream media is absolutely shocked that the housing bubble and bust was/is rife with criminality (allegedly), I have to admit this is not a total surprise for me. Consider this little tidbit from the Miami Herald from 2008:

Between 2000 and 2007, “regulators allowed at least 10,529 people with criminal records to work in the mortgage profession. Of those, 4,065 cleared background checks after committing crimes that state law specifically requires regulators to screen, including fraud, bank robbery, racketeering and extortion.

The article I’m quoting is from 2008. It starts with a story about an ex-convict who ADMITS he’d been convicted of cocaine trafficking ON HIS MORTGAGE LICENSE APPLICATION and was APPROVED.

Of course, not ALL of the housing bubble involved coke dealers and ex-cons, but this tidbit should have been a MAJOR red flag to everyone that the housing bust (which was accelerating at that time) was going to involve a lot more than home prices falling and money being lost.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again… the US economy today is not about a recession or a housing bust… it’s about an Empire in DECLINE.

We’ve got all the tell-tale signs: we’re engaged in endless foreign military excursions that bring nothing to the country, we’re depreciating our currency at a rapid rate, we’re trashing the national balance sheet and falling further and further into debt.

Indeed, the US was already bordering on bankruptcy BEFORE the Financial Crisis began. And SINCE the Crisis began the “powers that be” have done the following:

• The Federal Reserve cuts interest rates from 5.25-0.25% (Sept ’07-today)
• The Bear Stearns deal/ Fed buys $30 billion in junk mortgages (March ’08)
• The Fed opens various lending windows to investment banks (March ’08)
• The SEC proposes banning short-selling on financial stocks (July ’08)
• The Treasury buys Fannie/Freddie for $400 billion (Sept ’08)
• The Fed takes over AIG for $85 billion (Sept ’08)
• The Fed doles out $25 billion for the auto makers (Sept ’08)
• The Feds’ $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) (Oct ’08)
• The Fed buys commercial paper (non-bank debt) from non-financials (Oct ’08)
• The Fed offers $540 billion to backstop money market funds (Oct ’08)
• The Fed backstops up to $280 billion of Citigroup’s liabilities (Oct ’08).
• Another $40 billion to AIG (Nov ’08)
• The Fed backstops up to $140 billion of Bank of America’s liabilities (Jan ’09)
• Obama’s $787 Billion Stimulus (Jan ’09)
• The Fed’s $300 billion Quantitative Easing Program (Mar ’09)
• The Fed buying $1.25 trillion in agency mortgage backed securities (Mar ’09-’10)
• The Fed buying $200 billion in agency debt (Mar ’09-’10)
• Cash for Clunkers I & II (July-August ’09)
• The Fed opening up currency swap lines to European Central Banks (April-May ’10)

All of these sound pretty clever and complicated, but in reality they consist of nothing but throwing VAST amounts of money at every issue that arises rather than allowing the junk debt in the system to be cleaned out. Consequently, NOT ONE move that’s been implemented has been positive for the US Dollar OR the US balance sheet.

At some point, and I cannot tell you when, the US is going to find itself facing a situation very similar to that of Greece. Indeed, if Greece’s numbers are “Crisis Worthy” investors should consider that the US’s fiscal condition is in fact AS BAD IF NOT WORSE than Greece’s.

The US is expected to run a $1.7 trillion deficit in 2010. Assuming that the GDP numbers are accurate (they’re not, but that’s an article for another time), the US economy is in the ballpark of $14 trillion. This means we’re running a deficit equal to 12.3% of GDP. That’s RIGHT next to Greece.

Then of course, you’ve got our Debt-to-GDP ratio. If you ignore unfunded liabilities like Social Security and Medicare, the US already has a Debt-to-GDP ratio of 98.1%. That’s only slightly off of Greece’s Debt-to-GDP of 112%.

Throw in Fannie and Freddie’s mortgage debts (Uncle Sam own $5 trillion of these now too), and we’re already well over a Debt to GDP of 112% (actually it’s 130% or so). And when you include Social Security and Medicare ($45 trillion) this puts total US Debt-to-GDP at 421% ($59 trillion of Debt on a GDP of $14 trillion).

Those investors who believe the US is somehow immune to a debt collapse are in for a VERY rude surprise.

Good Investing!

Graham Summers