Another phenomenal article by Gordon Long:
The fork in the road which we chose has resulted in:
What is to stop U.S. banks and their customers from creating $1 trillion, $10 trillion or even $50 trillion on their computer keyboards to buy up all the bonds and stocks in the world, along with all the land and other assets for sale in the hope of making capital gains and pocketing the arbitrage spreads by debt leveraging at less than 1 per cent interest cost? This is the game that is being played today.”
FLAWED PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS ASSURE THE OUTCOME
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Debase, Default, and Deny
In September 2008 the US came to a fork in the road. The Public Policy decision to not seize the banks, to not place them in bankruptcy court with the government acting as the Debtor-in-Possession (DIP), to not split them up by selling off the assets to successful and solvent entities, set the world on the path to global currency wars.
By lowering interest rates and effectively guaranteeing a weak dollar through undisciplined fiscal policy, the US ignited an almost riskless global US$ Carry Trade and triggered an uncontrolled Currency War with the mercantilist, export driven Asian economies. We are now debasing the US dollar with reckless spending and money printing with the policies of Quantitative Easing (QE) and the expectations of QE II. Both are nothing more than effectively defaulting on our obligations to sound money policy and a “strong US$”. Meanwhile with a straight face we deny that this is our intention.
It’s called debase, default and deny.
Though prior to the 2008 financial crisis our largest banks had become casino like speculators with public money lacking in fiduciary responsibility, our elected officials bailed them out. Our leadership placed America and the world unknowingly (knowingly?) on a preordained destructive path because it was politically expedient and the easiest way out of a difficult predicament. By kicking the can down the road our political leadership, like the banks, avoided their fiduciary responsibility. Similar to a parent wanting to be liked and a friend to their children they avoided the difficult discipline that is required at certain critical moments in life. The discipline to make America swallow a needed pill. The discipline to ask Americans to accept a period of intense adjustment. A period that by now would be starting to show signs of success versus the abyss we now find ourselves staring into. A future that is now significantly worse and with potentially fatal pain still to come.
Unemployed Americans, the casualties of the financial crisis wrought by the banks, witness the same banks declaring record earnings while these banks refuse to lend. When the banks once more are caught with their fingers in the cookie jar with falsified robo-signing mortgage title fraud, they again look for the compliant parent to look the other way. Meanwhile the US debt levels and spending associated with protecting these failed (and still insolvent institutions) are so out of touch with US de-industrialized productive capability that the US dollar is falling and forcing countries around the world to devalue their currencies in a desperate attempt to maintain competitive advantage. So much for the “strong dollar” mantra we heard endlessly for years from every US Secretary of the Treasury that needed foreign investment to fund our deficits. Like second rate powers, our word is no longer our bond.
1) massive public debt levels that can never realistically be expected to be paid back,
2) Financial markets that are disconnected from fundamental historical values,
3) A global banking industry that can best be described as fragile and is realistically insolvent if the accounting games were to be removed.
I think most would agree that massive public, private and consumer debt levels are a central problem to the current global predicament. We also however need to appreciate that these massive debt build ups have also allowed the over-building of production capacity. We have global supply that is now outstripping demand. The output gap in the US alone would require a theoretical -7% Fed Funds Rate according to the Taylor Rule (6)
EXCESS CAPACITY
The currency wars are being fought because global players are being forced to fight for a piece of the global demand pie that is growing at a slower rate (a first derivative problem) versus the capacity presently available and coming online. The Asian buildup of production capacity is nothing short of startling but it is premised on a free spending and 70% consuming US economy. A slowdown in the US and a weakening US dollar are major threats to political and social stability in the Asian export economies. Everything in the mercantile, export led Asian economies must be done to avoid this. The facts however are that there are no longer sufficient jobs in America to support past and present levels of consumptions. The middle class in America is quickly becoming extinct and with it the ability to famously ‘shop till they drop’.
What are the US politicos to do? The well recognized Michael Hudson asserts in Why the U.S. Has Launched a New Financial World World War:
“Finance is the new form of warfare – without the expense of a military overhead and an occupation against unwilling hosts. It is a competition in credit creation to buy foreign resources, real estate, public and privatized infrastructure, bonds and corporate stock ownership. Who needs an army when you can obtain the usual objective (monetary wealth and asset appropriation) simply by financial means? All that is required is for central banks to accept dollar credit of depreciating international value in payment for local assets. Victory promises to go to whatever economy’s banking system can create the most credit, using an army of computer keyboards to appropriate the world’s resources. The key is to persuade foreign central banks to accept this electronic credit.
U.S. officials demonize foreign countries as aggressive “currency manipulators” keeping their currencies weak. But they simply are trying to protect their currencies from being pushed up against the dollar by arbitrageurs and speculators flooding their financial markets with dollars. Foreign central banks find them obliged to choose between passively letting dollar inflows push up their exchange rates – thereby pricing their exports out of global markets – or recycling these dollar inflows into U.S. Treasury bills yielding only 1% and whose exchange value is declining. (Longer-term bonds risk a domestic dollar-price decline if U.S interest rates should rise.)
The chart to the right was published in early spring of this year specifically spelling out that a ‘Beggar-thy-Neighbor’ roadmap lay ahead.
WINNERS & LOSERS IN A CURRENCY WAR
How could I have been so sure when I put this chart together? The realistic fact about wars are that there are winners and losers. These however are not the people on the battlefield. Since Caesar, wars are about money. The winners are those who finance them and the losers are those that pay for them. Rich banking families are well documented to have financed both sides. It matters not much who wins but rather that a war is fought so money is made.
So who actually wins in a currency war? The answer is found by forensically following the money.
EVERY WAR COMES WITH NEW TECHNOLOGY
The most effective way of following the money is to consider the major new innovations in the financial world. Like all wars the winner is the one who innovates the ‘combat technology’ the fastest.
We need to remember that the financial innovations discovered during and after the financial crisis such as: Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs), Special Purpose Entities (SPE’s) and a raft of securitization products were the foundations upon which were built the “Toxic Assets” and the reason for the global financial crisis. The toxic assets were the catalyst which we continuously heard referred to during the crisis which forced the government into massive public debt government spending in an apparent attempt to avoid a financial collapse.
If we examine the latest raft of new weaponry, we can easily see where this is headed, how the money will flow, who wins and unfortunately who loses.
1- FIAT PAPER BOMBERS - Quantitative Easing
Quantitative Easing is an euphemism for printing money. The US has embarked on a massive untested trial in recklessly printing money.
2- CURRENCY MISSILES - US$ Carry Trade
Like the hydrogen bomb was to the early atomic bomb, the US$ Carry Trade is to the original pilot Japanese Carry Trade. IF QE are the bombs, then the US dollar carry trade are the missiles that deliver the bombs. With borrowing costs in the US approaching zero, a weakening carry currency and unlimited money creation, we have the perfect carry trade missile that can and will hit any economy in the world.
3- REGULATORY ARBITRAGE - Guarantees and Contingent Liabilities
I have written extensively how the financial crisis has served as a vehicle to shift debt obligations from the banking and private sector to the public sector. This has been achieved through government guarantees, the use of balance sheet contingent liabilities and interest rate / currency swaps. It is the battlefield strategy of Regulatory Arbitrage.
ARTICLES: SULTANS OF SWAP: Smoking Guns! , SULTANS OF SWAP: The Sting! , SULTANS OF SWAP: The Get Away!
4- PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS / PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVES – PPP/PFI
The extensive hidden use of Public Private Partnerships & Private Finance Initiatives (PPP/PFI) recently came to light during the European Sovereign debt crisis. This tool has become the guidance system for missile delivery since it allows the conversion of freshly printed fiat paper into real, unencumbered, revenue producing assets.
ARTICLES: SULTANS OF SWAP: Explaining $605 Trillion in Derivatives! , SULTANS OF SWAP: Smoking Guns!
5- AN UNREGULATED $615 TRILLION – Derivative Swaps
The unregulated, off balance sheet, offshore, non exchange traded, private SWAP vehicle is the ideal vehicle with which to control global financial markets. The Sultans of Swaps now operate much as the Bond Vigilantes did at one time but with different control and much different motives. The growth of the SWAP market in interest rate and currency swaps effectively muzzled and obsoleted the Bond Vigilantes of yesteryear.
HOW THE MONEY WILL BE MADE – Paper Assets Exchanged for Real Assets
1- TAKE OVER PUBLIC SECTOR ASSETS – buildings, land, treasuries.
2- TAKE OVER PRIVATE SECTOR ASSETS - land and resources.
3- TAKE OVER OF SOVEREIGN TREASURY – transfer of sovereign treasury gold holdings
4- MAJOR CORPORATE CONSOLIDATIONS - reduced competition, reduced monopoly laws and emergence of cartels
5- NATIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE & PUBLIC PENSIONS - government grab of financial assets
REAL WEALTH
The financiers of the currency wars understand that real wealth in its most simplistic essence can only be created by:
1- GROWING IT
2- MINING IT
3- BUILDING IT
Paper money is simply a tool for the trading of wealth. When money is backed by a hard asset then it also becomes a store of that wealth. However that is not the case with fiat currencies. Though Gold is real wealth it does not grow wealth, but rather stores it or protects it from the debasement of paper ‘trading’ instruments. Ideal real wealth is wealth that continues to grow and yet maintains its inherent value. Over the longer term it is usually better to own well managed, unencumbered agricultural producing land, producing mines and production facilities than just the wealth product they output. The Rothschild banking family learned this hundreds of years ago and is the reason why they moved from solely owning gold to energy, mining, agriculture and selective base materials process production.
One mistake after another has been made in an attempt to ‘kick the can down the road’ and avoid the inevitable necessity to restructure the debt. Unfortunately when it is restructured it will be at the expense of the public and not the original parties. The cost to the tax payer will be insurmountable debt and the forced surrender of pubic assets. Public assets that in the future will be charged for by ’Private Banking’ and Special Purpose Entity (SPE) owners.
=> BAILOUTs: Banks, AIG, GM, Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac
=> ZIRP
=> TARP & ARRA
=> HAMP, Cash for Clunkers etc.
=> Extend & Pretend Accounting
=> QE I (Buying $1.7B in
(Mortgage & Treasury Products) => QE II
TIMING
Like a well oiled machine the sequence of events continue to unfold as laid out in my Extend & Preserve article series. The implementation of Quantitative Easing (QE I) and change in GAAP Mark-to-Market accounting treatment ignited the initial rally leg. With further refinements (see EXTEND & PRETEND - Manufacturing a Minsky Melt-Up) it continued until it became evident that the US employment and GDP were not improving in any meaningful manner despite $13T of Spend, Lend and Guarantee initiatives. Then as the polarization of the EU wanting ‘austerity’ policies versus the US wanting ‘stimulus’ measures, the US dollar began weakening and stocks stopped their retracement in June. When Bernanke signaled QE II in August the financial markets were once again ignited and the US dollar weakened further. The financial markets are now propelled by both euphoria and fear of more liquidity being made readily available. It will not end well as we naively get caught in the spider’s carefully laid out trap.
CONCLUSION
An interesting fact is that the US has positioned itself for this war as a result of the spending on previous wars. According to Michael Hudson (5):
“What destabilized the system was war spending. War-related transactions spanning World Wars I and II enabled the United States to accumulate some 80 per cent of the world’s monetary gold by 1950. This made the dollar a virtual proxy for gold. But after the Korean War broke out, U.S. overseas military spending accounted for the entire payments deficit during the 1950s and ‘60s and early ‘70s. Private-sector trade and investment was exactly in balance.
By August 1971, war spending in Vietnam and other foreign countries forced the United States to suspend gold convertibility of the dollar through sales via the London Gold Pool. But largely by inertia, central banks continued to settle their payments balances in U.S. Treasury securities. After all, there was no other asset in sufficient supply to form the basis for central bank monetary reserves. But replacing gold – a pure asset – with dollar-denominated U.S. Treasury debt transformed the global financial system. It became debt-based, not asset-based. And geopolitically, the Treasury-bill standard made the United States immune from the traditional balance-of-payments and financial constraints, enabling its capital markets to become more highly debt-leveraged and “innovative.” It also enabled the U.S. Government to wage foreign policy and military campaigns without much regard for the balance of payments.”
We don’t need to go into the additional costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Homeland Security (War on Terror) and military base expansion into 130 countries which have exploded the US fiscal deficits. Suffice it to say that these and all wars since Vietnam are wars that have been conducted without increasing taxes – a historical first which draws little attention or concern.
The present fiat currency system will end based on the strategy of Debase, Default and Deny! It is my opinion that it will be replaced by a system structured on the IMF and BIS’s Strategic Drawing Rights (SDRs) partially backed by precious metals. The question to be asked however is not what will be the replacement for fiat currency, but who will have ownership of the assets after this war ends? Who will pay the requisite ‘tribute’ that goes to the victors?
“Fiat Paper Bombers Spotted Overhead!!”
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SOURCES:
(6) 10-27-10
The Fed's impending blunder Ambrose Evans-Prichard Telegraph.co.ukDebase, 
Dollar in Freefall
"...if indeed the Fed sees the Dollar as one of its key policy levers for preventing inflation from staying below its mandate for a prolonged period – the Dollar needs to fall a lot further from here." --Robin Brook, Goldman Sachs
Stocks Reverse, Go Negative
The Fed polled the primary dealers this morning to know what they want the Fed to do with QE2. Unbelievable. Monetary by poll!
Futures Rise on "Seasonally Adjusted" Jobless Claims
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Turbulent Day for Stocks
Durable goods was up 3.3%, but only in the transportation sector. Everything else was down 0.8%.
Existing home sales were up 6.6%, a good showing.
But stocks are down for worries over QE2, Fed over-reach, P&G and Whirlpool earnings,
Tuesday, October 26, 2010
What Inflation Looks Like in Real Life
by Jake Weber of the the Casey Report:
The Casey Report provides a useful glance at the real inflation currently ravaging items that are actually purchased by Americans, not those captured by the Fed's BLS statistics: "On average, our basic food costs have increased by an incredible 48% over the last year (measured by wheat, corn, oats, and canola prices). From the price at the pump to heating your stove, energy costs are up 23% on average (heating oil, gasoline, natural gas). A little protein at dinner is now 39% higher (beef and pork), and your morning cup of coffee with a little sugar has risen by 36% since last October." Of course, the ongoing deflation in items purchases requiring leverage will continue to skew the CPI so far south to make all those who bought 5 Year TIPS yesterday at negative yields end up losing money on the transaction.
Chart of the Week: Inflation in the Real World, by Jake Webber of Casey Report
As is often the case, there is a big difference between what the government statistics are reporting and what’s going on in the real world. According to the most recent inflation reading published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), consumer prices grew at an annual rate of just 1.1% in August.
The government has an incentive to distort CPI numbers, for reasons such as keeping the cost-of-living adjustment for Social Security payments low. While there’s no question that you may be able to get a good deal on a new car or a flat-screen TV today, how often are you really buying these things? When you look at the real costs of everyday life, prices have risen sharply over the last year. For simplicity’s sake, consider the cash market prices on some basic commodities.
You probably aren’t buying new linens or shopping for copper piping at the hardware store every day, but I included these items to show the inflationary pressures on some other basic materials that will likely affect consumer prices down the road.
The jump in gold and silver prices illustrates that it’s not just supply and demand issues driving the precious metals higher – the decline in purchasing power of the dollar is also showing up in the price of physical goods. It is because stashing wheat and cotton in the garage is an impractical way to protect purchasing power that investors are increasingly looking to protect themselves with the monetary metals – a trend that is now very much in motion.
Broad Commodity Indexes Continue to Rise
The High Price of Rice
Consumer Confidence Beats Expectations, Stocks Surge Temporarily
U.S. consumer confidence rose slightly in October but remained near historically low levels as concerns about the labor market persisted, according to a private sector report released on Tuesday.
The Conference Board, an industry group, said its index of consumer attitudes rose to 50.2 in October from a revised 48.6 in September.
Case Shiller Contracts in August
“A disappointing report. Home prices broadly declined in August. Seventeen of the 20 cities and both Composites saw a weakening in year-over-year figures, as compared to July, indicating that the housing market continues to bounce along the recent lows,” says David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s. “Over the last four months both the 10- and 20-City Composites show slowing growth, after sustaining consistent gains since their April 2009 troughs.
“The month-over-month growth rates tell the same story. Fifteen of the 20 MSAs and the two Composites saw a decline in the month of August as compared to July levels. The 10- and 20-City Composites fell 0.1% and 0.2%, respectively. Indeed, the housing market appears to have stabilized at new lows. At this time, it does not seem that any of the markets are hanging on to the temporary momentum caused by the homebuyers’ tax credits.”
Monday, October 25, 2010
Here Comes Mortgage Meltdown, Act 2 (part 2)
part 2 from John Mauldin:
At the end of last week's letter on the whole mortgage foreclosure mess, I wrote:
"All those subprime and Alt-A mortgages written in the middle of the last decade? They were packaged and sold in securities. They have had huge losses. But those securities had representations and warranties about what was in them. And guess what, the investment banks may have stretched credibility about those warranties. There is the real probability that the investment banks that sold them are going to have to buy them back. We are talking the potential for multiple hundreds of billions of dollars in losses that will have to be eaten by the large investment banks. We will get into details, but it could create the potential for some banks to have real problems."
Real problems indeed. Seems the Fed, PIMCO, and others are suing Countrywide over this very topic. We will go into detail later in this week's letter, covering the massive fraud involved in the sale of mortgage-backed securities. Frankly, this is scandalous. It is almost too much to contemplate, but I will make an effort.
But first, let me acknowledge the huge deluge of emails I got over last week's letter, the most I can ever remember. I thought about just making this week's letter a response to many of them, but decided I needed to go ahead and finish the topic at hand. Maybe another time. As a side note, I quoted a letter that came to me anonymously via David Kotok. I said if I found out who wrote it, I would give them credit. It was originally written by Gonzalo Liro, at www.gonzalolira.blogspot.com.
Many of you wrote to point out that his argument about the tracking of title was not correct, but others pointed out many other issues as well. This is one of the most complex problems we face, and I got a lot of good information from readers. It just makes me wish I had our new web site finished so you could avail yourselves of the wisdom among my readers. We are close, down to final changes. And now, on to today's letter.
They Knew What They Were Selling
It's hard to know where to start. There is just so much here. So let's begin with testimony from Mr. Richard Bowen, former senior vice-president and business chief underwriter with CitiMortgage Inc. This was given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Hearing on Subprime Lending andnd Securitization andnd Government Sponsored Enterprises. I am going to excerpt from his testimony, but you can read the whole thing (if you have a strong stomach) at http://fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0407-Bowen.pdf. (Emphasis obviously mine.)"The delegated flow channel purchased approximately $50 billion of prime mortgages annually. These mortgages were not underwriten by us before they were purchased. My Quality Assurance area was responsible for underwriting a small sample of the files post-purchase to ensure credit quality was maintained.
"These mortgages were sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac [We will come back to this - JM] and other investors. Although we did not underwrite these mortgages, Citi did rep and warrant to the investors that the mortgages were underwritten to Citi credit guidelines.
"In mid-2006 I discovered that over 60% of these mortgages purchased and sold were defective. Because Citi had given reps and warrants to the investors that the mortgages were not defective, the investors could force Citi to repurchase many billions of dollars of these defective assets. This situation represented a large potential risk to the shareholders of Citigroup.
"I started issuing warnings in June of 2006 and attempted to get management to address these critical risk issues. These warnings continued through 2007 and went to all levels of the Consumer Lending Group.
"We continued to purchase and sell to investors even larger volumes of mortgages through 2007. And defective mortgages increased during 2007 to over 80% of production."
Mr. Bowen was no young kid. He had 35 years of experience. He was the guy they hired to pay attention to the risks, and they ignored him. How could a senior manager not get such an email and not notify his boss, if only to protect his own ass? They had to have known what they were selling all the way up and down the ladder. But the music was playing and Chuck Prince said to dance and rake in the profits (and bonuses!). More from his testimony:
"Beginning in 2006 I issued many warnings to management concerning these practices, and specifically objected to the purchase of many identified pools. I believed that these practices exposed Citi to substantial risk of loss.
Warning to Mr. Robert Rubin and Management
"On November 3, 2007, I sent an email to Mr. Robert Rubin and three other members of Corporate Management... In this email I outlined the business practices that I had witnessed and attempted to address. I specifically warned about the extreme risks that existed within the Consumer Lending Group. And I warned that there were 'resulting significant but possibly unrecognized financial losses existing within Citigroup.'"And now taxpayers own 75% of Citi, and our losses to them are huge. They are going to get worse, as we will see.
Now let's turn to the testimony of Keith Johnson, who worked for various mortgage companies and in 2006 became the president and chief operating officer of Clayton Holdings, the largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States and Europe. This is testimony he gave before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. Part of the testimony is by his associate Vicki Beal, senior vice-president of Clayton. The transcript is some 277 pages long, so let me summarize.
Investment banks would come to Clayton and give then roughly 10% of the mortgages that they intended to buy and put into a security. Clayton rated them on whether the documentation was what it was supposed to be, not as to whether they thought it was a good loan. Still, 46% of the loans did not have proper documentation (out of a pool of 9 million loans) and 28% had what was determined to be level 3 disqualifications that simply had no mitigating circumstances. Understand, these were loans that were already written, and there was no effort to check the facts, just the documentation.
And ultimately 11% of these loans (39% of the level 3's) were put back in by the investment bank. And what happened to the loans that were rejected? (This might require an adult beverage and a few expletives deleted.)
Popping Through
They were put back into another pool, where again only 10% of the loans were examined. Quoting from the testimony:"MR. JOHNSON: I think it goes to the 'three strikes, you're out' rule.
"CHAIRMAN ANGELIDES: So this was a case of - okay, three strikes.
"MR. JOHNSON: I've heard that even used. Try it once, try it twice, try it three times, and if you can't get it out, then put -
"CHAIRMAN ANGELIDES: Well, the odds are pretty good if you are sampling 5 to 10 percent that you'll pop through. When you said the good, the bad, the ugly, the ugly will pop through."
Yes, you read that right. If a loan was rejected a second time, it went back into yet another pool for a third try. The odds of coming up three times, when only 5 or 10 percent are sampled? About 1 in a thousand. Popping through, indeed.
Clayton presented their data to the ratings agencies, investment banks, and others in the industry. They were frustrated that no one was really paying attention or taking heed of their warnings.
Here is what Shahien Nasiripour, the business reporter for the Huffington Post, wrote (his emphasis). For those interested, the entire article is worth reading. (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/25/wall-street-subprime-crisis_n_739294.html):
"Johnson told the crisis panel that he thought the firm's findings should have been disclosed to investors during this period. He added that he saw one European deal mention it, but nothing else.
"The firm's findings could have been 'material,' Johnson said, using a legal adjective that could determine cause or affect a judgment.
"It's unclear whether the firms ended up buying all of those loans, or whether Wall Street securitized them all and sold them off to investors.
"'Clayton generally does not know which or how many loans the client ultimately purchases,' Beal said. That likely will be the subject of litigation and investigations going forward.
"'This should have a phenomenal effect legally, both in terms of the ability of investors to force put-backs and to sue for fraud,' said Joshua Rosner, managing director at independent research consultancy Graham Fisher & Co.
"'Original buyers of these securities could sue for fraud; distressed investors, who buy assets on the cheap, could force issuers to take back the mortgages and swallow the losses.
"'I don't think people are really thinking about this,' Rosner said. 'This is not just errors and omissions - this appears to be fraud, especially if there is evidence to demonstrate that they went back and used the due diligence reports to justify paying lower prices for the loans, and did not inform the investors of that."
"Beal testified that Clayton's clients use the firm's reports to 'negotiate better prices on pools of loans they are considering for purchase,' among other uses.
"Nearly $1.7 trillion in securities backed by mortgages not guaranteed by the government were sold to investors during those 18 months, according to Inside Mortgage Finance. Wall Street banks sold much of that. At its peak, the amount of outstanding so-called non-agency mortgage securities reached $2.3 trillion in June 2007, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Less than $1.4 trillion remain as investors refused to buy new issuance and the mortgages underpinning existing securities were either paid off or written off as losses, Bloomberg data show.
"The potential for liability on the part of the issuer 'probably does give an investor more grounds for a lawsuit than they would ordinarily have', Cecala said. 'Generally, to go after an issuer you really have to prove that they knowingly did something wrong. This certainly seems to lend credibility to that argument.'
"'This appears to be a massive fraud perpetrated on the investing public on a scale never before seen,' Rosner added."
It's Time for Some Putback Payback
Investment banks large and small originated a lot of subprime garbage in the 2005-2007 era. This week PIMCO, Black Rock, Freddie Mac, the New York Fed, and - what I think is key and no one has picked up on - Neuberger Berman Europe, Ltd., an investment manager to a managed-account client, came together and sued Countrywide for not putting back bad mortgages to its parent, Bank of America. This is the first of what will be a series of suits aimed at getting control of the portfolio and peeking into the mortgages. (Text of lawsuit at http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/10/full-text-of-letter-to-bofa-from-ny-fed-maiden-lane-freddie-mac-pimco-western-asset-mgmt-neuberger-berman-kore-advisors/)Basically, if buyers of 25% or more of a mortgage-backed security can come together, they have standing to sue the mortgage servicer to do its duty to the investors and make putbacks of bad mortgages, and if they fail to do so the plaintiffs can take control of the process and take the issuer to court directly (that's a very simplistic description but roughly accurate).
There are two key take-aways. First, note that a European entity is involved. Hundreds of billions of dollars of this junk was sold to European banks and funds. And these guys get together at conferences (sometimes they even invite me to speak). So Helmut will be talking to Lars who will talk to Jean Pierre and they will realize they all own some of this junk. They will be watching with very real interest to see how the big boys at PIMCO and Black Rock and the New York Fed fare in their efforts. And then you can count on them all piling on (more later on this).
Second, little noticed this week was the fact that The Litigation Daily wrote that Philippe Selendy of Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan has been retained by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to investigate billions of dollars in potential claims against banks and other issuers of mortgage-backed securities.
Who? Not on your celebrity list? Just wait. He will soon be getting the best tables everywhere. He and his firm are the guys representing MBIA in all their cases against Countrywide and Merrill Lynch. And they are kicking ass. Slowly to be sure, but very steady. That means Fannie and Freddie are getting ready to get serious.
They were sold well over $227 billion of the subprime garbage issued in 2006 and 2007. And the bad stuff started before then. But they have one advantage that the guys at PIMCO, et al. don't have: they (or actually the FHFA) are a federal agency. That means they have subpoena power. The agency has sent 64 subpoenas to issuers of mortgage-backed securities, and although they have not said who they went to, they obviously include almost everyone and clearly all the big players. (They couldn't have ignored Goldman, could they? Naah. Too obvious.)
From American Lawyer.com (I know, this website is probably already on your favorites list, but for those souls who actually have a life I provide the text):
"Through those subpoenas, the agency could gain access to the loan files for the mortgages that backed the securities it bought and thus establish whether the mortgages were what the issuers represented them to be in securities contracts. According to the Journal, the difficulty of obtaining loan files has been a big obstacle for investors trying to force issuers to repurchase bonds.
"If the FHFA were to decide down the road to initiate litigation, it would still have to have the support of a percentage (usually 25 percent) of its fellow bondholders for each issue. But given what the agency and its Quinn lawyers will be able to see before bringing suit, it probably won't be too hard to get other investors on the bandwagon." (http://www.quinnemanuel.com/media/183456/hurricane%20warnings%20fannie%20mae%20and%20freddie%20mac%20hire....pdf)
It is tough not to jump to the conclusion, but we need one more piece of the puzzle before we get there.
The Worst Deal of the Decade?
Arguably Bank of America had Merrill shoved down their throats, but no one can say that about the acquisition of Countrywide. And Countrywide could end up costing BAC $50 billion or more in losses. That may prove to be a serious candidate for worst deal of the decade. (Although WAMU is a leading candidate too!)Let's look at a report by Branch Hill Capital, a hedge fund out of San Francisco. And before we start on it, let me point out they are short Bank of America. You can see the full PowerPoint at http://www.businessinsider.com/bank-of-america-mortgage-report-2010-10#-1.
(And let me say a big thanks to the author of the report, Manal Mehta, for all the background material he sent me and his help with this week's letter. It helped make it a lot better. Of course, any erroneous conclusions or outrageous statements are all mine.)
First, they point out that the potential size of Bank of America's (BAC) liabilities is $74 billion (with a B). And that is just for Countrywide. That does not include Merrill, which is also large. Against that they have set aside $3.9 billion. You can count on more suits than just the PIMCO, et al. mentioned above.
In the MBIA case, the judge has ruled that the suit can proceed even though BAC has denied responsibility. Although on appeal, this is high-stakes poker. Countrywide originated over $1.4 trillion of mortgages in 2005-2007. MBIA alleges that over 90% of the defaulted or delinquent loans in the Countrywide securitizations show material discrepancies. Care to take the under in the over/under bet on that?
Further to the case on BAC, Merrill was the largest originator of subprime CDOs during the housing boom, for another $120 billion, along with about $255 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities.
And then there are all those CDOs (collaterized debt obligations). Merrill did a lot of those that went sour. This deserves it own leter, but a gentleman named Wing Chau went from making $140k a year to $25 million in just a few years, putting together CDOs from Merrill, some of which were completely bankrupt in just six months.
Countrywide has already settled with the New York pension funds for $624 million, one of the largest securities fraud settlements in US history. And the line is growing longer.
Of course, BAC CEO Brian Moynihan denied this week that there is a problem. Let's look at Moynihan's statements at the last earnings call and compare them to what the judge in the case said earlier. Moynihan:
"... we execute repurchases on a loan by loan basis... And as we learn more, and again, our perspective on this - we're going to be quite diligent as I said in defending the interest of our shareholders. This really gets down to a loan-by-loan determination and we have, we believe, the resources to deploy against that kind of a review."
Back in June the judge on the case (a Judge Bransten) said (from the transcript):
"I think that it makes all the sense in the world that you can use a sample to prove the case because otherwise I can't imagine a jury listening to 386 thousand cases. Even if you have that available, nevertheless you are not going to present that to a jury or even to a judge. I'm patient but not that patient. So therefore it is going to be a sample in the end..."
OK, let me get this straight, Brian. Your company committed fraud, with robosignings and all the rest, and you won't man up and take responsibility? You and your lawyers want to thrash this out, case by case, fighting a trench-warfare, rear-guard action? Well I'm afraid that's not going to work out for you. There are so many examples of Countrywide outright fraud that it is going to be hard to convince a jury that BAC is not on the hook. Will it take years? Of course.
You can read the PowerPoint for details. Bottom line: BAC is probably liable for putbacks that could total over a hundred billion. And that is just BAC.
Think Citi. And any of the scores of mortgage originators and investment banks. There were a couple of trillion dollars in these securitizations issued. Plus how many hundred of billions of second-lien loans? And can we forget CDOs? And CDOs squared?
And let's not forget all those completely synthetic CDOs that were written at the height of the mania. Most of it AAA, of course. Frankly, anyone stupid enough to buy a synthetic CDO should lose their money, but that is not what the courts will base their decision on. It is all about representations and warranties. And maybe a little fraud.
I picked on BAC because that is the analysis I saw. But it could be any of dozens of banks. Look at this list from the Branch Hill PowerPoint.
Could we see a hundred billion in losses to the major banks? In my opinion we will for sure, over time. $200 billion? Probably. $300 billion? Maybe. $400 billion? It depends on how organized the investors in the securities get and what gets settled out of court. Out of a few trillion dollars in securitizations? It's anybody's guess. I just made mine.
But let's not forget the $227 billion sold to Fannie and Freddie. Taxpayers are on the hook for $300-400 billion in losses. Those putbacks could save us a lot. Will this threaten the viability of some banks? Maybe. But most will survive. BAC made $3 billion last quarter. A steep yield curve (with the help of the Fed) can cure a lot of evils. But it will absorb the profits of a lot of banks for a long time.
And that of course, will come back to haunt the rest of us as banks have to raise more capital and get more conservative.
Anyone who owns stocks in banks with relatively large MBS exposure is not investing, they are gambling that the losses will not be more than management is telling them. There will be no bailouts (at least I hope not) this time around. Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. There will be little sympathy for shareholders or bondholders this time, if it comes to that.
One more sad point. The FDIC (read taxpayers) is liable for some of this, as they took over some of these institutions. It just keeps on coming.
Final rant. If you were part of a group that knowingly created or sold flawed and fraudulent mortgage-backed securities to pensions and insurance companies and took home tens of millions in bonuses, up and down the management chain, maybe you should consider moving yourself and your money to a country that does not honor US extradition, because my guess is that, as all this comes out, you may have to hire some very expensive lawyers and get measured for pinstripes.
And the Mozilo agreement was a sham. Sigh. That would be the equivalent of fining me $10,000 and letting me keep my tanning bed. I don't have the space to go into the fraud at Countrywide, but their internal documents show they all knew what was going on.
Here Comes Mortgage Meltdown, Act 2 (part 1)
by John Mauldin:
Trouble, oh we got trouble, Right here in River City!
With a capital "T" That rhymes with "P"
And that stands for Pool, That stands for pool.
We've surely got trouble!
Right here in River City,
Right here! Gotta figger out a way
To keep the young ones moral after school!
Trouble, trouble, trouble, trouble, trouble...
- From The Music Man
(Quick last-minute note: I think this (and next week's) is/will be one of the more important letters I have written in the last ten years. Take the time to read, and if you agree send it on to friends and responsible parties. And note to new readers: this letter goes to 1.5 million of my closest friends. It is free. You can go to www.frontlinethoughts.com to subscribe. Now, let's jump in!)
There's trouble, my friends, and it is does indeed involve pool(s), but not in the pool hall. The real monster is hidden in those pools of subprime debt that have not gone away. When I first began writing and speaking about the coming subprime disaster, it was in late 2007 and early 2008. The subject was being dismissed in most polite circles. "The subprime problem," testified Ben Bernanke, "will be contained."
My early take? It would be a disaster for investors. I admit I did not see in January that it would bring down Lehman and trigger the worst banking crisis in 80 years, less than 18 months later. But it was clear that it would not be "contained." We had no idea.
I also said that it was going to create a monster legal battle down the road that would take years to develop. Well, in the fullness of time, those years have come nigh upon us. Today we briefly look at the housing market, then the mortgage foreclosure debacle, and then we go into the real problem lurking in the background. It is The Subprime Debacle, Act 2. It is NOT the mortgage foreclosure issue, as serious as that is. I seriously doubt it will be contained, as well. Could the confluence of a bank credit crisis in the US and a sovereign debt banking crisis in Europe lead to another full-blown world banking crisis? The potential is there. This situation wants some serious attention.
This letter is going to print a little longer. But I think it is important that you get a handle on this issue.
Where is the Housing Recovery?
We are going to quickly review a few charts from Gary Shilling's latest letter, where he review the housing market in depth. Bottom line, the housing market has not yet begun to recover, and it is not only going to take longer but the decline in prices may be greater than many have forecast. I wrote three years ago that it could be well into 2011 before we get to a "bottom." That may have been optimistic, given what we will cover in this letter.First, existing and new single-family home sales continue to slide, in the wake of the tax rebate that ended earlier this year. We have declined back to the down-sloping trend line. If you are a seller, this is not a pretty picture.
The homebuilding industry, which was the source of so many jobs last decade (aka the good old days), is on its back. This country needs a healthy housing construction market to get back to lower unemployment, and until the overhang in the foreclosure market is cleared out, that is unlikely to happen.
Lending is tighter, as is reasonable. Banks actually expect you to have the ability to pay back the mortgage you take out (solid FICO scores) and want reasonable down payments. Only 47% of applicants have the FICO score to get the best mortgage rates.
(Sidebar: Gary writes, "Furthermore, false appraisals rose 50% in 2009 from 2008. The tax credit for first-time homebuyers cost taxpayers about $15 billion, twice the official forecast, in part due to fraud. Over 19,000 tax filers claimed the credit but didn't buy houses, while 74,000 who claimed $500 million in refunds already owned homes." Where are the regulators?)
Shilling thinks prices are likely to fall another 20%. Given what I am writing about in the next section, that is a possibility. There is certainly no demand pressure to push up housing prices.
Finally, two charts on foreclosures. Residential mortgages in foreclosure are near all-time highs, close to 1 in 21 of all mortgages, up from 1 in 100 just four years ago. That's got to be bad for your profit models.
Anyone who tells you the housing problem is "bottoming" either has an agenda or simply does not pay attention to the data. I really want to see housing bottom and then turn around and the home builders come back; the nation desperately needs the jobs. But my job is to be realistic. When we see 3-4 months of non-stimulus-induced housing sales growth, then we can start talking about bottoms.
But housing sales are not really the issue. Let's look at the next leg of the problem.
The Foreclosure Mess
OK, in a serendipitous moment, Maine fishing buddy David Kotok sent me this email on the mortgage foreclosure crisis just as I was getting ready to write much the same thing. It is about the best thing I have read on the topic. Saves me some time and you get a better explanation. From Kotok:"Dear Readers, this text came to me in an email from sources that are in the financial services business and with whom I have a personal relationship. The original text was laced with expletives and I would not use it in the form I received it. Therefore the text below has had some substantial editing in order to remove that language. The intentions of the writer are undisturbed. The writer shall remain anonymous. This text echoes some of the news items we have seen and heard today; however, it can serve as a plain language description of the present foreclosure-suspension mess. There is a lot here. It takes about ten minutes to read it. - David Kotok (www.cumber.com)
"Homeowners can only be foreclosed and evicted from their homes by the person or institution who actually has the loan paper...only the note-holder has legal standing to ask a court to foreclose and evict. Not the mortgage, the note, which is the actual IOU that people sign, promising to pay back the mortgage loan
"Before mortgage-backed securities, most mortgage loans were issued by the local savings & loan. So the note usually didn't go anywhere: it stayed in the offices of the S&L down the street.
"But once mortgage loan securitization happened, things got sloppy...they got sloppy by the very nature of mortgage-backed securities.
"The whole purpose of MBSs was for different investors to have their different risk appetites satiated with different bonds. Some bond customers wanted super-safe bonds with low returns, some others wanted riskier bonds with correspondingly higher rates of return.
"Therefore, as everyone knows, the loans were 'bundled' into REMICs (Real-Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, a special vehicle designed to hold the loans for tax purposes), and then "sliced & diced"...split up and put into tranches, according to their likelihood of default, their interest rates, and other characteristics.
"This slicing and dicing created 'senior tranches,' where the loans would likely be paid in full, if the past history of mortgage loan statistics was to be believed. And it also created 'junior tranches,' where the loans might well default, again according to past history and statistics. (A whole range of tranches was created, of course, but for the purposes of this discussion we can ignore all those countless other variations.)
"These various tranches were sold to different investors, according to their risk appetite. That's why some of the MBS bonds were rated as safe as Treasury bonds, and others were rated by the ratings agencies as risky as junk bonds.
"But here's the key issue: When an MBS was first created, all the mortgages were pristine...none had defaulted yet, because they were all brand-new loans. Statistically, some would default and some others would be paid back in full...but which ones specifically would default? No one knew, of course. If I toss a coin 1,000 times, statistically, 500 tosses the coin will land heads...but what will the result be of, say, the 723rd toss? No one knows.
"Same with mortgages.
"So in fact, it wasn't that the riskier loans were in junior tranches and the safer ones were in senior tranches: rather, all the loans were in the REMIC, and if and when a mortgage in a given bundle of mortgages defaulted, the junior tranche holders would take the losses first, and the senior tranche holder last.
"But who were the owners of the junior-tranche bond and the senior-tranche bonds? Two different people. Therefore, the mortgage note was not actually signed over to the bond holder. In fact, it couldn't be signed over. Because, again, since no one knew which mortgage would default first, it was impossible to assign a specific mortgage to a specific bond.
"Therefore, how to make sure the safe mortgage loan stayed with the safe MBS tranche, and the risky and/or defaulting mortgage went to the riskier tranche?
"Enter stage right the famed MERS...the Mortgage Electronic Registration System.
"MERS was the repository of these digitized mortgage notes that the banks originated from the actual mortgage loans signed by homebuyers. MERS was jointly owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (yes, those two again ...I know, I know: like the chlamydia and the gonorrhea of the financial world...you cure 'em, but they just keep coming back).
"The purpose of MERS was to help in the securitization process. Basically, MERS directed defaulting mortgages to the appropriate tranches of mortgage bonds. MERS was essentially where the digitized mortgage notes were sliced and diced and rearranged so as to create the mortgage-backed securities. Think of MERS as Dr. Frankenstein's operating table, where the beast got put together.
"However, legally...and this is the important part...MERS didn't hold any mortgage notes: the true owner of the mortgage notes should have been the REMICs.
"But the REMICs didn't own the notes either, because of a fluke of the ratings agencies: the REMICs had to be "bankruptcy remote," in order to get the precious ratings needed to peddle mortgage-backed Securities to institutional investors.
"So somewhere between the REMICs and MERS, the chain of title was broken.
"Now, what does 'broken chain of title' mean? Simple: when a homebuyer signs a mortgage, the key document is the note. As I said before, it's the actual IOU. In order for the mortgage note to be sold or transferred to someone else (and therefore turned into a mortgage-backed security), this document has to be physically endorsed to the next person. All of these signatures on the note are called the 'chain of title.'
"You can endorse the note as many times as you please...but you have to have a clear chain of title right on the actual note: I sold the note to Moe, who sold it to Larry, who sold it to Curly, and all our notarized signatures are actually, physically, on the note, one after the other.
"If for whatever reason any of these signatures is skipped, then the chain of title is said to be broken. Therefore, legally, the mortgage note is no longer valid. That is, the person who took out the mortgage loan to pay for the house no longer owes the loan, because he no longer knows whom to pay.
"To repeat: if the chain of title of the note is broken, then the borrower no longer owes any money on the loan.
"Read that last sentence again, please. Don't worry, I'll wait.
"You read it again? Good: Now you see the can of worms that's opening up.
"The broken chain of title might not have been an issue if there hadn't been an unusual number of foreclosures. Before the housing bubble collapse, the people who defaulted on their mortgages wouldn't have bothered to check to see that the paperwork was in order.
"But as everyone knows, following the housing collapse of 2007-'10-and-counting, there has been a boatload of foreclosures...and foreclosures on a lot of people who weren't sloppy bums who skipped out on their mortgage payments, but smart and cautious people who got squeezed by circumstances.
"These people started contesting their foreclosures and evictions, and so started looking into the chain-of-title issue, and that's when the paperwork became important. So the chain of title became crucial and the botched paperwork became a nontrivial issue.
"Now, the banks had hired 'foreclosure mills'...law firms that specialized in foreclosures...in order to handle the massive volume of foreclosures and evictions that occurred because of the housing crisis. The foreclosure mills, as one would expect, were the first to spot the broken chain of titles.
"Well, what do you know, it turns out that these foreclosure mills might have faked and falsified documentation, so as to fraudulently repair the chain-of-title issue, thereby 'proving' that the banks had judicial standing to foreclose on delinquent mortgages. These foreclosure mills might have even forged the loan note itself...
"Wait, why am I hedging? The foreclosure mills did actually, deliberately, and categorically fake and falsify documents, in order to expedite these foreclosures and evictions. Yves Smith at Naked Capitalism, who has been all over this story, put up a price list for this 'service' from a company called DocX...yes, a price list for forged documents. Talk about your one-stop shopping!
"So in other words, a massive fraud was carried out, with the inevitable innocent bystanders getting caught up in the fraud: the guy who got foreclosed and evicted from his home in Florida, even though he didn't actually have a mortgage, and in fact owned his house free - and clear. The family that was foreclosed and evicted, even though they had a perfect mortgage payment record. Et cetera, depressing et cetera.
"Now, the reason this all came to light is not because too many people were getting screwed by the banks or the government or someone with some power saw what was going on and decided to put a stop to it...that would have been nice, to see a shining knight in armor, riding on a white horse.
"But that's not how America works nowadays.
"No, alarm bells started going off when the title insurance companies started to refuse to insure the titles.
"In every sale, a title insurance company insures that the title is free -and clear ...that the prospective buyer is in fact buying a properly vetted house, with its title issues all in order. Title insurance companies stopped providing their service because...of course...they didn't want to expose themselves to the risk that the chain of title had been broken, and that the bank had illegally foreclosed on the previous owner.
"That's when things started getting interesting: that's when the attorneys general of various states started snooping around and making noises (elections are coming up, after all).
"The fact that Ally Financial (formerly GMAC), JP Morgan Chase, and now Bank of America have suspended foreclosures signals that this is a serious problem...obviously. Banks that size, with that much exposure to foreclosed properties, don't suspend foreclosures just because they're good corporate citizens who want to do the right thing, and who have all their paperwork in strict order...they're halting their foreclosures for a reason.
"The move by the United States Congress last week, to sneak by the Interstate Recognition of Notarizations Act? That was all the banking lobby. They wanted to shove down that law, so that their foreclosure mills' forged and fraudulent documents would not be scrutinized by out-of-state judges. (The spineless cowards in the Senate carried out their master's will by a voice vote...so that there would be no registry of who had voted for it, and therefore no accountability.)
"And President Obama's pocket veto of the measure? He had to veto it...if he'd signed it, there would have been political hell to pay, plus it would have been challenged almost immediately, and likely overturned as unconstitutional in short order. (But he didn't have the gumption to come right out and veto it...he pocket vetoed it.)
"As soon as the White House announced the pocket veto...the very next day!...Bank of America halted all foreclosures, nationwide.
"Why do you think that happened? Because the banks are in trouble...again. Over the same thing as last time...the damned mortgage-backed securities!
"The reason the banks are in the tank again is, if they've been foreclosing on people they didn't have the legal right to foreclose on, then those people have the right to get their houses back. And the people who bought those foreclosed houses from the bank might not actually own the houses they paid for.
"And it won't matter if a particular case...or even most cases...were on the up -and up: It won't matter if most of the foreclosures and evictions were truly due to the homeowner failing to pay his mortgage. The fraud committed by the foreclosure mills casts enough doubt that, now, all foreclosures come into question. Not only that, all mortgages come into question.
"People still haven't figured out what all this means. But I'll tell you: if enough mortgage-paying homeowners realize that they may be able to get out of their mortgage loans and keep their houses, scott-free? That's basically a license to halt payments right now, thank you. That's basically a license to tell the banks to take a hike.
"What are the banks going to do...try to foreclose and then evict you? Show me the paper, Mr. Banker, will be all you need to say.
"This is a major, major crisis. The Lehman bankruptcy could be a spring rain compared to this hurricane. And if this isn't handled right...and handled right quick, in the next couple of weeks at the outside...this crisis could also spell the end of the mortgage business altogether. Of banking altogether. Hell, of civil society. What do you think happens in a country when the citizens realize they don't need to pay their debts?"
(I am not sure who wrote this, but if you want your 15 minutes of fame, I will be glad to credit you next week. - John)
Some Foreclosure Takeaways
Let me add a few thoughts. First, I agree, this is very serious. It has the possibility of seriously hurting the housing market, which as we saw in the first section is already on the ropes. But at the end of the day, there is a cure.Someone borrowed money for a mortgage. Some entity is cashing a check if that person is paying. That entity should have the title until it is paid off. If someone is not making their mortgage payments, they should be removed from the house and it should be sold to the benefit of the ultimately correct and what everyone thought was the proper title holder.
If you took out a mortgage and now the title is in some doubt because the investment banks and mortgage banks and all the middle guys screwed up (big-time!) because they wanted to save some bucks and make some commissions, you did not win the lottery. That is not America as I know it. You can't pay the mortgage, I am sorry. But you do not get to keep the house. The people who (thought) they bought the mortgage in a fair deal need to end up with that mortgage.
If you pay your mortgage, you get to have the American Dream.
We CANNOT allow this debacle to continue. It will bring the system down. Who will want to buy a mortgage that is in a securitized package with no clear title? Who will get title insurance? Some judge somewhere is going to make a ruling that is going to petrify every title company, and the whole thing grinds to a halt.
Let's be very clear. If we cannot securitize mortgages, there is no mortgage market. We cannot go back to where lenders warehoused the notes. It would take a decade to build that infrastructure. In the meantime, housing prices are devastated. Whatever wealth effect remains from housing gets worse, and the economy rolls over.
This is beyond my pay grade, but there have to be some adults who can make everyone play nice in the sandbox. Ideally, someone in authority at the Treasury, with bipartisan support steps in and says everyone follow these rules, whatever these rules need to be.
I had a very spirited conversation with good friend Barry Ritholtz today (of The Big Picture). Barry runs money but is also a lawyer and has a somewhat different perspective. He thinks we do not need any legislation and there is a legal cure. He says that real trained people (lawyers and paralegals) need to look at each mortgage and figure it out, and that it can get resolved. It is expensive to the banks; but I agree, if it is just dollars I don't care. Fix it.
But that is a maybe. Other people I talk to disagree. Some think we need some regulatory fixes. Some think we will need a legislative cure. But if we need to, there need be no finger pointing, no partisan BS. This needs to get solved.
Someone took out a mortgage. Some entity thinks they are owed money. Fix the damn paper trail so that happens, whether in a legal if time-consuming manner, in a regulatory fix, or with legislation.
Now, that is not to say the people who did this stuff did not commit felonies and such. We can sort that out over time. The longer we wait the worse it will get. Fix the problem and then go round up the bad guys. There are bigger issues in play here. (I know this will be somewhat controversial. Oh well.)
I get the fraud being done here. I am regulated by FINRA, the NFA, various states, the British FSA, and ultimately the SEC. If I did something in my business like the stuff described above, someone would come in and justifiably shut me down, fine me, and ban me from the securities business. Oh, wait. These guys ARE regulated by the above groups.
Finally on this topic, I shake my head when I think that the FDIC is now running several of the banks (think IndyMac) that are part of this foreclosure crisis. These are the guys who are supposed to be preventing something like this. Again, where are the adults?
The Subprime Debacle: Act 2
OK, this letter is already getting too long. I am going to finish it next week, as the next topic needs a lengthy treatment. But I will not leave you hanging. A quick preview.All those subprime and Alt-A mortgages written in the middle of the last decade? They were packaged and sold in securities. They have had huge losses. But those securities had representations and warranties about what was in them. And guess what, the investment banks may have stretched credibility about those warranties. There is the real probability that the investment banks that sold them are going to have to buy them back. We are talking the potential for multiple hundreds of billions of dollars in losses that will have to be eaten by the large investment banks. We will get into details, but it could create the potential for some banks to have real problems.
And all this coming as European banks are going to have to sort out their own sovereign debt problems. Shades of 2008. I hope I am wrong, but it's all connected.
John Hussman: We Are In a Classic Liquidity Trap
"There is the possibility... that after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity preference is virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt at so low a rate of interest. In this event, the monetary authority would have lost effective control."
John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory
One of the many controversies regarding Keynesian economic theory centers around the idea of a "liquidity trap." Apart from suggesting the potential risk, Keynes himself did not focus much of his analysis on the idea, so much of what passes for debate is based on the ideas of economists other than Keynes, particularly Keynes' contemporary John Hicks. In the Hicksian interpretation of the liquidity trap, monetary policy transmits its effect on the real economy by way of interest rates. In that view, the loss of monetary control occurs because at some point, a further reduction of interest rates fails to stimulate additional demand for capital investment.
Alternatively, monetary policy might transmit its effect on the real economy by directly altering the quantity of funds available to lend. In that view, a liquidity trap would be characterized by the failure of real investment and output to expand in response to increases in the monetary base (currency and reserves).
In either case, the hallmark of a liquidity trap is that holdings of money become "infinitely elastic." As the monetary base is increased, banks, corporations and individuals simply choose to hold onto those additional money balances, with no effect on the real economy. The typical Econ 101 chart of this is drawn in terms of "liquidity preference," that is, desired cash holdings, plotted against interest rates. When interest rates are high, people choose to hold less cash because cash doesn't earn interest. As interest rates decline toward zero (and especially if the Fed chooses to pay banks interest on cash reserves, which is presently the case), there is no effective difference between holding riskless debt securities (say, Treasury bills) and riskless cash balances, so additional cash balances are simply kept idle.
A related way to think about a liquidity trap is in terms of monetary velocity: nominal GDP divided by the monetary base. (The identity, which is true by definition, is M * V = P * Y. The monetary base times velocity is equal to the price level times real output). Rising velocity implies that a given stock of money is "turning over" rapidly, so that nominal GDP is increasing faster than the stock of money. This is associated with either growth in real output or inflation. Falling velocity implies that a given stock of money is being hoarded, so that nominal GDP is growing slower than the stock of money. This is associated with either unresponsive real output or deflation.
How to spot a liquidity trap
The chart below plots the velocity of the U.S. monetary base against interest rates since 1947. Since high money holdings correspond to low velocity, the graph is simply the mirror image of the theoretical chart above.
Few theoretical relationships in economics hold quite this well. Recall that a Keynesian liquidity trap occurs at the point when interest rates become so low that cash balances are passively held regardless of their size. The relationship between interest rates and velocity therefore goes flat at low interest rates, since increases in the money stock simply produce a proportional decline in velocity, without requiring any further decline in yields. Notice the cluster of observations where interest rates are zero? Those are the most recent data points.
One of the most fascinating aspects of the current debate about monetary policy is the belief that changes in the money stock are tightly related either to GDP growth or inflation at all. Look at the historical data, and you will find no evidence of it. Over the years, I've repeatedly emphasized that inflation is primarily a reflection of fiscal policy - specifically, growth in the outstanding quantity of government liabilities, regardless of their form, in order to finance unproductive spending. Look at the experience of the 1970's (which followed large expansions in transfer payments), as well as every historical hyperinflation, and you'll find massive increases in government spending that were made without regard to productivity (Germany's hyperinflation, for instance, was provoked by continuous wage payments to striking workers). Likewise, real economic growth has no observable correlation with growth in the monetary base (the correlation is actually slightly negative but insignificant). Rather, economic growth is the result of hundreds of millions of individual decision-makers, each acting in their best interests to shift their consumption plans, saving, and investment in response to desirable opportunities that they face. Their behavior cannot simply be induced by changes in the money supply or in interest rates, absent those desirable opportunities.
You can see why monetary base manipulations have so little effect on GDP by examining U.S. data since 1947. Expand the quantity of base money, and it turns out that velocity falls in nearly direct proportion. The cluster of points at the bottom right reflect the most recent data.
[Geek's Note: The slope of the relationship plotted above is approximately -1, while the Y intercept is just over 6%, which makes sense, and reflects the long-term growth of nominal GDP, virtually independent of variations in the monetary base. For example, 6% growth in nominal GDP is consistent with 0% M and 6% V, 5% M and 1% V, 10% M and -4% V, etc. There is somewhat more scatter in 3-year, 2-year and 1-year charts, but it is random scatter. If expansions in base money were correlated with predictably higher GDP growth, and contractions in base money were correlated with predictably lower GDP growth, the slope of the line would be flatter and the fit would still be reasonably good. We don't observe this.]
Just to drive the point home, the chart below presents the same historical relationship in Japanese data over the past two decades. One wonders why anyone expects quantitative easing in the U.S. to be any less futile than it was in Japan.
Simply put, monetary policy is far less effective in affecting real (or even nominal) economic activity than investors seem to believe. The main effect of a change in the monetary base is to change monetary velocity and short term interest rates. Once short term interest rates drop to zero, further expansions in base money simply induce a proportional collapse in velocity.
I should emphasize that the Federal Reserve does have an essential role in providing liquidity during periods of crisis, such as bank runs. Undoubtedly, we would have preferred the Fed to have provided that liquidity in recent years through open market operations using Treasury securities, rather than outright purchases of the debt securities of insolvent financial institutions, which the public is now on the hook to make whole. Regardless, when liquidity constraints are truly binding, the Fed has an essential function in the economy.
At present, however, the governors of the Fed are creating massive distortions in the financial markets with little hope of improving real economic growth or employment. There is no question that the Fed has the ability to affect the supply of base money, and can affect the level of long-term interest rates given a sufficient volume of intervention. The real issue is that neither of these factors are currently imposing a binding constraint on economic growth, so there is no benefit in relaxing them further. The Fed is pushing on a string.
Toy blocks
Certain economic equations and regularities make it tempting to assume that there are simple cause-effect relationships that would allow a policy maker to directly manipulate prices and output. While the Fed can control the monetary base, the behavior of prices and output is based on a whole range of factors outside of the Fed's control. Except at the shortest maturities, interest rates are also a function of factors well beyond monetary policy.
Analysts and even policy makers often ignore equilibrium, preferring to think only in terms of demand, or only in terms of supply. For example, it is widely believed that lower real interest rates will result in higher economic growth. But in fact, the historical correlation between real interest rates and GDP growth has been positive - on balance, higher real interest rates are associated with higher economic growth over the following year. This is because higher rates reflect strong demand for loans and an abundance of desirable investment projects. Of course, nobody would propose a policy of raising real interest rates to stimulate economic activity, because they would recognize that higher real interest rates were an effect of strong loan demand, and could not be used to cause it. Yet despite the fact that loan demand is weak at present, due to the lack of desirable investment projects and the desire to reduce debt loads (which has in turn contributed to keeping interest rates low), the Fed seems to believe that it can eliminate these problems simply by depressing interest rates further. Memo to Ben Bernanke: Loan demand is inelastic here, and for good reason. Whatever happened to thinking in terms of equilibrium?
Neither economic growth nor the demand for loans are a simple function of interest rates. If consumers wish to reduce their debt, and companies do not have a desirable menu of potential investments, there is little benefit in reducing interest rates by another percentage point, because the precise cost of borrowing is not the issue. The current thinking by the FOMC seems to treat individual economic actors as little unthinking toy blocks that can be moved into the desired position at will. Instead, our policy makers should be carefully examining the constraints and interests that are important to people and act in a way that responsibly addresses those constraints.
A good example of this "toy block" thinking is the notion of forcing individuals to spend more and save less by increasing people's expectations about inflation (which would drive real interest rates to negative levels). As I noted last week, if one examines economic history, one quickly discovers that just as lower nominal interest rates are associated with lower monetary velocity, negative real interest rates are associated with lower velocity of commodities (hoarding). Look at the price of gold since 1975. When real interest rates have been negative (even simply measured as the 3-month Treasury bill yield minus trailing annual CPI inflation), gold prices have appreciated at a 20.7% annual rate. In contrast, when real interest rates have been positive, gold has appreciated at just 2.1% annually. The tendency toward commodity hoarding is particularly strong when economic conditions are very weak and desirable options for real investment are not available. When real interest rates have been negative and the Purchasing Managers Index has been below 50, the XAU gold index has appreciated at an 85.7% annual rate, compared with a rate of just 0.1% when neither has been true. Despite these tendencies, investors should be aware that the volatility of gold stocks can often be intolerable, so finer methods of analysis are also essential.
Quantitative easing promises to have little effect except to provoke commodity hoarding, a decline in bond yields to levels that reflect nothing but risk premiums for maturity risk, and an expansion in stock valuations to levels that have rarely been sustained for long (the current Shiller P/E of 22 for the S&P 500 has typically been followed by 5-10 year total returns below 5% annually). The Fed is not helping the economy - it is encouraging a bubble in risky assets, and an increasingly unstable one at that. The Fed has now placed itself in the position where small changes in its announced policy could have disastrous effects on a whole range of financial markets. This is not sound economic thinking but misguided tinkering with the stability of the economy.
Implications for Policy
In 1978, MIT economist Nathaniel Mass developed a framework for the liquidity trap based on microeconomic theory - rational decisions made at the level of individual consumers and firms. The economic dynamics resulting from the model he suggested seem strikingly familiar in the context of the recent economic downturn. They offer a useful way to think about the current economic environment, and appropriate policy responses that might be taken.
"The theory revolves around a set of forces that for a period of time promote cumulative expansion of capital formation, but eventually lead to overexpansion of capital production capacity and then into a situation where excess capacity strongly counteracts expansionary monetary policies.
"The capital boom followed by depression runs much longer than the usual short-term business cycle, and is powerfully driven by capital investment interactions. The weak impact of monetary stimulus on real activity arises because additional money has little force in stimulating additional capital investment during a period of general overcapacity. Instead, money is withheld in idle balances when profitable investment opportunities are scarce."
In one illustration of the model, Mass introduces a monetary stimulus much like what Alan Greenspan engineered following the 2000-2002 recession (which was also preceded by an unusually large buildup of excess capacity, leading to an investment-led downturn). Though Greenspan's easy-money policy didn't prompt a great deal of business investment, it did help to fuel the expansion in another form of investment, specifically housing. Mass describes the resulting economic dynamics:
"Following the monetary intervention, relatively easy money provides a greater incentive to order capital... But now the overcapacity that characterizes the peak in the production of capital goods reaches an even higher level than without the stimulus. This overcapacity eventually makes further investment even less attractive and causes the decline in capital output to proceed from a higher peak and at a faster pace. Due to persistent excess capital which cannot be reduced as fast as labor can be cut back to alleviate excess production, unemployment actually remains higher on the average following the drop in production."
In what reads today as a further warning against Bernanke-style quantitative easing, Mass observed:
"Even aggressive monetary intervention can do little to correct excess capital.. Once excess capacity develops, the forces that previously led to aggressive expansion are almost played out. Efforts to prolong high investment can produce even more excess capital and lead to a more pronounced readjustment later."
Mass concluded his 1978 paper with an observation from economist Robert Gordon:
"Why was the recovery of the 1930's so slow and halting in the United States, and why did it stop so far short of full employment? We have seen that the trouble lay primarily in the lack of inducement to invest. Even with abnormally low interest rates, the economy was unable to generate a volume of investment high enough to raise aggregate demand to the full employment level."
I've generally been critical of Keynes' willingness to advocate government spending regardless of its quality, which focused too little on the long-term effects of diverting private resources to potentially unproductive uses. His remark that "In the long-run we are all dead" was a reflection of this indifference. Still, I do believe that fiscal responses can be useful in a protracted economic downturn, and can include projects such as public infrastructure, incentives for research and development, and investment incentives in sectors that are not burdened with overcapacity. Additional deficit spending is harmful when it fails to produce a stream of future output sufficient to service the debt, so the expected productivity of these projects is the essential consideration. Given present economic conditions, it appears clear that Keynes was right about the dangers of easy monetary policy when an economic downturn results from overcapacity. As I noted last week in The Recklessness of Quantitative Easing, better options are available on the fiscal menu.
Market Climate
As of last week, the Market Climate for stocks remained characterized by an overvalued, overbought, overbullish condition. This has been historically associated with a poor return-risk profile and "negative skew" - a tendency for the market to establish a string of marginal new highs, and for occasional 2-3 day pullbacks to be followed by sharp recoveries. The pattern is for little overall progress, but repeated slight highs, terminating with a steep, abrupt decline that can wipe out weeks or months of gains in a matter of days. In statistical terms, the mode of the distribution is positive, the mean is negative, and the skew is downright wicked.
It's a Dollar Debacle!
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Home Prices Begin Double Dip
CNBC reported that home prices slipped 6% in the past two months.
It gets worse: Gary Shilling is predicting an additional 20% drop in housing prices. That means that homeowner mortgages that are underwater will nearly double from 23% to 40%! More housing misery to come!
Fitch Downgrades U.S. Banks' Debt
"Today, Fitch Ratings issued a number of separate press releases placing on Rating Watch Negative most U.S. bank and bank holding companies' Support Ratings, Support Floors and other ratings that are sovereign-support dependent. The two companies mostly impacted by this announcement are Bank of America Corporation and Citigroup, Inc."
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