Read all of Dr. Hussman's weekly market commentaries here. 
Accompanying the news of the "grand and comprehensive" European solution on Thursday was the news that GDP rose at an annual rate of 2.5% in the third quarter. There was already coincident data that the U.S. was not yet in contraction in August or September, so this was no surprise. Still, investors continued the habit of confusing lagging and coincident indicators for leading ones, so the positive GDP figure was taken as evidence that an oncoming economic downturn was "off the table."
Accompanying the news of the "grand and comprehensive" European solution on Thursday was the news that GDP rose at an annual rate of 2.5% in the third quarter. There was already coincident data that the U.S. was not yet in contraction in August or September, so this was no surprise. Still, investors continued the habit of confusing lagging and coincident indicators for leading ones, so the positive GDP figure was taken as evidence that an oncoming economic downturn was "off the table."
I can't emphasize enough that leading evidence is in fact leading 
 evidence. Take, for example, the ECRI Weekly Leading Index. It's 
certainly not a perfect indicator in itself, but its leading properties 
are instructive. If you look at the historical points where the WLI 
growth rate fell below zero, you'll find that weekly unemployment claims
 (a coincident indicator) were generally still about 3% below their 
5-year average. It generally took about 13-16 weeks for unemployment 
claims to climb above that 5-year average, and even longer for the 
unemployment rate (a lagging indicator) to rise sharply. That's not much
 of a lag in the grand scheme of the full economic cycle, but allows a 
great deal of intervening and often contradictory action in the 
financial markets. 
The tendency to demand predictable outcomes to 
also be immediate is a dangerous one, because it allows investors to be 
sucked in by temporary reprieves during what are, in fact, very negative
 conditions. As I noted in May (see Extreme Conditions and Typical Outcomes ),
 "It's clear that overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields 
syndromes as extreme as we observe today are even more important for 
their extended implications than they are for market prospects over say,
 3-6 months. Though there is a tendency toward abrupt market plunges, 
the initial market losses in 1972 and 2007 were recovered over a period 
of several months before second signal emerged, followed by a major 
market decline. Despite the variability in short-term outcomes, and even
 the tendency for the market to advance by several percent after the 
syndrome emerges, the overall implications are clearly negative on the 
basis of average return/risk outcomes." 
The same can be said here of economic prospects. 
Investors have almost entirely abandoned any concern about recession 
risk based on a few weeks of benign economic figures. Yet on the basis 
of indicators that have strong leading  characteristics, a 
broad ensemble of evidence continues to suggest very high recession 
risks, and even sparse combinations of indicators provide a major basis 
for concern. 
For example, since 1963, when the ECRI Weekly 
Leading Index growth rate has been below -5 and the ISM Purchasing 
Managers Index has been below 54, the economy has already been in 
recession 81% of the time, and the probability of recession within the 
next 13 weeks was 86%. 
If in addition, the S&P 500 was below its 
level of 6 months earlier, the economy was already in recession 87% of 
the time, and the probability of recession within the next 13 weeks 
climbed to 93% (and then to 96% within 26 weeks). Under these 
conditions, once the PMI fell below 52, the probability of recession 
within 13 weeks climbed to 97%.