Corn Price Decimated

The price of corn today was hit hard due to China canceling all purchases for this season. This is devastating for farmers, who have been struggling to make a profit.
This quote from CNBC today:
"U.S. farmers lost their fourth largest export market this week after China officially cancelled all purchases of U.S. agricultural products, a retaliatory move following President Donald Trump’s pledge to slap 10% tariffs on $300 billion of Chinese imports."

Stocks Back Near Record Highs Following Trump Tweet

China's RE Bubble Pops; Japan Debt Downgraded

More news weighing down stocks:

From Zero Hedge:
"... the Shanghai Stock Exchange Property Index slumped by a whopping 9.3%, the steepest drop since June 2008, and pushing it down to -11% for the year. The weakness also spread to the broader market, with the Composite closing down 3.65% the biggest drop in months, and now just barely positive, at +0.2%, year to date...
"...a few hours ago Dagong downgraded Japan from A+ to A, with a negative outlook.
"Among other things, Dagong said the Abe administration’s economic policies would 'critically exacerbate the fiscal situation and cannot solve the entrenched problems constraining national wealth creation capability', that Abe's policies will 'critically exacerbate the fiscal situation and cannot solve the entrenched problems constraining national wealth creation capability' and that 'the economy will remain in a "prolonged slump" causing the risk of sovereign credit crisis to rise.'"

And from Societe Generale:
 "Asian stock markets started the week on a sour note, reacting to news of additional measures in mainland China to restrain real estate prices. This was arguably also the main factor driving down the Australian dollar, although the economic news reports this morning were also weak. The main exception to stock market weakness was Japan, where stocks are trading firmer despite a fractionally stronger yen. The relative stability of the yen is noteworthy, given that the proposed new BoJ governor, Mr Kuroda, reiterated in his confirmation hearing his strongly dovish bias, arguing for accelerated and broadened asset purchases.

Stocks Plunge on China's Less-Than-Altruistic Intents

from Zero Hedge:
An hour after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao dropped all pretense of working together for the greater good, markets around the world are reacting more notably than many would have expected. With most talking heads still clinging to the line about 'helping the Europeans' and missing the quid-pro-quo of it all that we so clearly intimated from his speech, expectations of a risk-on 'we-are-all-saved' reaction have been dashed on a beach of the-trade-wars-have-begun.
ES is -13pts from the day session close (and almost 20pts from intraday highs), having taken out intraday swing support levels around 1154.

News of Bailout of Europe by China Sends Stocks Soaring

Bad Debt Everywhere -- Even in China

This, too, will be ignored on Wall Street.

China, India, South Korea Show Softening Manufacturing Data

from FT.com:

Chinese manufacturing growth has fallen to its lowest level in more than two years and soft data from India and South Korea have added to the picture of a slowdown in Asia after a battery of government moves to tame inflation.
With price pressures still high, though, economists said policymakers would be able to shift only gingerly from fighting inflation to supporting growth.

What to Expect Over the Next Few Years

Debt Defaults and a U.S. Economic Crisis

By Simon Hunt

The global economy is facing a difficult period. The US Federal Reserve’s QE2 program ends at the end of the month. Europe’s debt issues continue to roll on as no party wants to pull the plug on Greece. The Middle East is in turmoil and high oil prices, together with food, are a tax on global consumers. Japan’s reconstruction has yet to get into full gear; and there are new concerns about the durability of China’s economy. Any significant slowdown there will send ripples of fear around the world.
The Federal Reserve is likely to sit pat for some months to see how the US economy will be able to perform without the steroids provided by them. Foreign central banks have largely been absent from Treasury auctions. In quarter 1 this year, foreign central banks bought just 16% of the issuances while the Federal Reserve acquired almost 200%, according to Russell Napier. In other words, the Fed’s activities have masked the exodus of foreign central banks including China from these auctions.
If foreign central banks continue to abstain from purchasing US Treasuries, the private sector will have to fund the fiscal deficit, implying quarterly remittances to the US Treasury of some $370bn. The private sector will be able to fund these auctions but at a price. They will demand a higher return on treasury paper and the funding will mean that the free-flow of funds into equity and commodities will come to an end. Many institutions are taking risk off the table.
On our associate’s, WaveTrack International technical work, 10-year US Treasuries should be yielding around 4% later this summer and 6% a year or so later. The repercussions of such a change in the yield structure will have global consequences, not least on stock and commodity markets.
Debt has woven a dangerous spider’s web in Europe. The basic truth is that Greece can never repay its debt; the ECB, the IMF and Euro governments are merely buying time by granting new loans, hoping that the problem goes away. Future stability, however, does not depend on what these institutions and governments do, but on how the electorates will react. In their view, austerity can be accepted only on a one or two year view, not as an ongoing way of life.
This is especially true of Greece whose national pride will find the sale of assets to foreigners wholly unacceptable. The same is true in other debt-laden Euro countries. All, apart from Italy, have seen their economies contract significantly over the past two years with little hope of any imminent improvement. The next major move could emanate from Ireland; the Irish government wants to renegotiate its ECB and other loans.
In fact, nearly all the conventional forward looking indicators (PMIs, OECD leading indicators etc.) are suggesting that global growth is slowing and rolling over. The US ISM data for May was universally awful with every component from New Orders to Imports down significantly. This is a view shared by industry mills we talk to and visit regularly.
The USA does not only have a cyclical problem, but a structural one also. The fundamental issue is that sooner rather than later government will be forced to introduce measures that will allow the country to live within its means. It will take a deep crisis before such policies can be put together and passed by the country’s politicians. For instance, a run on the US dollar sometime next year or early in 2013 might do the trick.
Unemployment amongst teenagers has become a serious structural and social problem for the USA in an economy that is becoming dominated by skilled workers. The number of unemployed teenagers (16-19) now totals almost one in four. However, the number of African-American, not seasonally adjusted U-3 unemployment, including both sexes, in the same age group has risen to a stunning 41%, almost every other teenager.
Once Washington puts its act together, (it will have to or else the crisis will get so deep that US markets will become dysfunctional), America will find a large number of companies which had vacated the shores of the USA for China and other parts of Asia returning to their homeland.
There are two main reasons for this change, what we call reverse globalisation. First, manufacturers want their supply chains located close to the market, not on the other side of the world. And second just as important is the cost differential trend which is narrowing together with the increasing logistical costs. It is not only the wage profile looking 10 years forward, but the other costs, such as land, electricity, taxes together with the indirect supply chain cost increases. There is also the reluctance of the system in China to allow foreign companies to gain access to government contracts.
Within a decade, the USA could supplant China as the manufacturing hub of the world. To repeat, big changes will be needed in Washington for this historic development to occur. The changes will not just be on the fiscal side, but the need to offer businesses the right incentives to produce in the USA rather than abroad, the permitting procedures to allow the development of the country’s resources, including oil (the USA could become self-contained), making government less intrusive in households and businesses and so on.
In short, it is putting back in place the principals that made America the great country it once was. Crises produce opportunities and this one is as big as they have been since the USA entered WW11. What is noteworthy is that should America grab its opportunity, it will become self-contained in energy and of course food. What other major power has those valuable twin assets?
China and the rest of Asia are no exception to this slowing economic trend. In the former, government’s focus on CPI inflation and the housing market together with its concerns on the degree of speculative or hot money circulating within the economy will almost ensure that the tight monetary policy will continue for some months yet. In these circumstances, further hikes in interest rates and Reserve Requirements are likely to be seen before the end of the year.

Chart 1: Shanghai Composite Index

Such a scenario fits the political cycle. Some of the country’s excesses can be cleaned out by end 2011, much to the delight of the incoming leadership, whilst monetary policy remains tight. The chief economist of the State Information Centre, who is well regarded in Beijing, said at a recent conference in Shanghai that “China has a serious inflation”. He concluded his speech by saying that China had to endure some short term pain for the longer term benefit of the economy. Early in 2012, monetary policy will start to be loosened and should continue to do so throughout that year. The economy should recover so allowing the outgoing leadership to depart on a high note. Post 2012, we guess that the incoming leadership will want to put the economy on a firmer long-term footing, meaning more tightening. This may well coincide with the real estate sector seeing major falls in prices and, externally, the global economy starting to suffer from the breakout of its second global credit crisis. Oil prices in the $150-200 will be a disaster for China as one senior government economist said to us. China may well go through two odd years of real recession in 2013-14 years, in our view. The impact of an effective recession in China on the rest of the world will be serious and widespread.

Chart 2: The Demographics of the Middle East

Some of the underlying causes for MENA countries’ youth to rebel against their autocratic governments are common with China. The youth in these countries don’t care about democracy or who governs: they want freedom of expression, for governments to uphold their rights and the right to work. It is why Beijing has become so sensitive to the Jasmine movement and ongoing developments in MENA. Workers’ protests appear to be on the rise. The ability to communicate via computers and mobile phones (Facebook etc.) increasingly makes government powerless to control the flow of information.
As the Financial Times wrote on 20th July, “the perception that local protests might be gaining a broader national coherence is deeply threatening to China’s Communist Party....That is the conclusion of the government itself. A report by the State Council Development Research Centre blamed protests on the marginalisation of about 150M migrant workers...

Graph 1: Global Food Prices

Global food prices have risen by 37% in the past year according to the FAO. It was higher food prices plus the high level of unemployment in MENA countries that sparked so much rioting in the region. China’s government is highly sensitive to rising food prices. They may well rise further over the coming months due to the hog cycle so ensuring that pork prices increase further followed by corn and in due course even wheat. But, China’s agricultural base is deteriorating. Top soil is collapsing to dangerous levels; its fertility is being destroyed by acidification; water is being consumed way beyond sustainable levels; and aquifers are being exhausted. These are structural issues, not short term cyclical ones.
The demographics of the rural areas of China imply that the pool of active workers in the age group 15-30 is fast diminishing. It means that productivity will decline to a rate closer to the Asian Tigers ex. China or down to the 2% a year level from its historic 5% rate. The above remarks also imply that China will be importing more foodstuffs over the coming decade. Unlike the USA, China is becoming increasingly dependent on imports of food and energy.
The above is a more likely scenario to evolve than the benign outlook postulated by so many. The world is not back to the 1990s sustainable growth, but its fragility is being patched up by unsustainable fiscal and monetary excesses. In fact, as Charles Gave wrote recently in GaveKal Five Corners, these policies have had the opposite effect than those intended (the unintended consequences of policy actions!), “Capitalism cannot work without a proper cost of capital. Capitalism needs the process of creative destruction, and if real rates are negative or abnormally low, the destruction part of the process cannot happen, zombie companies are kept on perpetual life support and growth flags.”
This is exactly what is happening nearly everywhere. Politicians won’t bite the bullet (perhaps with the exception of the UK) without a crisis. That crisis is coming, certainly by early 2013 if not sooner, to be followed by years of recession and deflation, a period when the down years will outnumber the up ones. It will be accompanied by a serious deflation of assets, both equities and commodities, perhaps excepting food. This period of austerity is likely to last until around 2018; a generation of debt should by then have been worked off so laying the foundations for a long period of sustainable growth.

Chart 3: Historical Sovereign Default/Restructuring Events

The truth is that the lessons of history have been conveniently forgotten or ignored, as illustrated by Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff in their epic work “Growth in a Time of Debt”. Those lessons are simple: credit crises are followed by years of sub-par growth and sovereign defaults.

And Speaking of Global Alarm Signals, China Flashes the Infamous Death Cross

from Tomi Kilgore at WSJ:


While US investors’ eyes may be on Greece, China’s Shanghai Composite just produced a “death cross,” a longer-term bearish pattern in which the 50-day moving average crosses below the 200-day.
The “cross” appeared one day after the index fell below the January low, which confirmed a long-term ”double-top” reversal pattern (the tops were seen in April and November 2010).
The last time a “death cross” appeared, in March 2010, the index rose slightly for a month before starting a 3-month, 25% slide. US stocks may be able to rise with China going nowhere, but it’s very doubtful they can if China’s in a bear market.
The Shanghai Composite is down 0.8% today, and the Hang Seng is down 1.2%. Most of the rest of Asia is down as well.
China’s stock indexes are among the worst-performing in the world so far this year, which may not bode well for the US market, Barry Ritholtz warned this morning.

Stocks Spike on Lower-Than-Expected Inflation in China

China Should Reduce Reserves By 2/3 to 3/4 of Current Levels

from Xinhua News:


BEIJING, April 23 (Xinhua) -- China should reduce its excessive foreign exchange reserves and further diversify its holdings, Tang Shuangning, chairman of China Everbright Group, said on Saturday.
The amount of foreign exchange reserves should be restricted to between 800 billion to 1.3 trillion U.S. dollars, Tang told a forum in Beijing, saying that the current reserve amount is too high.
China's foreign exchange reserves increased by 197.4 billion U.S. dollars in the first three months of this year to 3.04 trillion U.S. dollars by the end of March.
Tang's remarks echoed the stance of Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, who said on Monday that China's foreign exchange reserves "exceed our reasonable requirement" and that the government should upgrade and diversify its foreign exchange management using the excessive reserves.
Meanwhile, Xia Bin, a member of the monetary policy committee of the central bank, said on Tuesday that 1 trillion U.S. dollars would be sufficient. He added that China should invest its foreign exchange reserves more strategically, using them to acquire resources and technology needed for the real economy.
Tang also said that China should further diversify its foreign exchange holdings. He suggested five channels for using the reserves, including replenishing state-owned capital in key sectors and enterprises, purchasing strategic resources, expanding overseas investment, issuing foreign bonds and improving national welfare in areas like education and health.
However, these strategies can only treat the symptoms but not the root cause, he said, noting that the key is to reform the mechanism of how the reserves are generated and managed.

China Considers Capping US Dollar Reserves, Diversifying

BEIJING, April 23 (Xinhua) -- China should reduce its excessive foreign exchange reserves and further diversify its holdings, Tang Shuangning, chairman of China Everbright Group, said on Saturday.
The amount of foreign exchange reserves should be restricted to between 800 billion to 1.3 trillion U.S. dollars, Tang told a forum in Beijing, saying that the current reserve amount is too high.
China's foreign exchange reserves increased by 197.4 billion U.S. dollars in the first three months of this year to 3.04 trillion U.S. dollars by the end of March.
Tang's remarks echoed the stance of Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of China's central bank, who said on Monday that China's foreign exchange reserves "exceed our reasonable requirement" and that the government should upgrade and diversify its foreign exchange management using the excessive reserves.

Black Swan Events and How to Hedge Them

from Zero Hedge:

With all the hoopla over Egypt some have forgotten that this is merely a geopolitical event (one of those that absolutely nobody, with a few exceptions, was talking about less a month ago, so in many ways this is a mainstream media black swan which once again exposes the entire punditry for the pseudo-sophist hacks they are), and that the actual mines embedded within the financial system continue to float just below the surface. Below we present the five key fat tail concerns that keep SocGen strategist Dylan Grice up at night, which happen to be: i) long-term deflation, ii) a bond market blow-up, iii) a Chinese hard-landing, iv) an inflation pick-up, and v) an Emerging Markets bubble. Far more importantly, Grice provides the most comprehensive basket of trades to put on as a hedge against all five of these, while also pocketing a premium associated with simple market beta in a world in which the Central Banks continue to successfully defy gravity and economic cycles. For all those who continue to trade as brainless lemmings, seeking comfort in numbers, no matter how wrong the "numbers" of the groupthink herd are, we urge you to establish at least some of the recommended trades in advance of what will inevitably be a greater crash than anything the markets experienced during the depths of the 2008 near-cataclysm.
But before we get into the meat of the piece, we were delighted to find that Zero Hedge is not the only entity that believes that providing traditional annual forward looking forecasts is nothing more than an exercise in vanity (and more often than usual, error).

At this time of the year we’re supposed to give our predictions for what’s in store for the year ahead. The problem is I don’t have any. Not because making forecasts is difficult. It isn’t. It’s just pointless. Instead, I suggest getting in touch with our inner Kevin Keegan, the hapless former England football manager who, facing the sack after a bad run of results famously lamented “I know what’s around the corner, I just don’t know where the corner is.” The more people construct portfolios on the assumption that they can see the future, the greater the opportunity for those building portfolios which are robust to the reality that we can’t.

That said, no matter how ridiculous the act of Oracular vanity ends up being, those who charge an arm and a leg for their "financial services" continue to do it, only to be among the first carted out head first when reality is imposed upon them and their blind belief that this time is different and the crowd is actually right. Few are willing to accept and recognize the humility that they really know little if anything about how a non-linear, chaotic system evolves. Which is once again why we believe that Grice is among the best strategists out there: in his attempt to hedge the stupidity of the crowd, he has coined a term that may well be the term that defines 21st century finance and economics: instead of foresight, Grice believes the far more correct term to explain the process of prognostication should be one based on foreblindness.

In financial markets, craziness creates opportunity. It affects only prices, not values. And one of the craziest afflictions I know of is our faith in our ability to see the future. Indeed, there isn't even an appropriate opposite to the word "foresight"  in the English language. So I'?m going to make one up. And rather than build a portfolio based on the pretense we have foresight, let's explore some ideas for building one that is robust to our foreblindness.

This is the kind of insight that one will never find from a TBTF "strategist"... And one wonders where all those softdollars go.
So now that we know that unlike the traditional cadre of sell side idiots who are always wrong in the long-run, Grice actually admits that he has no clue what will happen, which is precisely the reason to listen far more carefully to what he has to say.
Let's dig in:

Here are some things I think are true:

• developed economy governments are insolvent
• Japan is the highest risk developed market (DM) to an inflation crisis (though it might be Greece)
• there is too much debt around
• China?s economic model is biased towards misallocating resources
• every country which has industrialized has experienced nasty bumps on the way
• China and the US are in the early stages of an arms race
• demographic trends suggest more conflict in the oil rich regions of the world
• bottlenecks are developing in key commodity markets
• the only thing central banks are good at is blowing the bubbles that cause the crashes which are used to justify their existence
• market prices only reflect fair value by accident and in passing
• most people don't think these things are important
• they might be right.

Here are some things I know are true:

• perceived uncertainty causes emotional discomfort which isn't conducive to good decision making
• all the above situations have the potential to cause significant asset price volatility
• I have no idea when.

What to do? To my mind, the ideal is not to make huge bets on particular events happening because failure of the expected event to materialize will materially endanger your capital. Instead, the ideal is purchase insurance at a price which won't materially pressure the returns from your core portfolio of investments if the event fail to materialize, but will protect capital from significant impairment if it does.

Is such an ideal attainable? By evaluating insurance and using the same valuation discipline you'd apply to anything else, I think it is. So what follows is not a list of recommendations here, or even any suggestions. Everyone should do their own homework. What follows is an illustration of why I think the macro research we've been doing is relevant and can be used to lower portfolio risk. The insurable risks I'm most worried about at the moment are:

• long-term deflation
• a bond market blow-up
• a Chinese hard-landing
• an inflation pick-up
• an EM bubble

The first thing you?'ll notice is that these aren't all consistent with one another. It's difficult to get a Chinese hard landing and an EM bubble at the same time, for example. But internal consistency is overrated. It's only relevant for point-in-time forecasts, and the assumption underlying this entire exercise is that I haven't a clue if/when any of what follows is going to happen. At the risk of repetition, I'm interested in the possibility of building a profitable portfolio which is robust to my ignorance.

Let's take a look at the five fat tails in detail:
Long-term deflation
Not surprisingly, Grice gives the least amount of weight to the one thing most troubling to such economic disgraces as Ben Bernanke and Paul Krugman. Yet it should not be avoided. After all there are many deflationists out there, who believe that the Fed, which has now clearly telegraphed it is all in on reflating (or after the Fed, the monetary collapse deluge) may actually succumb to what has been ailing Japan for two decades.

According to economists the primary risk faced by economies is that a huge deleveraging spiral becomes self-fulfilling: deleveraging reduces demand, which lowers prices, which further lowers demand, and so on. The idea was first developed by Irvine Fisher in the 1930s to describe the great depression, and has been used to explain the ?First Great Depression? of the 1870s and Japan since the early 1990s.

Paul Krugman says everything has changed because we?re in a liquidity trap. The fear of prolonged deflation is what keeps poor old Ben Bernanke awake at night. And maybe that's the clue. At our London conference this year, James Montier said that Bernanke  as the worst economist of all time. Now, I'm not sure I agree with James on this one because I can't make up my mind, sometimes I think it's the Bernanke, other times I think it's the Krugman. But usually I think nearly all economists to be the joint worst economists of all time. So I have a lot of sympathy with the idea that if the consensus macroeconomic opinion is worried about something, it probably isn't worth worrying about. In fact, if they worry about deflation, I'm going to worry about inflation.

We couldn't have said it better ourselves.
So how does one trade deflation insurance?

More importantly though, deflation insurance is expensive. The following chart shows the price of 5y 0% US CPI floors to be trading for just under 200bps. The way these floors work is that they provide the owner of the contract with the right to payments equal to the rate of deflation. Since the floors in the chart have a five-year maturity, they entitle the owner to five annual payments. For example, if inflation was -1% in year one, the owner would receive 100bps of the notional value of the contract. If inflation was -1% in year two, he'd receive another 100bps. And if the rate of deflation remained at -1% for years three, four and five, he'd receive 100bp cash flow for each of those annual payments so that over the life of the contract he'd have received a total cash flow of 500bps. So if you're worried by the prospect of CPI deflation, this is the product for you.

And skeptical though I am of the debt deflation hypothesis, Western demographics worry me. Although we don?t know what aging economies look like, we know that the glimpse into the future provided by Japan isn't encouraging. So I do take the scenario seriously and would be happy to put the hedge on at the right price. The problem is, I don't think the price is right. I think this insurance should be sold, not bought.

Chinese Hard Landing
While Grice is obviously far less worried about a systemic deflation scenario arising out of events in the US, what may happen in China is obviously a far riskier proposition, and one that could generate deflation out of the proverbial "Hard Landing." Luckily there is an instrument with some wonderfully convex properties to hedge this...

Albert calls China a ‘freak economy.’ Certainly, running with an investment to GDP ratio of over 50% doesn't seem normal. Neither does keeping interest rates at 5% when the economy is growing by 15% in nominal terms each year. Such lax monetary conditions have helped land prices rise by 800% in the last seven years, according to NBER economists. And when you come to think of it, more recent examples of real estate inflation fueled by negative real interest rates: Ireland, Spain, the US didn't end too well. Jim Chanos says China is a shortseller's dream and that there's not one company he's looked at that passes the accounting sniff test. And if Jim Chanos, who built a very successful business around spotting accounting gimmickry says something like that, my guess is he's right.

Taking a step back though, as far as I?m aware all industrialized countries have experienced financial crashes. It seems a part of the maturing process. Why should China be any different? A credit crisis wouldn't necessarily mean the end of the China story any more than the panic of 1873 meant the end of America's, (though US demographic prospects were considerably more favorable at the end of the 18th century than China's are today). For the record, I think the Chinese have a bright future. My son is learning Mandarin. But when I look at the numbers I can't help but think there's going to be a crash and that it's going to be  quite unpleasant. It's just that my guess as to when it's going to happen is as good as Kevin Keegan's.

What happens if and when the inevitable crash happens? One word - Australia. Another word(s): 10x-20x payout.

When it does happen though, the Australian economy will be toast and its government bond yields will collapse. During the panic of 2008, AUD 10y swap rates fell around 3% to 4.40%.

The panic of 2008 was a "good crisis" for Australia though. A Chinese crash would be more serious.

And you can get pretty attractive odds on AUD rates collapsing. The following chart shows the payout available using AUD receiver swaptions prices with a three-year maturity, based on the 10y swap rate. Effectively, these are put options that pay out when rates fall below the strike price. The prices I've used here are from Bloomberg based on the swaptions striking at about 5.5% (i.e. 100bp below the current rate of 6.50%). What's interesting is that at current prices, if Australian swaps were to break their 2008 lows, you'd be making about 10x your premium (for the record, these swaptions are priced at about 120bps, or 40bps per year over three years, which is about the same as the annualized revenue you'd get if you sold the CPI floors discussed above). If swap rates fell by 300bps as they did during the panic of 2008 the rate would fall to 3.5% and you'd make nearly 15x your premium. To repeat the point I made earlier, this isn't a recommendation. It's just a starting point (my guess is that you'd find more attractive payouts as you went further out of the money with the strike price, and that  capital structures of Australian banks, property companies and levered resource stocks would be worth looking into too).

Asset Bubbles
Grice provides one of the best and most succinct explanations of bubble mentality we have read to date:

For reasons I won't go into now, but which are probably obvious from what I just wrote about China, I think EM is riskier than it seems. I'm not even sure I feel comfortable valuing EMs yet. So should EMs bubble up, the risk for investors sharing my concern is that they'll be faced with quite a nasty dilemma: do they buy something they don't feel sure is cheap because everyone else is and they're scared of underperforming, or do they stick to their principles and prepare themselves to take on the business and career risk of underperforming their competitors, seeing clients withdraw their funds, and possibly finding themselves out of work?

And the sad reality is that ultimately nearly everyone gets hurt during a bubble. Sceptics get hurt as it inflates, believers get hurt when it bursts. George Soros says when he sees bubbles he buys them. He?'s been pretty good at selling them at the right time too. But most of us aren't so clever.

Regardless of the psychology behind each and every bubble, the good thing is that there is a good way to hedge this risk outright.

One way to hedge the inflation of a bubble, rather than its bursting, is to buy out of the money call options on the equity indices. Calls are usually cheaper than puts ? I think because fear is a more powerful emotion than greed and the tails in equity markets tend to be on the downside. But the following chart shows that that difference (or skew, the difference in implied volatilities between puts and calls) is close to unprecedented highs, at around 4.5 vol points (the chart shows skew for the S&P500 though other equity indices show a similar picture).

In other words, the upside is close to unprecedentedly cheap relative to the downside. If you could get two year call options 30-35% out of the money for 130bps per year you?'d be getting good value (of course you could make this zero cost, or even ve cost by selling puts to fund the purchase, and you could do it in such a way that your downside risk would be similar to that of holding stock, but I'm no derivatives strategist- as usual, if you want to talk about this stuff to people who know more than I do, speak to your SG derivatives salesman, or ask me and I?'ll put you in touch).

Hyperinflation
A topic near and dear to many. Luckily, once again, one which can be hedged proximally in a form that generates massive returns should it transpire there where it most needed: no, not the US. Japan. In fact, if Grice is right about Japan, his proposed trade takes the returns generated by Paulson in shorting subprime... And magnifies them by about a million.

Historically, bankrupt governments have used inflation to alleviate their indebtedness. I doubt things will ultimately be different this time. And as regular readers know, I think Japan is the country closest to the edge. All DM governments have the same problems: they've made promises to their electorates which they're unlikely to be able to keep. But while there's time for European and US governments to fix the problem, for Japan I think it's already too late. John Mauldin says the Japanese government debt position is a “bug in search of a windshield”. I agree with him.

I've already written too much this week, so I don't want to rehash all the stuff I've already written on Japan and which regular readers will be familiar with. But if you chart past episodes of extreme inflations with how stock markets behaved during the episodes, you invariably find something similar to what happened to Israel in the 1980s.

In Steven Drobny's excellent “Hedge Funds Off the Record” (which I consider a must read - almost every interview oozes with profound risk-management wisdom), Steve Leitner talks about buying out of the money call options to hedge against such a hyperinflation. Buying 40,000 strike Nikkei calls with a ten- year maturity, with a payout in a strong currency can be done for around 40bps per year. And to give you an idea of how explosive that asymmetry might be, if Japan was to follow the Israeli experience from here, the Nikkei- currently 10,500 would trade at around 60,000,000 (sixty million). So putting even one-tenth of your notional into that kind of hedge would cost 4bp per year (for reference, the Nikkei currently offers in excess of a 2% annual yield, while some JREITS offer in excess of 4% - I'd argue that 40bp is a bearable burden, and 4bps certainly is).

Bond Market Blow-up
When a few weeks ago we presented Sean Corrigan's chart which we dubbed the Great Regime Change, few put two and two together, and realized the vast trading implications of this chart. And they are profound. As Grice rightfully observes, they stand at the base of nothing less than the hedge against that most critical of fat-tail events: a bond market blow up, one which is getting increasingly more probable with every single $X0 billion UST bond auctions (the bulk of which is now monetized directly by the Fed).

One obvious way to hedge against a bond market blow-up is to use the swaptions market as we did in the Australian market to hedge a Chinese crash, only this time buying payer swaps, which are effectively call options on rates. But I thought I'd show you something I think is a bit more interesting: the correlation between the S&P500 and bond yields.

Bonds represent poor value in my opinion, with little margin of safety to protect against the very real risk that governments try to inflate away their debts. But one good reason to continue holding them is that they protect risk asset positions during the '?tails'?. The following chart shows that over the last ten years the correlation has been volatile, but positive: when equities have fallen so have bond yields, offsetting losses in the equity portfolio as bonds benefit during "risk-off" events.

When inflation expectations were (probably) around zero (before the 1960s) the correlation between bonds and equities was zero too. But look what happened during the 1960s when inflation expectations broke (this was during the Vietnam war, as the Bretton-Woods system was coming under pressure and as the bear market in bonds was getting into full swing). The chart shows that the correlation went negative. When bond yields rose equities fell because government bonds were reflecting the same tensions that were pulling down equity valuations (fear of ever-higher inflation).

As the bond bear market reached its climax in the early 1980s, the correlation remained negative. But as the worm turned, and central banks across the developed world made new and credible commitments to stop printing money, a bond market rally was born. And as inflation expectations began to fall, what was good for the bond market was good for the equity market. Now, falling yields coincided with rising equity prices and so the correlation remained negative. But during the last ten years, inflation expectations have been roughly stable and, if anything, slightly biased towards the deflationary side. So what?s been good for bonds hasn't been good for equities, and the correlation between yields and equity prices has been positive to reflect that.

The point is this: if governments are insolvent, and the government bond market becomes a source of risk once again (as opposed to the nonsensical "risk-free" description it has somehow obtained in recent years) what's bad for the bond market will be bad for risk assets too. As yields rise, risk assets will fall. The correlation will go negative. Bonds will provide less protection against the tail events than they have done in recent years because they will be a source of the tail event.

For all those who figured this out based on the Corrigan chart, congratulations. This could well be the holy grail of the biggest black swan insurance trade of all. For those who haven't quite grasped it, here is some more from Grice:

This correlation is tradeable. Any bank with a derivatives operation must have an implicit correlation exposure between products they've sold options on. So for derivatives houses, correlation is a by-product in much the same way that molybdenum is a by-product of copper miners. and correlations like this trade in the IDM market. And sometimes that means you can get it for a very good price. I recently heard of a correlation trade between the S&P500 and the US 10y swap rate done at 40 correlation points, which seems a decent enough price to me (of course, selling at 50 points would give you even more margin of safety), although current pricing is at around 30 I believe. Pricing can be volatile though and waiting to sell in the 40-50 range seems sensible to me. It would hedge risk positions against a regime in which government bonds were seen as the source of risk, rather than the reliever of it.

Finalizing the Black Swan Insurance basket.

Let's add it all up and see how much it would cost to insure our portfolio. If we were to sell the 5y US CPI floors for 200bps (40bps annualized); buy the 3yr AUD receiver swaption for 120bps (-40bps annualized); buy 2yr 30% S&P500 calls for around 130bps (-65bps annualized) and bought one tenth of our notional on NKY calls for 40bps (-4bps annualised) the net upfront cost would be 90bps (200bps-120bps-130bps-40bps). If we wanted to hedge the risk of bond market turbulence with a correlation product, this would cost nothing upfront because it would be done on a swap basis with the bank. On a roughly annualized basis our cost would be 69bps each year.

Of course, we'd have a maturity mismatch because our hedges would have different time horizons. So we'd have to adjust them from year to year. We'd also be more vulnerable to deflation because we don't think the deflationary hedges offer value. So our portfolio wouldn't quite be bullet-proof because it would be tilted towards inflationary outcomes. But we'd have insurance against deflation with the Australian receiver swaption. And since the correlation swap hedges us against any bond market blow-up which also blows up the equity market, we can feel more comfortable allocating some capital towards bonds we think might offer good value (not that there are many, I'd say maybe about 20-30% in Australian and New Zealand bonds).

I'd put 10% in gold. I'll explain more in another note but for now, although I've said I'm not a fan of plain commodities as investment vehicles because buying commodities was equivalent to selling human ingenuity, I exclude gold from that logic. I prefer to see buying gold as buying into the stupidity of governments, policy-makers and economists, and I'm comfortable doing that.

With the exception of Japan (which we'd be hedged against anyway) I'm not so worried about "traditional" CPI inflation any time soon. At the moment, I think the first signpost on the way to that kind of crisis will be via the bond market, which the correlation swap should protect us against. That and my gold holdings would make me comfortable allocating 20%-25% cash. I still think risk assets are generally overvalued and cash is the simplest insurance "option", whose relative value rises proportionate to the decline in other assets. So let's say I'm 20% in cash,10% in gold, and 20% in mainly Australian and New Zealand government bonds. That leaves just under 50% of my capital for me to put into the equity market (the 69bps per year for my insurance bucket to be precise).

Which equities? I've always thought investing in index funds to be crazy, but nearly everyone does it and it's a part of the craziness we can use to our advantage. The EMH says that market prices are always broadly efficient because all market participants respond to all available information. But around 10% of the market is explicitly passive and probably another 50% is benchmarked and therefore implicitly passive. In other words, the overriding variable for the majority of equity investors is a company's weight in the index! Intuitively therefore, the prices can't fairly reflect fundamental value, which means that at any point in time, there will be lots of stocks which are mispriced.

The following chart shows two lines. The red line shows the cumulative return to buying stocks in the cheapest decile, while shorting stocks in the most expensive decile (I define value as the discount relative to the estimated intrinsic value - a methodology I've been meaning to write up in detail for several months now but which I will definitely do within the next few weeks). Using a monthly rebalance, the annualized return is 750bps. This shows that there is meaningful alpha in identifying and owning those stocks trading at a discount to intrinsic value. The black line shows the relative outperformance of the top decile against our wider stock universe. (In passing, note that this value strategy underperformed in the late 1990s during the tech bubble, and remember that this is the reason our hypothetical portfolio has out of the money call options.)

The relative outperformance of this long-only basket has been 330bps. If I expect a stock market return of 5% per year over the coming years, that 330bps outperformance is highly significant. It means we only need to put 60% of our capital into that basket of stocks to generate the same incremental return as a market portfolio would generate. So owning 50% isn't as cautious as it sounds.

The bottom line, and the reason why we think this is a great basket trade, is that it makes money in a normal environment while at the same time, providing great positional hedges to those 5 events which sooner or later are bound to happen.

In the sort of world in which everything is normally distributed, well behaved, and in which our insurance expires worthless (i.e. the sort of world most economists forecast), we'd still be making decent returns. And while there's no such thing as a truly bullet proof portfolio, we'd have done so with far less embedded risk. Because if any of the scenarios I've explored here come to pass we'd be in a much better position to take advantage of the distressed selling of others.

That said, and as Dylan would be the first to acknowledge, if and when everyone is positioned with precisely this hedge on their books, it will be something totally different that will cause the next great financial wipeout. But until then, those who step in first, will benefit from appreciating prices precisely on their hedges. At that point it will be up to the principal to decide whether to take profits or to hold off until the bitter end. The problem, however, at least the way we see it, is that should any of these five black swans occur, any currency that one generates as a result of a successful trade, no matter the P&I, will probably not be all that useful for the world that materializes at T+1.

Europe Worries About China as Creditor

from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard

Herman Van Rompuy, Europe's president, said during a visit to Downing Street that the Chinese may have "political" thoughts in the back of their minds for coming to Europe's help, and gave a strong hint that they are also engaging in currency manipulation.

"When they buy euros, the euro becomes stronger and their currency a little bit weaker. That is not neutral in regard to their competitive position. But I go no further in this topic. It could be too delicate," he said.

Mr Van Rompuy nevertheless welcomed the latest purchases of bonds from the eurozone periphery as a valuable gesture of support. "They invested even in some weak countries, so they are very confident in the solvency of some countries," he said.

China has emerged as the transforming force in the eurozone debt crisis over recent days, pledging to use part of its €2.87 trillion (£1.82 trillion) reserves to safeguard global stability. The question is whether the Communist regime is hoping to extract strategic concessions in exchange.

The footsteps of a giant creditor were clearly felt in Portugal's bond markets on Wednesday, and again on Thursday in Spain and Italy. Madrid sold €3bn of five-year debt at 4.54pc, a full percentage point jump from November but still below the danger level. Italy also enjoyed a benign auction.
The exact role of China is unclear. Chinese vice-premier Li Keqiang promised to buy Spanish debt during a visit to Madrid last week, reportedly up to €6bn (£5bn).
China was the secret buyer in a private placement of €1.1bn of Portuguese debt last week, according to the Wall Street Journal. Finance minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos said China "may well have been" a key buyer in this week's debt auction.
China was not the only force at work. Traders say the European Central Bank (ECB) acted aggressively behind the scenes, calling some 20 dealers to buy Portuguese debt in the secondary market.
This created what amounted to a "short-squeeze" in Portuguese bonds just before auction, causing spreads to tighten dramatically and inflicting damage on market makers acting in good faith. City sources say this has caused some bitterness.
Charles Grant, head of the Centre for European Reform and author of a book on EU-China relations, said China's top goal is to secure an end to the EU arms embargo, imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. It rankles as humiliating treatment for a global superpower that has since changed profoundly.
The EU has refused to move on the sanctions until China ratifies the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and China's arrest of Nobel peace dissident Liu Xiaobo has further complicated matters.
Yet Brussels has suddenly begun to shift gear. Baroness Ashton, the EU's foreign policy chief, said the embargo is damaging EU-China ties and called for new thinking to "design a way forward".
Mr Grant said Britain, France and Germany are all wary of giving ground, cleaving closely to US policy. Washington views China's growing military might as a strategic threat to the Pacific region. There have already been hot words over the South China Sea, and the Pentagon claims that China has an "operational" ballistic missile able to sink aircraft carriers at long range.
A WikiLeaks cable from the US embassy in Beijing last January cites the EU's mission chief, Alexander McLachlan, saying Spain had tried to curry favour with Chinese leaders, "seeking advantage at other EU states' expense". He said China was fully aware of Madrid's game but was exploiting intra-EU divisions to gain leverage.
China's second goal is to secure market economy status from the EU. This would make it much harder for the EU to impose anti-dumping measures against Chinese imports. As it happens, the EU has just lifted its punitive tariff on Chinese shoes.
Mr Grant said Beijing will not risk much cash to woo Europe. "They are very hard-nosed. They may splash some money around for goodwill but they are not going to waste the hundreds of billions that may be needed. Nothing short of meaningful action by Europe's leaders can genuinely stabilise the eurozone," he said.
China's sovereign wealth funds, including the central bank's exchange fund SAFE, have been severely criticised at home for losing money on US investment banks during the credit crisis, or on dollar losses from US Treasury debt. They will be careful about fresh risks in euroland.
"It is debatable whether China would actually be willing to become buyer of last resort of the debt of a country close to default," said Julian Jessop from Capital Economics. "Chinese officials are acutely aware of past losses and will not want to be seen to risk their peoples' capital on a lost cause. Their actions frequently fall short of expectations raised by their words."
Simon Derrick, from the Bank of New York Mellon, said that China must find somewhere to recycle its fresh reserves or lose control of its own currency. It is already sated with US assets. Holdings are 65pc in dollars, 26pc in euros, 5pc in sterling and 3pc in the yen.
"They may start buying some emerging market bonds but basically the only place they can go is into euros, and buying €6bn of Spanish debt is a good investment if it helps protect their other euro assets," he said.
Mr Derrick said Beijing appears to take the view that the ECB's monetary policy is fundamentally more rigorous than the money-printing ventures of the US Federal Reserve. "The Chinese have made it clear that they don't see any meaningful shift in US policy."
In the global beauty contest, Europe's debt still looks less ugly than the main alternative.

China to Set Up Trading in Rare Earths

Brilliant move!

from People's Daily:

China is considering establishing an industry association and a government unit for the rare earths industry to gain more control over the precious metals, senior officials said Tuesday.

The rare earths industry association is likely to be launched in May and will assist companies in exports and international cooperation, Wang Caifeng, a former official of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), who is setting up the group, said at a forum.

"We will be on the frontlines leading price talks with foreign buyers. Our role will be similar to that of the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA)," she said.

Chinese industry associations have served as agents through which companies negotiate with foreign suppliers and buyers, such as CISA representing Chinese steelmakers in talks with global miners on iron ore prices.

China also plans to establish a government unit in 2011 to specifically manage the rare earth sector, said an industry insider who requested anonymity. There are six ministry-level bodies overseeing the sector, including MIIT, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the Ministry of Commerce.

"The MIIT is leading the work of setting up the new unit, but it hasn't been decided whether it will be vice-ministerial or bureau level," he said. "The new unit will formulate the industry plan and guide the industry."

China has released guidelines to reform the industry by cracking down on illegal mining practices, encouraging more consolidation and reducing exports as oversupplies have depleted its own resources and seriously damaged the environment.

Rare earths, composed of 17 elements, are used in a number of high-tech processes ranging from wind turbines and hybrid cars to missiles. China has about 30 percent of global rare earths reserves, but produces 97 percent of the world's total.

China on Tuesday issued the first round of 2011 export quotas for rare earths, 14,446 tons, 11 percent less than the first round last year, according to a statement on the Ministry of Commerce website.

On claims made by United States on China's alleged restrictions on exports of rare earths, experts said China's policy has never violated the rules and regulations under the framework of the World Trade Organization.

On Tuesday, in the annual report on China's compliance with WTO rules, the Office of the US Trade Representative filed complaints to the WTO against China's trade policy for the alleged "excessive government intervention". The rare earths export policy was highlighted in the report.

"China's moves are based on market demand and economic development. Based on this, no one should blame China," Wang said.

Zhang Anwen, deputy secretary-general of the Chinese Society of Rare Earths, said: "China's measures are for the sake of protecting the environment for the sustainable development for the industry."

Since 2006, the country has imposed temporary taxes on rare earths exports and set limits on quotas. In 2010, China reduced export quotas to 60 percent, causing alarm among importing countries such as Japan.

The Ministry of Finance said on its website last week that China will raise the export taxes for some rare earth minerals to 25 percent in 2011.

The country is speeding up the pace of mergers and acquisitions in the rare earths sector and is encouraging consolidation among State-owned enterprises. China plans to cut the number of rare earths companies from the current 90 to 20 by 2015.

Rare Earths: About to Become More Rare In the U.S.

So much for cheap technology!

from Reuters:
* China controls 95 percent of global rare earth supplies
* China plans to raises fees on rare earth exports in 2011
* U.S. needs to boost domestic mining of rare earth metals
By Tom Doggett
WASHINGTON, Dec 15 (Reuters) - The United States risks major supply disruptions of rare earth metals used in clean energy products unless it diversifies its sources of the minerals, the Energy Department warns in a report due to be released later on Wednesday.
The United States and other countries are worried that China, which controls 97 percent of the world trade in rare earth metals, will use those supplies as a political weapon and cut back their export when it is in a dispute with another country or to grow China's clean energy technology sector.
"The availability of a number of these materials is at risk due to their location, vulnerability to supply disruptions and lack of suitable substitutes," U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu said in a report, due to be unveiled on Wednesday at a rare earth metals conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The release of the report coincides with trade talks in Washington between the United States and China. U.S. officials are expected to push Chinese officials to loosen export restraints on rare earth elements.
China, which said on Tuesday it planned to raise export taxes on some rare earth metals beginning next month, holds 37 percent of known rare metal reserves, the United States has 13 percent and the rest is in other countries.
The 17 rare earth metals, with exotic names like lanthanum and europium, form unusually strong lightweight materials and are used in a wide range of applications including high-tech and defense products, car engines and clean energy.
CHINESE STRANGLEHOLD
China has vowed that it would not use its dominance of rare earth supplies as a bargaining tool with foreign economies but it has cut its exports of the materials on environmental grounds.
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised U.S. concerns over Beijing's export policy with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi during a visit to Asia at the end of October.
The Energy Department said in its report that it looked at the use of rare earths in wind turbines, electric vehicles, solar cells and energy efficient lighting because these clean technologies are expected to be deployed substantially on a global basis over the next 15 years, increasing demand for rare earth metals.
It said that in order to manage the risk of rare earth supply disruptions, the United States must increase its domestic extraction and processing of the materials.
There is only one U.S. rare earths producer, Molycorp Inc (MCP.N: Quote). It is the largest non-Chinese rare earths firm and the only rare earth oxide producer in the Western Hemisphere.
The report said the United States must work closely with its international partners, including Europe and Japan, to boost their production of the materials.
"Diversified global supply chains are essential," the report said.
However, mining rare earth metals can be very expensive and the lead times for new mining operations are long, ranging from two to 10 years.
"Whether a deposit can be mined economically will depend on a number of factors, including rare earth prices, regulatory requirements and improvements in extraction and separation technologies," the report said.
Recycling and reusing the rare earth metals could also significantly lower world demand for the materials.
Traditional energy sectors are also at risk from rare earth supply problems, the report said.
Rare earth ores are used in the fluid cracking catalysts that convert heavy oils in the refining process into more valuable gasoline, distillates and lighter products. Rare earth elements are used in catalysts to produce higher yields of more valuable products such as gasoline.
A disruption in rare earth supplies could have a noticeable impact on refinery yields and require oil refinery owners to make investments so the fluid cracking process will work without the rare earth materials, the department said.
The department said it will develop an updated strategy by the end of next year for increasing supplies of critical rare earth metals.

China Acknowledges U.S. Fiscal Health Worse Than Europe's

 from Reuters:

(Reuters) - The U.S. dollar will be a safe investment for the next six to 12 months because global markets are focused on the euro zone's troubles but America's fiscal health is worse than Europe's, an adviser to the Chinese central bank said on Wednesday.
Li Daokui, an academic member of the central bank's monetary policy committee, said that U.S. bond prices and the dollar would fall when the European economic situation stabilized.
"For now, market attention is still on Europe and for the coming 6-12 months, it will not shift to the United States," Li said, when asked about U.S. President Barack Obama's plan to extend tax cuts for all Americans.
"But we should be clear in our minds that the fiscal situation in the United States is much worse than in Europe. In one or two years, when the European debt situation stabilizes, attention of financial markets will definitely shift to the United States. At that time, U.S. Treasury bonds and the dollar will experience considerable declines."
U.S. Treasury prices fell sharply for a second day on Wednesday as the proposed tax deal sparked concerns over the government's ability to service its massive debt burden. Moody's Investors Service said it is worried the tax cuts could become permanent, hurting U.S. finances and credit ratings in the long run.
In Europe, Ireland's parliament passed the first in a series of resolutions underpinning its 2011 austerity budget on Tuesday, marking the first step in a lengthy approval process. But investors are now worried that the region's debt crisis could engulf Portugal next, or Spain.
China has a big stake in the performance of dollar assets. The country holds the world's biggest stock pile of foreign exchange reserves at $2.64 trillion and an estimated two-thirds of that is invested in dollar assets, including U.S. Treasuries.
The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an arm of the central bank, is responsible for managing the reserves.
Li was speaking on the sidelines of a financial forum in Beijing. He sits on the monetary policy committee of the central bank but does not have real influence on key decisions on interest rates and the yuan.

http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B71KO20101208

Russia, China Decide to Dump the Dollar

Good for them! I don't blame them for a moment!

from China Daily:
St. Petersburg, Russia - China and Russia have decided to renounce the US dollar and resort to using their own currencies for bilateral trade, Premier Wen Jiabao and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin announced late on Tuesday.
Chinese experts said the move reflected closer relations between Beijing and Moscow and is not aimed at challenging the dollar, but to protect their domestic economies.

"About trade settlement, we have decided to use our own currencies," Putin said at a joint news conference with Wen in St. Petersburg.

The two countries were accustomed to using other currencies, especially the dollar, for bilateral trade. Since the financial crisis, however, high-ranking officials on both sides began to explore other possibilities.

The yuan has now started trading against the Russian rouble in the Chinese interbank market, while the renminbi will soon be allowed to trade against the rouble in Russia, Putin said.

"That has forged an important step in bilateral trade and it is a result of the consolidated financial systems of world countries," he said.

Putin made his remarks after a meeting with Wen. They also officiated at a signing ceremony for 12 documents, including energy cooperation.

China Sends Global Stocks Lower With Monetary Tightening

BEIJING, Nov 19 (Reuters) - China ordered lenders on Friday to lock up more of their money with the central bank for the second time in two weeks, stepping up its battle to pull excess cash out of the economy before inflation has a chance to take off.
The People's Bank of China said that it would increase banks' required reserves by 50 basis points, its fifth such announcement this year. Including a temporary increase, the move takes required reserve ratios (RRR) to 18.5 percent for big banks, a record high.
The increase was intended "to strengthen liquidity management and appropriately control money and credit issuance", the central bank said in a statement on its website (www.pbc.gov.cn).
The move was not a surprise and, in fact, could be something of a relief for investors who had expected worse.
"It suggests China is intent to manage price pressures through withdrawing liquidity from the system," said Dongming Xie, China economist at OCBC Bank in Singapore. "However, it also suggests that China is being cautious about aggressive monetary tightening."

Knight Research Says the Game is Over

The Game Is Over
The simple story is this: We believe the structural and cyclical terms of global trade have finally reached their tipping point. This will catalyze a wholesale change in sentiment and a historic repositioning of risk assets. The emerging market global growth story is over.

• In meetings with clients throughout October, we began emphasizing our growing concerns about the nearly ubiquitous confidence the financial markets—and for that matter, global leaders and their body politic—have in China; and by extension, the rest of the emerging market story, commodities, and the direction of foreign exchange cross-rates.
• Not surprisingly, our concerns were met with varying degrees of resistance; but the overall consensus clearly favored a very bullish, asymmetric outcome over both the near and intermediate terms. When pressed as to our own sense of timing and specific catalysts  for broad-based trend reversal, candidly we were unclear. Our sense then, was that the higher and faster the commodity markets pushed, the sooner the reversal would occur. But we have now clarified our view.
• In just the past several weeks, we believe the data and government actions out of China, the back-up in US interest rates, the Fed’s emphatic commitment to QE2, intensifying pressures across the EU, broadly rising commodity prices, government efforts to control hot money flows, have finally pushed the global terms of trade to their tipping point.
• And now, as is evident by the flight to safety, and growing evidence that China will soon try and effect price controls in addition to raising interest rates and significantly changing the rules for their vast network of Local Government Funding Vehicles (LGFVs); the writing is on the wall. The game is over.
• The simple story is this: The structural and cyclical terms of global trade have reached their tipping point which will effect a wholesale change in sentiment and a historic repositioning of risk assets.
• So what do we consider the “terms of global trade”? Structurally, per our top chart, they are the intersection of Government Policy (viz., rule of law, market systems, trade law, etc.,) Resource and Industry (viz., natural resources, labor/demographic pools, industrial advantages, import dependencies, etc.,) and Economic Security (viz., the sovereign’s competitive standing, the relative power/needs of the citizenry, the mandate/control of the government, etc.) And cyclically, (as represented by the light blue, bold arrows) the terms of trade are defined by the intersection of foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, and the cost and availability of trade finance.

• And in our assessment given:

1. The structural breakdown of the credit and labor markets in the developed world and the anemic outlook for nominal GDP growth
2. The immaturity of the developing world and their vulnerability to credit shocks and uncontrollable inflation
3. China’s dependence upon non-economic, and unsustainable credit expansion to maintain growth far beyond natural export and domestic demand, and
4. Asia’s dependence upon imported energy and agriculture

the game is over. Presently, we believe that the broad-based resurgence of investor confidence in the emerging market and secular bull market in commodities will end badly; proving that the rally which commenced in Q2 2009, was in fact an “echo bubble” facilitated by massive—and unsustainable—stimuli from the Chinese Government

• And although such cataclysmic shocks rarely result in rhythmic, straight line fractures, the chain of price adjustments should be  relatively clear. Accordingly, we expect a shockingly powerful rally in the dollar, broadbased weakness across the commodity sector, a dramatic widening of emerging market credit spreads, and what could prove to be a stampede of hot fund flows out of the emerging markets.
• We appreciate both the gravity and the brevity of this note; but then again, the story is simple.

We believe that the end of the Great Consumer Credit Cycle and the vast structural differences in the terms of trade between the United States, the EU, and China, have finally caught up with the secular bull thesis on Emerging Market and Commodities. Quite ironically, the Fed’s aggressive policies will likely prove to be the catalyst which breaks China’s unbridled expansion of credit and non-economic growth, ushering in a wholesale rebalancing of risk assets.