It's a Bank Balance Sheet Race

from Calculated Risk blog:
Imagine a bank holds a RMBS (Residential Mortgage Back Security). Forget about tranches - just imagine the security is based on 100 mortgage loans. All of the loans are current, but the security is actively traded, and the price falls to 50 cents on the dollar because investors believe that there are many default (and losses) coming. The bank has lost 50% immediately. The bank holds the security, not the loans - so it is the change in the value of the security that hits their income statement.

Perhaps the bank believes the most profitable thing to do is just keep the loans in its own portfolio (fair value accounting principle called "highest and best use"). Now the bank also has a portfolio of 100 loans with exactly the same characteristics as the RMBS. The Fair Value estimate for income producing loans for which there is no available market or counterparty will be based on the Income approach (discounted future cash flows). As before all of the loans are current, so the bank takes writedowns based on estimates of discounted future cash flows (they are being held to maturity). As the losses, both current and future, become estimable, the bank takes the writedown.
The Fed estimated both future losses and future earnings. As Dr. Roubini noted, there will be a race between losses and earnings - and if the Fed overestimated earnings or underestimated losses, the banks will need additional capital.

Strange thing to bet our future on!

Stress Test Results Were "Negotiated"

from Reuters:
The Federal Reserve reduced the size of capital deficits facing several banks before releasing the results of "stress tests" on the financial institutions, according to a story in the Wall Street Journal on Saturday.

The changes came after days of negotiations with the banks, the story said. The Federal Reserve used a different method than analysts and investors had expected to calculate the required capital levels.

and the Wall Street Journal:

The Federal Reserve significantly scaled back the size of the capital hole facing some of the nation's biggest banks shortly before concluding its stress tests, following two weeks of intense bargaining.

In addition, according to bank and government officials, the Fed used a different measurement of bank-capital levels than analysts and investors had been expecting, resulting in much smaller capital deficits.

The overall reaction to the stress tests, announced Thursday, has been generally positive. But the haggling between the government and the banks shows the sometimes-tense nature of the negotiations that occurred before the final results were made public.

Stress Tests Signal More Government Intervention

from FT.com:

The stress tests on the 19 biggest US banks pave the way for an ongoing interventionist approach to regulation, Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, signalled on Thursday.

Hours before the publication of the results of the tests, which are expected to show that banks including Citigroup and Bank of America will need to raise equity, Mr Bernanke told the Chicago Fed that the “exercise has been comprehensive, rigorous, forward-looking, and highly collaborative… Undoubtedly, we can use many aspects of the exercise to improve our supervisory processes in the future.”

Stress Test is a Sham

from James Quinn at PrudentBear.com:

William Black is a former senior bank regulator. He is currently an associate professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri. Mr. Black held a variety of senior regulatory positions during the S&L crisis. He managed investigations with teams of examiners reporting to him, redesigned how exams were conducted, and trained examiners. He calls the stress tests conducted on the 19 biggest banks in the country a complete sham. In his own words:

• "You can't conduct a meaningful stress test without reviewing (sampling) the underlying loan files and it seems likely that the purchasers of securitized instruments (not just mortgages) do not even have the loan file data. Moreover, loss ratios vary enormously depending on the issuer, so even a bank that originates (or has purchased a bank that originates) similar product cannot simply take its own loss rate and extrapolate it to the measure the risk on the value of securitized credit instruments.
• "It is vastly more difficult to examine a bank that is engaged in accounting control fraud. You can't rely on the bank's books and records. It doesn't simply take more, far more [employees]. It takes examiners with experience, care, courage, and investigative instincts and abilities. Very few folks earning $60,000 are willing to get in the face of the CEO and CFO making $25 million annually and tell them that they are running a fraudulent bank and they are liars. FYI, this is one of the reasons why having "resident examiners" never works.
• "Examiners certainly can't do the stress testing that Geithner describes or evaluate the reliability of a large bank's proprietary stress test. If they were serious about constructing reliable stress tests, which they aren't, you'd require their analytics to be made public. You'd have the industry fund independent investigations by rocket scientists chosen by a committee selected by the regulators of the soundness of the analytics. You'd also have the industry fund competitions to rip them apart (a bit like we hire legit hackers to test security by trying to defeat it) and show where they produce absurd results. The concept that there are 100 examiners with these skills, suddenly freed up from all other duties, assigned to CONDUCT stress tests is a lie."

We should also keep in mind that the "profits" recently reported by the big banks were concocted through one-time sales and FASB accounting gimmicks that allowed them to count bad loans as good ones. This doesn't inspire confidence except in an environment of fraud and irrational exuberance -- on steroids.