Saturday, March 28, 2009

Mark to Market Suspended by FASB

from John Mauldin:
The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) changed the mark-to-market rules last week, which many thought was needed. First, they suspended the mark-to-market rules for assets in distressed markets. Second, they widened the definition of "temporary" impairments of troubled assets, which will "allow banks to write up the value of some troubled assets if these have been hit by falling markets without (yet) suffering any significant credit losses."

Here's the important part. The board decided to make the new changes effective immediately, prior to full board approval on April 2.

As my friend Charles Gave noted, this will allow banks to write up their paper, and it happens before Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner starts putting taxpayer money at risk. Expect to see a pop in valuations. It will be interesting to see if Citi and B of A post profits this quarter.

(I should note that the International Accounting Standards Board sent out a scathing press release. I guess from that we should assume that European banks will not be so fortunate as their US counterparts.)

I disagree with John Mauldin on this for these reasons:

  • One of the primary causes of this entire financial crisis was lack of transparency of these exotic derivative financial instruments. There was not market, no liquidity, and no transparent pricing mechanism for them. The imposition of mark-to-market accounting was to force these instruments to be valued on a more transparent and real-time basis, just like the various exchanges do with their products (stocks, futures, bonds, etc.). By eliminating this accounting standard, we are literally recreating the causes that created the crisis in the first place. We are making them less transparent, not more so. This is no solution. It is delaying the inevitable accounting. It is also injecting -- delaying -- more systemic risk back into the financial system. It is nothing but a delay tactic. It doesn't solve the problem.
  • It assumes that economic circumstances will improve in the medium to long term -- months, not years. What if is doesn't? The whole premise of the assumption could be wrong! If it is wrong, it will only make the final accounting that much worse when the piper must be paid.
  • It allows weak financial institutions to artificially inflate the worth of their stock and the value of damaged and distressed assets. It also deceived investors into believing that these banks are healthy, when in reality, they are insolvent.