The Hoisington Quarterly Review and Outlook is one of the 
cornerstones of my reading on where the economy is headed. Van 
Hoisington and Lacy Hunt do a masterful job of turning data points into 
cogent, well-argued themes.
 This month they waste no time in dissecting the Fed’s recent move to 
QE3 and similar efforts in Europe, arriving at the conclusion that 
“While prices for risk assets have improved, governments have not been 
able to address underlying debt imbalances. Thus, nothing suggests that 
these latest actions do anything to change the extreme over-indebtedness
 of major global economies.”
 Their expectation: global recession. The only issue left to sort out, they say, is How deep will the downturn be?
 They make the interesting observation that with each injection of 
liquidity by the Fed, commodity prices have surged: “During QE1 & 
QE2 wholesale gasoline prices jumped 30% and 37%, respectively, and the 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Food Index (GSCI-Food) rose 7% and 22%, 
respectively. From the time the press reported that the Fed was moving 
toward QE3, both gasoline and the GSCI Food index jumped by 19%, through
 the end of the 3rd quarter.”
 The QE picture gets even muddier. The unintended consequence of the Fed’s actions, say Lacy and Van, has been to actually slow economic activity:
 “The CPI rose significantly in QE1 and QE2 (Chart 1). These price 
increases had a devastating effect on worker's incomes (Chart 2). Wages 
did not immediately respond to commodity price changes; therefore, there
 was an approximate 3% decline in real average hourly earnings in both 
instances. It is true that stock prices also rose along with commodity 
prices (S&P plus 36% and 24%, respectively, in QE1 and QE2). 
However, median households hold a small portion of equities, and thus 
received minimal wealth benefit.”
 They proceed to tear apart the wealth effect that the Fed is banking on
 to restimulate the economy, drawing on several solid studies. They also
 make the key point that “When the Fed actions lead to higher food and 
fuel prices, the shock wave reverberates around the world, with many 
foreign economies being hit adversely. When prices of basic necessities 
rise, the greatest burden is on those with the lowest incomes since more
 of their budget is allocated to the basic necessities such as food and 
fuel.”
 The next few years are not going to be pretty. We’re looking right into
 the teeth of a rolling global deleveraging recession—the End Game, I’ve
 called it. And the decisions we make in the next couple years about how
 to handle our debts and budget deficits—here in the U.S., in Europe, in
 China and Japan, and elsewhere—are going to be absolutely crucial.
 Hoisington Investment Management Company (www.hoisingtonmgt.com)
 is a registered investment advisor specializing in fixed-income 
portfolios for large institutional clients. Located in Austin, Texas, 
the firm has over $4 billion under management, composed of corporate and
 public funds, foundations, endowments, Taft-Hartley funds, and 
insurance companies.
 My daughter Abbi is coming into town tonight from Tulsa with her 
fiancé, and most of the family will gather over the weekend for dinners 
and fun. And her twin Amanda is expecting, so another grandchild is in 
the future as well. Family and friends are among the few permanent 
fixtures in a world that seems to change almost weekly.
 I was with Pat Cox of Breakthrough Technology Alert on Tuesday
 night. We watched the debate and then went deep into the night talking 
about the future. And got up the next day and did the same between 
meetings. We ended up doing a tag team that night for Hedge Fund Cares, 
which raised a lot of money to help abused children. I talked about the 
global landscape (which was not so upbeat) and he talked about the 
changes we see in the biotech world; and we then both answered 
questions, which was more fun, as we got to think about the marvelous 
the future that is shaping up. Such totally amazing things are 
happening. I am really quite the optimist over the longer term.
 Have a great weekend, and look for your next Thoughts from the Frontline in your inbox Monday.
 Your bullish on the future but bearish on governments analyst,
      
John Mauldin, Editor
Outside the Box
Hoisington Investment Management
 Quarterly Review and Outlook
 Third Quarter 2012
 Growth Recession
 Entering the final quarter of the year, domestic and global economic 
conditions are extremely fragile.  Across the globe, countries are in 
outright recession, and in some instances where aggregate growth is 
holding above the zero line, manufacturing sectors are contracting.  The
 only issue left to determine is the degree of the downturn underway.  
International trade is declining, so weaknesses in different parts of 
the world are reinforcing domestic deteriorations in economies 
continents away.  With this global slump at hand, a highly relevant 
question is whether the U.S. can escape a severe recession in light of 
the following:
 a) the U.S. manufacturing sector that paced domestic economic growth over the past three years has lapsed into recession;
 b) real income and the personal saving rate have been slumping in the face of an interim upturn in inflation, and
 c) aggregate over-indebtedness, which is the dominant negative force in
 the economy, has continued to move upward in concert with flagging 
economic activity.
 New government initiatives have been announced, particularly by central
 banks, in an attempt to counteract deteriorating economic conditions.  
These latest programs in the U.S. and Europe are similar to previous 
efforts.  While prices for risk assets have improved, governments have 
not been able to address underlying debt imbalances.  Thus, nothing 
suggests that these latest actions do anything to change the extreme 
over-indebtedness of major global economies. 
 To avoid recession in the U.S., the Federal Reserve embarked on 
open-ended quantitative easing (QE3).  Importantly, the enactment of QE3
 is a tacit admission by the Fed that earlier efforts failed, but this 
action will also fail to bring about stronger economic growth.
 Commodity Market Reactions
 Commodity markets have risen in reaction to the Federal Reserve’s 
liquidity injections into the banking sector (Table 1).  From the time 
the press reported that the Fed was moving toward QE1 & QE2 
commodity prices surged.  During QE1 & QE2 wholesale gasoline prices
 jumped 30% and 37%, respectively, and the Goldman Sachs Commodity Food 
Index (GSCI-Food) rose 7% and 22%, respectively.  From the time the 
press reported that the Fed was moving toward QE3, both gasoline and the
 GSCI Food index jumped by 19%, through the end of the 3rd quarter.
 
 
 Two theoretical considerations account for the rise in commodity prices
 during QE3.  The first is the expectations effect.  When the Fed says 
they want higher inflation, the initial reaction of the markets is to 
“go with”, rather than fight the Fed.  The second linkage, which is the 
expanded availability of funds used for collateral (margin), was 
identified and subsequently confirmed by Newedge economist, Dr. Rod 
McKnew, who stated, “In a world of advanced derivatives, high cash 
balances are not required to take speculative positions.  All that is 
required is that margin requirements be satisfied.”  Thus, when the Fed 
massively expanded reserve balances in QE1 and QE2, margin risk was 
minimized for those market participants who wished to take positions 
consistent with the Fed’s goal of higher inflation, and who had either 
direct or indirect access to the Fed’s hugely inflated reserve 
balances.  The April 22, 2011 issue of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer 
documented support for McKnew’s insight.  They asked Darrell Duffie, the
 Dean Witter Distinguished Professor of Finance at the Graduate School 
of Business at Stanford University, whether excess reserves could serve 
as collateral for futures and derivatives transactions.  Dr. Duffie’s 
answer was “acceptable collateral is a matter of private contract, but 
reserve deposits are virtually always acceptable.”
 Devastation for Households
 The unintended consequence of these Federal Reserve actions, however, 
is to actually slow economic activity.  The CPI rose significantly in 
QE1 and QE2 (Chart 1).  These price increases had a devastating effect 
on worker's incomes (Chart 2).  Wages did not immediately respond to 
commodity price changes; therefore, there was an approximate 3% decline 
in real average hourly earnings in both instances.  It is true that 
stock prices also rose along with commodity prices (S&P plus 36% and
 24%, respectively, in QE1 and QE2).  However, median households hold a 
small portion of equities, and thus received minimal wealth benefit.
 Wealth Effect
 Despite the miserable economic results in QE1 and QE2, we now have 
QE3.  Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and other Fed advocates believe the “wealth
 effect” of QE3 will bring life to the economy.  The economics 
profession has explored this issue in detail.  Sydney Ludvigson and 
Charles Steindel in How Important is the Stock Market Effect on Consumption
 in the FRBNY Economic Policy Review, July 1999 write: “We find, as 
expected, a positive connection between aggregate wealth changes and 
aggregate spending.  Spending growth in recent years has surely been 
augmented by market gains, but the effect is found to be rather unstable
 and hard to pin down.  The contemporaneous response of consumption 
growth to an unexpected change in wealth is uncertain, and the response 
appears very short-lived.”  More recently, David Backus, economic 
professor at New York University found that the wealth effect is not 
observable, at least for changes in home or equity wealth.
 A 2011 study in Applied Economic Letters entitled, Financial Wealth Effect: Evidence from Threshold Estimation
 by Sherif Khalifa, Ousmane Seck and Elwin Tobing found “a threshold 
income level of almost $130,000, below which the financial wealth effect
 is insignificant, and above which the effect is 0.004.” This means a $1
 rise in wealth would, in time, boost consumption by less than one-half 
penny.
 These three studies show that the impact of wealth on spending is 
miniscule—indeed, “nearly not observable.” How the Fed expects the U.S. 
to gain any economic traction from higher stock prices when rising 
commodity prices are curtailing real income and spending is puzzling.  
This is particularly relevant when econometricians have estimated that 
for every dollar of gained real income, consumption will rise by about 
70 cents.  Conversely, the Fed actions are causing real incomes to 
decline, which has a 70-cent negative impact on spending for every 
dollar loss.  Compare that with the 0.004 positive impact on spending 
for every one-dollar increase in wealth.  Former Fed Chairman, Paul 
Volcker, summarized the new Fed initiative as sufficiently and 
succinctly as anyone when he stated that another round of QE3 “is 
understandable, but it will fail to fix the problem.”
 An International Corollary
 The unintended consequences of QE3 could also serve to worsen and 
undermine global economic conditions already under considerable duress. 
 When the Fed actions lead to higher food and fuel prices, the shock 
wave reverberates around the world, with many foreign economies being 
hit adversely.  When prices of basic necessities rise, the greatest 
burden is on those with the lowest incomes since more of their budget is
 allocated to the basic necessities such as food and fuel.  Thus, a jump
 in daily essentials has a more profound negative impact on living 
standards in economies with lower levels of real per capita income.
 Can the Fed Create Demand?
 Can all the trillions of dollars of reserves being added to the banking
 system move the economy forward enough to eventually create a higher 
level of aggregate spending?  Our analysis of the aggregate demand curve
 and its determinants indicate they cannot.  The question is whether 
monetary actions can shift this aggregate demand (AD) curve out to the 
right from AD0 to AD1 (Chart 3).  If this were possible, then indeed the
 economy would shift to a higher level of prices and real GDP.
 The AD curve is equal to planned expenditures for nominal GDP since 
every point on the curve is equal to the aggregate price level (measured
 on the vertical axis of the graph), multiplied by real GDP (measured on
 the horizontal axis of the graph).  We know that GDP is equal to money 
times its turnover or velocity, which is called the equation of exchange
 as developed by Irving Fisher (Nominal GDP = M*V). 
 Deconstructing this formula, M (or M2) is comprised of the monetary 
base (currency plus reserves) times the money multiplier (m).  The 
Federal Reserve has control over the monetary base since its balance 
sheet is the dominant component of the monetary base.  However, the Fed 
does not directly control the money supply.  The decisions of the 
depository institutions and the non-bank public determine the money 
multiplier (m).  M2 thus equals the monetary base multiplied by the 
money multiplier.  The monetary base, also referred to as high powered 
money, has exploded from $800 billion in 2008, to $2.6 trillion 
currently, but the money multiplier has collapsed from 9.3 to 3.9 (Chart
 4).  Therefore, the money supply has risen significantly less than the 
increase in the Fed’s balance sheet, with the result that neither rapid 
gains in real GDP nor inflation were achieved.  Indeed, with the 
exception of transitory episodes, inflation remains subdued and the gain
 in GDP in the three years of this expansion was the worst of any 
recovery period since World War II.
 
 
 The other element that is required for the Fed to shift the aggregate 
demand curve outward is the velocity or turnover of money over which 
they also have no control.  During all of the Fed actions since 2008 the
 velocity of money has plummeted and now stands at a five decade low 
(Chart 5).
 The consequence of the Fed’s lack of control over the money multiplier 
and velocity is apparent.  The monetary base has surged 3.3 times in 
size since QE1.  Nominal GDP, however, has grown only at an annual rate 
of 3%.  This suggests they have not been able to shift the aggregate 
demand curve outward.  Nor, with these constraints, will they be any 
more successful in shifting that curve under the present open-ended 
QE3.  Increased aggregate demand and thus rising inflation is not on the
 horizon.
 [For a more complete discussion of the complexities of the movement
 of the aggregate supply and aggregate demand curves please see the 
APPENDIX.]
 Treasury Bonds
 As commodity prices rose initially in all the QE programs, long-term 
Treasury bond yields also increased.  However, those higher yields 
eventually reversed and generally continued to ratchet downward, 
reaching near record lows.  The current Fed actions may be politically 
necessary due to numerous demands for them to act to improve the clearly
 depressed state of economic conditions.  However, these policies will 
prove to be unproductive.  Economic fundamentals will not improve until 
the extreme over-indebtedness of the U.S. economy is addressed, and this
 is in the realm of fiscal, not monetary policy.  It would be more 
beneficial for the Fed to sit on the sidelines and try to put pressure 
on the fiscal authorities to take badly needed actions rather than do 
additional harm.  Until the excessive debt issues are addressed, the 
multi-year trend in inflation, and thus the long Treasury bond yields 
will remain downward.
  
 APPENDIX
 One of the most important concepts in macroeconomics is aggregate 
demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) analysis – a highly attractive 
approach that is neither Keynesian, monetarist, Austrian, nor any other 
individual school, but can be used to illustrate all of their main 
propositions.  However, before detailing the broader macroeconomics 
associated with the movement of the AD and AS curves, it is important to
 understand microeconomic supply and demand curves.  This can best be 
illustrated through the recent impact the Fed’s decisions had on 
commodity prices.  In the commodity market, like individual markets in 
general, the demand curve is downward sloping, the supply curve is 
upward sloping, and where they intersect determines the price of the 
commodity and the quantity supplied/demanded.  The micro-demand curve 
slopes downward because as the price of an item rises, the quantity 
demanded falls due to income and substitution effects (buyers can shift 
to a substitute product).  The micro-supply curve slopes upward since 
producers will sell more at higher prices than lower ones. 
 Both supply and demand schedules are influenced by expectation, 
fundamental, and liquidity considerations.  When the Fed says that they 
want faster inflation and that they are going to take steps to achieve 
this objective, both economic theory and historical experiences indicate
 that commodity prices will rise, at least transitorily (as seen with 
the surge in commodity prices after the announcement of QE1, QE2 and 
QE3).  Information and liquidity available to the buyers is also 
available to the suppliers, so by saying faster inflation is ahead, 
suppliers are encouraged to reduce or withhold current production or 
inventories, moving the supply curve inward.  Thus, in the commodity 
market, the Fed action spurs an outward shift in the micro-demand curve 
along with an inward shift of the micro-supply curve, producing higher 
prices and lower quantities.  These microeconomic developments transmit 
to the broader economy, which we will now trace through AD and AS 
curves. 
 
 
 The AD curve slopes downward and indicates the amount of real GDP that 
would be purchased at each aggregate price level (Chart 6).  Aggregate 
demand varies inversely with the price level, so if the price level 
moves upward from P0 to P1, real GDP declines from Y0 to Y1.  When the 
price level rises, real wages, real money balances and net exports 
worsen, thereby reducing real GDP.  The rationale for the downward 
sloping AD curve is thus quite different from the sloping of the 
micro-demand curve since substitution effects are not possible when 
dealing with aggregate prices.  In order to improve real GDP with a 
rising price level, the AD curve would need to be shifted outward and to
 the right (from AD0 to AD1).  And as detailed in the letter, the Fed is
 not capable of shifting the entire AD curve. 
 The AS curve slopes upward and indicates the quantity of GDP supplied 
at various price levels.  The positive correlation between price and 
output in micro and macroeconomics is the same since the AS curve is the
 sum of all supply curves across all individual markets.  When Fed 
policy announcements shock commodity markets, the AS curve shifts inward
 and to the left (from AS0 to AS1).  This immediately causes a reduction
 in real GDP (the difference between Y0 and Y1) as the price increases 
by the difference between P0 and P1 (also Chart 6).  Furthermore, as 
discussed in the letter, lower GDP as a result of higher prices reduces 
the demand for labor and widens the output gap, setting in motion a 
negative spiral. 
For Fed policy to improve real GDP, actions must be taken that either 
(1) shift the entire demand curve outward (to the right), or (2) do not 
cause an inward shift of the AS curve that induces an adverse movement 
along the AD curve.  Accordingly, the Fed is without options to improve 
the pace of economic activity.