Contrary to the view of many, the Great Crisis didn’t have to happen. I reject the excuse offered by many of the apologists that it was a once-in-a-century tsunami that would have occurred in any case – that policy makers could have done little to forestall the outcome. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. Defensive and steeped in denial, policy makers are ducking responsibility.
The recent crisis is a painfully visible manifestation of the greatest failure of central banking since the 1930s. Out of basis points, relying on dubious quantitative easing strategies, and still agnostic when it comes to coping with asset and credit bubbles, monetary policy has become the weak link in the daisy chain. Yet in the rush to re-regulate, central banks have largely been let off the hook. Nor are ever-profligate fiscal authorities exactly a beacon of hope in this crisis battered world.
Out of the darkness of the 1930s, a new approach to fiscal and monetary policy was borne. That renaissance is now over. The Great Crisis of 2008-09 demands a rethinking of the strategy and tactics of orthodox stabilization policies. Glaring shortcomings in our policy architecture must be addressed if the world is ever to learn the most important Lessons of Japan. As day follows night, a failure to learn these lessons almost guarantees another crisis in the not-so-distant future.
"I fear that unless regulatory reform is accompanied by a rethinking of monetary policy, another crisis is far more likely than not."
Stephen Roach, CEO, Morgan Stanley Asia
