Gold, Copper Find Their Footing

Gold

Copper

Commodities Surge to New Highs

Grains have hit new 2010 highs today, especially corn and soybeans. Gold is above $1400/ounce again, and silver is also surging. Sugar just hit a new 29-year high. Cotton, after a limit down move yesterday, just erased all those losses! Copper just hit a new high also. Livestock futures are setting new records today also. Inflation is here, like it or not!
NYBOT weekly, daily chart:

NYBOT monthly chart -- higher than 2008 high!

Consumer Sentiment, Shiller Home Values Drop

Now that elections are in the past, reality sets in.

Consumer Confidence:

The Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index®, which had improved in November, decreased slightly in December. The Index now stands at 52.5 (1985=100), down from 54.3 in November. The Present Situation Index declined to 23.5 from 25.4. The Expectations Index decreased to 71.9 from 73.6 last month.

The Consumer Confidence Survey® is based on a representative sample of 5,000 U.S. households. The monthly survey is conducted for The Conference Board by TNS. TNS is the world’s largest custom research company. The cutoff date for December’s preliminary results was December 20th.

Says Lynn Franco, Director of the Consumer Research Center at The Conference Board: "Despite this month's modest decline, consumer confidence is no worse off today than it was a year ago. Consumers' assessment of the current state of the economy and labor market remains tepid, and their outlook remains cautious. Thus, all signs continue to suggest that the economic expansion will continue well into 2011, but that the pace of growth will remain moderate."

Consumers' appraisal of present-day conditions was slightly more pessimistic than in November. The percentage of consumers claiming business conditions are "bad" decreased to 41.2 percent from 42.9 percent, however, those claiming business conditions are "good" declined to 7.5 percent from 8.5 percent. Consumers’ assessment of the labor market was less favorable than last month. Those saying jobs are "plentiful" decreased to 3.9 percent from 4.3 percent, while those stating jobs are "hard to get" edged up to 46.8 percent from 46.3 percent.

Consumers’ expectations were slightly less optimistic than in November. Those expecting an improvement in business conditions over the next six months edged up to 16.6 percent from 16.4 percent, while those anticipating business conditions will worsen edged down to 12.1 percent from 12.4 percent. Consumers remained mixed about future job prospects. Those anticipating fewer jobs in the months ahead increased to 19.5 percent from 19.1 percent, while those expecting more jobs declined to 14.3 percent from 15.1 percent. The proportion of consumers expecting an increase in their incomes decreased to 9.9 percent from 11.1 percent.

Case Shiller from Zero Hedge:

If Bernanke is hoping to eventually have restore HELOCs as a piggybank for the greater US population, he better come up with something quick. The Case Shiller for October, as always nearly three months delayed, shows that the double dip in home prices which started in June, is persisting. And since both new and mortgage refi apps have plunged in recent weeks following the spike in the 30 Year cash mortgage rate, do not expect to see any rise in Top 20 Composite MSA home prices. From the October print: the October SA Composite 20 came at 143.52%, a decline of 0.99% from September, and just down from a year earlier. There was a sequential decline in 18 of the 20 MSAs, with just Denver and DC posting an increase. The biggest drops were in Atlanta (-2.13%), Chicago (-1.80%), and Minneapolis (-1.76%). The decline was even worse on a non-seasonally adjusted basis, where the sequential decline in the Composite 20 was -1.32%. As the attached chart demonstrates, the double dip is accelerating, as the sequential drops are increasing in magnitude. This data flatly continues to refute claims that there is  any economic recovery going on, as the primary source of middle class wealth continues to decline in value.

Copper's Continued Climb to New Record High

Spec Sell-Off to Come?

from John Hussman:


Why are Treasury yields rising despite hundreds of billions of Treasury purchases by the Federal Reserve? There are two possibilities in the current debate. One is that the Fed's policy of purchasing Treasuries has scared the willies out of the bond market on fears of higher inflation, and that the policy is a failure. The other is that the policy has been such a success at boosting the prospects for economic growth that interest rates are rising on anticipation of a better economy.

From our standpoint, neither of these explanations hold much water. On the inflation front, the recent bond selloff has hit TIPS prices as well as straight Treasuries, which isn't something you'd expect to see if inflation expectations were being destabilized. And although precious metals and other commodity prices have been pressed higher, the commodity run can be more accurately traced to negative real interest rates at the short-end of the maturity curve, coupled with a downward trend in long-term yields that has now reversed dramatically (more on that below). I've long argued that unproductive government spending and profligate fiscal policy are ultimately inflationary (regardless of how the spending is financed, and particularly if it is monetized), but I continue to view persistent inflation as a long-term, not near-term concern. A rise in T-bill yields of more than 15-25 basis points would change that assessment. Until then, velocity can be expected to collapse in direct proportion to changes in the monetary base, with little impact on prices.

As for the notion that the Fed's targeted Treasury purchases have directly aided the economy, the argument requires bizarre logical gymnastics. It demands one to believe that although the purchases were intended to stimulate the economy by lowering rates, they have been successful without lowering them, and in fact by raising them, because the expectation of lower rates was so stimulative that it caused rates to rise, so that the higher rates can be taken as evidence that lowering rates without lowering them was a success. Oh, brother.

It's clear that we've seen some firming in various indicators such as the Purchasing Managers Index, the ECRI Weekly Leading Index and weekly claims for unemployment. The question is whether these can be traced to lower yields and greater availability of liquidity. On the interest rate front, the answer is clearly no, as Treasury and mortgage rates are even higher than they were before QE2 was announced. On the "liquidity" front, the additional reserves have simply added to an existing pile of well over a trillion dollars of idle reserve balances in the banking system. And while we did see a pop in consumer credit in the latest report, it was entirely due to Federal loans to students (arguably people displaced from the labor force and seeking an alternative). Other forms of consumer credit have collapsed at an accelerating rate.

So neither side typically taken in the debate over the Fed's Treasury purchases is particularly satisfying. Fortunately for fans of logic, there is a third explanation that is much more plausible, and has the benefit of having data behind it. Despite my extreme criticism of Fed actions in recent years, I would argue that QE2 has in fact been "successful" over the short-term, but not through any monetary mechanism. Rather, QE2 has been successful a) by creating a burst of enthusiasm that released some pent-up demand in the same way that Cash for Clunkers and the new homebuyer tax credit did, and b) by encouraging investors to believe that the Fed has provided a "backstop" for stocks and other risky assets, creating a speculative blowoff in these securities, to the detriment of what investors perceive as "safe" assets, which ironically includes Treasury securities.

In short, the main effect of QE2 has not been monetary but has instead been rhetorical - and that rhetoric may very well be nearly empty.

The key event related to QE2 wasn't its formal announcement, but was instead the Op-Ed piece that Ben Bernanke published a few days later in the Washington Post, which essentially advanced the argument that the Fed was targeting a "wealth effect" in stocks and other risky assets, in hopes of getting people to consume off of that perceived wealth. At that moment, Bernanke unleashed a speculative bubble in risky assets, and a selloff in safe ones. This has rewarded risk-seeking and punished risk-aversion, but it has also unfortunately driven the markets into an overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields condition that has historically ended in steep and abrupt losses.

Ned Davis Research tracks a set of "factor attribution" portfolios, which measure the performance between the top 10% of stocks ranked by a given factor, and the bottom 10% of stocks as ranked by that factor. The factors are things like market beta, dividend yield, 26-week momentum, and so forth. Essentially, the these factor portfolios track the return of hypothetical portfolios that are long the top 10% and short the bottom 10% of stocks based on any given variable.

The performance of these 133 factor portfolios over the past 13 weeks offers tremendous insight into the extent to which the Federal Reserve has encouraged speculative risk. Investors are chasing stocks with the greatest exposure to market fluctuations, commodities, credit risk, small-cap risk and volatility. Conversely, securities demonstrating reasonable valuation, stability, quality, or payout have been virtually abandoned by investors. Here is a sampling:

FACTOR	FACTOR GROUPING	13-WEEK RETURN
Market Beta	Risk	17.80%
Raw Materials Beta	Commodity Sensitivity	17.47%
Credit Spread Beta	Macro Economic Sensitivity	14.66%
Small vs. Large Beta	Style Sensitivity	12.54%
Silver Beta	Commodity Sensitivity	10.87%
Sigma Risk (Volatility)	Risk	10.73%
Operating Cash Flow Yield	Valuation	-4.02%
EPS Stability	Quality	-5.56%
Value vs. Growth Beta	Style Sensitivity	-5.87%
Return on Invested Capital	Profitability	-6.61%
Dividend Yield	Valuation	-9.34%
10-Year T-Note Beta	Macro Economic Sensitivity	-9.55%
High vs. Low Quality Beta	Style Sensitivity	-15.70%

For us, the past few months have felt like our own miniature equivalent of a bear market. The Strategic Growth Fund has pulled back by several percent, and though our occasional drawdowns have been a fraction of those experienced by the S&P 500 over time, the past four weeks have felt relentless on a day-to-day basis. During this period, the strongest four factors have been: Market Beta (8.98%), Sigma Risk (8.50%), Small vs. Large Beta (8.05%), and Cyclical vs. Consumer Beta (7.75%). Meanwhile, factors such as High vs. Low Quality Beta (-2.18%), Dividend Yield (-3.07%), and EPS Stability (-5.16%) have been particularly unrewarding.

The problem with this outcome is that the speculative factors being rewarded over the short-term have nothing to do with the characteristics that have historically been rewarded over the long-term. Despite various periods where valuation is out-of-favor, value has been the clear winner over time. Moreover, it has been destructive to discard valuation in preference for chasing momentum and relative strength after the fact. In contrast, chasing high beta or momentum has conferred no durable benefit for investors. Here is a sampling of 10-year factor returns:

FACTOR	FACTOR GROUPING	520 WEEK RETURN
Operating Cash Flow Yield	Valuation	20.26%
Sales / Price	Valuation	19.68%
Market Cap	Liquidity and Size	19.10%
EBIT / Enterprise Value	Valuation	15.00%
Free Cash Flow / Enterprise Value	Valuation	10.49%
Market Beta	Risk	1.55%
Silver Beta	Commodity Sensitivity	-1.04%
Relative Strength	Risk	-7.49%
26-Week RSI	Trend	-15.46%
26-Week Momentum	Momentum	-15.99%
52-Week Stochastics	Momentum	-23.79%

From a stock selection perspective, we've found it most effective over the long-term to maintain a discipline favoring cash-flow based valuation, supplemented by measures of price/volume behavior, overweighting or underweighting individual sectors to the degree that they overlap our selection criteria. So we're perfectly happy holding cyclical stocks, technology stocks, or other sectors, but we hold those stocks because they exhibit characteristics that have historically been rewarding. What we don't do is speculate on a given industry when its component stocks are clearly overvalued, or chase a given sector just because it happens to be the favorite momentum concept of the quarter. I should note that market action can be useful as a component of a stock selection approach, but it has historically been a dangerous sign when investors chase speculative momentum while at the same time penalizing favorable valuation and quality, which is what we see at present.

We've seen this movie a few times now, and the ending never changes. As the market approached the peak of the last market cycle, I noted that the performance of value managers has often been least impressive when the market was approaching a long period of dull and often negative returns. Following that piece (When Value Mavens Lag - November 18, 2006), the S&P 500 actually advanced for another 14 weeks, gaining nearly 4% in that period. It then dropped about 6% in the next few sessions. The market would eventually recover about 15%, before losing the gain in the next 13 weeks, and then falling in half from there. While the current speculative run may be shorter or longer, I doubt that any of the returns of recent months will prove to be any more durable. We've introduced some changes into our Market Climate approach that will allow us to accept moderate exposures to market fluctuations more frequently than we have in recent years, but our stock selection approach remains unchanged, despite the recent discomfort.

In the "Value Mavens" piece, I made some observations about Berkshire Hathaway's long-term record under Warren Buffett: "Though Berkshire's stock price has historically been much more volatile than its book value, they have soared together over the long run. That's not to say that they've grown every year – they haven't. But over time, price has followed value. That says something. It says that the attention of a good investor should be on the worth of the underlying businesses. If those are solid and growing, market prices will come to reflect that over time. In my view, a good fund manager spends a lot of time thinking about the underlying value of the businesses that are owned on behalf of shareholders, and doesn't gamble a great deal of shareholder capital when the only merit is speculative momentum. The responsibility is to own assets and claims on probable future cash flows, not just hot air. If the underlying values in the portfolio have a solid foundation (and particularly if investor sponsorship supports that assessment, as evidenced by price-volume behavior), market prices generally come to reflect the underlying values over time."

In short, we are observing what can only be described as a Fed-induced speculative blowoff. While this has been avidly encouraged by the Fed, it is important to recognize that there is no actual economic mechanism at play here other than words. Investors are chasing stocks because Ben Bernanke told them to, and despite the fact that we have seen two plunges of more than 50% each over the past decade, investors are at least temporarily willing to believe that the Fed will "backstop" their risk-taking by preventing the market from falling. As for any "transmission mechanism" attributable to QE2 itself, Treasury yields and mortgage rates have increased sharply since the Fed first announced QE2, and the additional reserves created by Fed purchases have simply added to the already massive and idle pool held by banks. Unless one twists logic into a pretzel so that up is down, one can identify nothing of substance in the Fed's policy that is supporting the markets. Stocks are being buoyed solely by a combination of words, sentiment and superstition. As Stevie Wonder put it, "When you believe in things that you don't understand, then you suffer."

From a longer-term perspective, the simple fact is that Fed-induced bubbles do not change the long-term mathematics of investment returns, which are based on deliverable cash flows. Over the short-term, Fed actions can undoubtedly postpone market declines. But as we've repeatedly observed, the Fed can do so only by making those losses far worse when they arrive.

Valuation Update

On the valuation front, the consensus estimate from the strongest models we track indicates that the S&P 500 is most likely priced to achieve 10-year total returns averaging about 3.6% annually. Given the inverse relationship between the Russell 2000/S&P 500 ratio and subsequent relative returns for the Russell 2000, I expect that returns will most likely be negative for small-cap stocks over the coming 4-year period, even without the assumption of renewed economic weakness.

As the market approached its 2007 peak, I published a piece titled Fair Value - 40% Off (not a forecast, but don't rule it out) where I noted that stocks were grossly overpriced not only on the basis of earnings-driven models, but also based on discounted dividends (including the impact of repurchases):

“Suppose we look back over history, and at each date, add up all the dividends the S&P 500 actually delivered over the subsequent years, discounted at a long-term rate of return of 10%. We could literally check whether investors got what they paid for. Of course, the more recent the date, the more we'd have to project some future dividends. But that's not a terribly difficult matter. As it turns out, the average dividend growth rate since 1900 has been about 5%, the average since 1940 has been 6%, and the highest growth rate for any 30-year period has been 6.4%. We also know that S&P 500 earnings growth has displayed a very, very durable 6% growth rate measured from peak-to-peak across economic cycles. So assuming anything between 6% to 7% long-term dividend growth will give us a very robust series of likely future dividends.”

As it turned out, the "40% off" valuation assessment was actually optimistic, as the S&P 500 lost more than half of its value over the next two years. Below, I've updated the chart that appeared in that study. Even if we assume a future dividend growth rate of 6.7%, which is the fastest growth rate observed over any 25-year span during the past century (and again, includes the impact of share repurchases), the S&P 500 would currently have to stand at 748 in order to be priced to achieve long-term total returns of 10% annually.

Of course, with the S&P 500 at about 1256 despite a contraction in dividends over the past few years, this analysis would imply that fair value is again about 40% below present levels. It would be nice to be able to rule that conclusion out. Then again, it would have been nice to rule it out in 2007, not to mention in 2000, when our 10-year total return projection for the S&P 500 was negative based on every historically consistent assumption we could make about terminal valuations.

What's interesting today is that a projected 3.6% annual total return for the coming decade, compared with a "normal" 10-year return of 10% annually, implies roughly the same level of overvaluation as indicated by discounted dividends - putting fair value roughly 40% below present levels. On that note, I was struck by Alan Abelson's latest piece in Barron's, where he offered:

"The latest calculation by Andrew Smithers, the smart Brit who runs the eponymous London-based investment firm Smithers & Co., is that U.S. equities are more than 70% overpriced, according to q, his favorite yardstick and essentially a measure based on replacement value.

"Just to put you at ease, we haven't quite lost our minds, nor Andrew his. The market, rest assured, isn't about to vanish into the void. And Andrew is quick to point out that by his reckoning, stocks are well below their valuation peaks of 1929 and 1999, but more or less even-steven with the highs of 1906, 1937 and 1968.

In the chart below - courtesy of Doug Short - the historical norm for Q is 0.70, which is nearly 40% below the recent Q ratio of 1.12. Equivalently, the recent level is nearly 70% above the historical norm.

Abelson continues, "For all his wariness for the long pull, he doesn't see share prices suffering a steep fall so long as the Federal Reserve keeps pumping liquidity into the system and Washington stalls on meaningful deficit reduction. Frankly, although we greatly esteem Andrew's perspicacity, we aren't so sure he's right. Not least because so many market mavens now share his view, which suggests to us, as the old Street cliché has it, it probably has already been discounted in the latest bump up in equities."

With advisory bullishness back to 2007 extremes and equity put/call ratios at similarly extreme levels, I have to agree with Alan on that point.

So that is where valuations stand. I recognize that the conclusions seem implausible. I would not be inclined to share this data if it didn't have a strong historical record. The first criticism of these valuation implications is undoubtedly that they imply P/E ratios on forward operating earnings that seem far "too low." On this note, it's important to recognize that profit margins are currently about 50% above the historical norm. Moreover, while a multiple of 15 may be appropriate for trailing net earnings on normalized profit margins, it is a wholly inappropriate multiple to apply to forward operating earnings on elevated margins.

It is one thing to factor that reality into valuations - if margins can remain 50% above the norm for a full decade before contracting, it's easy to show that stocks should be valued about 15% higher than otherwise. But it is entirely another thing to assume that profit margins will remain 50% above historical norms forever, ignoring every bit of historical evidence that they revert to the norm over time. Analysts who blindly apply a multiple that "feels right" to next year's projected operating earnings are implicitly assuming that margins will remain permanently elevated at record levels. The common practice of blindly applying an arbitrary multiple to the coming year's projected earnings is an error that reflects profound misunderstanding of how securities are priced.

The second criticism of course, is that 10% may not be an appropriate discount rate, given 30-year Treasury yields at 4.5%. On this, I'll make two observations. The first is that in post-war data, the projected long-term total return for stocks has averaged about 4.25% more than long-term Treasury bonds. So if one believes that long-rates will remain at 4.5% forever, it's probably appropriate to bring the discount rate down, which would make stocks less overvalued, but highly vulnerable to any interest rate surprise. The second observation is that the S&P 500 has historically carried an average duration of about 30 years (if you work through some calculus, the duration of stocks turns out to be roughly equal to the price/dividend ratio), so the appropriate benchmark would normally be a 30-year zero coupon bond. Presently, the S&P 500 has a duration upward of 53 years. In order to price it properly, you can't simply refer to the current, depressed 10-year yield on a coupon-bearing Treasury. You have to think of the rate of return investors will demand 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, 30 years, and even 40 years from today. A 10-year Treasury has a duration of roughly 7 years. There's neither a theoretical nor historical basis (if you actually test it, which most people don't) for using the 10-year Treasury as a benchmark return for equities.

We focus on valuation models where the deviation from fair value is strongly correlated with subsequent market returns over the following 5-10 years. We hear a lot of "valuation" calls from analysts who seem to believe it is unnecessary to subject their models to historical tests. But investors should demand no less than a 7th grade math teacher does - "Please show your work." We're certainly open to alternative models that have a testable historical record. We're not interested in making a bullish case or a bearish case - our objective is to estimate prospective returns accurately. From where we stand, the evidence is presently not encouraging.

To say that fair value is far below present levels does not imply that the market will revert quickly to that level - only that long-term total returns are likely to be tepid as prices grow slower than fundamentals for an extended period. Moreover, to say that stocks may not revert quickly to our estimates of fair value means that we will need to have some willingness to accept market risk even in periods when stocks are still overvalued from a longer-term perspective. As I've noted in recent weeks, we've broadened the range of Market Climates we define in a way that we believe is robust, and will allow us to accept moderate exposures to market fluctuations more frequently than we have in recent years. In short, while we are not enthusiastic at all about market valuations, we've also improved our ability to play the hand that the market deals us as we move forward.

Market Climate

As of last week, the Market Climate for stocks continued to be characterized by an overvalued, overbought, overbullish, rising-yields conformation that has historically been very hostile to stocks. That said, this Climate is also characterized by what I've frequently called "unpleasant skew" - if you think of day-to-day market returns as being drawn from a sort of "bell curve," the highest probability area of the bell is actually a small positive gain, but there is also a shortened right tail (a lower-than-normal likelihood of large gains) and a fat left tail (a much higher-than-normal likelihood of steep losses). So the average outcome is negative, but the most frequent "draw" is actually a small gain.

To offer a basic feel for this, below is a sample path of 100 draws from a probability distribution where there is a 98% chance of a 0.2% gain, coupled with a 2% chance of a 9.8% loss. Clearly, real-world distributions are more subtle, but my concern about this Climate should be evident.

Both Strategic Growth and Strategic International Equity are fully hedged. With option volatilities extremely depressed, we have a "staggered strike" position in Strategic Growth, which tightens our hedge by raising our put option strikes closer to the level of the market.

In bonds, the Market Climate was characterized last week by relatively neutral yields and unfavorable yield pressures. The Strategic Total Return Fund continues to carry a defensive duration of just under 2 years.

On the precious metals front, it's useful to recognize how important falling Treasury bond yields and negative short-term interest rates have been in the recent commodities run. Historically, the Philadelphia gold stock index (XAU) has advanced at a 23.0% annual rate when the 10-year Treasury bond yield has been below its level of 6 months earlier, but has declined at a -5.9% annual rate when Treasury yields have been rising. With respect to short-term real interest rates, the XAU has advanced at a 16.1% annual rate when 3-month Treasury bill yields have been below the year-over-year CPI inflation rate, and just 4.1% otherwise. Put falling Treasury yields together with negative short-term real rates, as we've seen during much of the recent commodity price run, and you'll find that the XAU has historically advanced at a 33.9% annual rate. Notably, Treasury yields have recently reversed course, and are now above their levels of 6 months ago. While real short rates are still negative, this has historically not been enough to overcome rising bond yields and produce positive returns in the XAU, on average, except when the Gold/XAU ratio has been well above 7.

In short, my impression is that investors chasing commodities have not paused to recognize that one of the major supports for this run - falling Treasury bond yields - has been knocked away from them. There may be some pure momentum remaining for commodities, but this is now purely speculative. A much better environment for gold stock holdings would include falling Treasury yields, negative real rates at the short-end of the maturity curve, reasonable valuations of gold stocks to the bullion (which is presently still the case), and some amount of downward economic pressure, such as a Purchasing Managers Index below 50. The present Market Climate for precious metals shares isn't terrible by any means - it's just not positive anymore.

The Real Global Warming Agenda: Global Redistribution of Wealth

A better name would be "Global Scamming" or "Global Fraud"!

from Investor.com:

Freezing weather: Just another example of global warming? View Enlarged Image

Climate: Nothing makes fools of more people than trying to predict the weather. Whether in Los Angeles or London, recent predictions have gone crazily awry. Global warming? How about mini ice age?
The sight of confused and angry travelers stuck in airports across Europe because of an arctic freeze that has settled across the continent isn't funny. Sadly, they've been told for more than a decade now that such a thing was an impossibility — that global warming was inevitable, and couldn't be reversed.
This is a big problem for those who see human-caused global warming as an irreversible result of the Industrial Revolution's reliance on carbon-based fuels. Based on global warming theory — and according to official weather forecasts made earlier in the year — this winter should be warm and dry. It's anything but. Ice and snow cover vast parts of both Europe and North America, in one of the coldest Decembers in history.
A cautionary tale? You bet. Prognosticators who wrote the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, or IPCC, global warming report in 2007 predicted an inevitable, century-long rise in global temperatures of two degrees or more. Only higher temperatures were foreseen. Moderate or even lower temperatures, as we're experiencing now, weren't even listed as a possibility.
Since at least 1998, however, no significant warming trend has been noticeable. Unfortunately, none of the 24 models used by the IPCC views that as possible. They are at odds with reality.
Karl Popper, the late, great philosopher of science, noted that for something to be called scientific, it must be, as he put it, "falsifiable." That is, for something to be scientifically true, you must be able to test it to see if it's false. That's what scientific experimentation and observation do. That's the essence of the scientific method.
Unfortunately, the prophets of climate doom violate this idea. No matter what happens, it always confirms their basic premise that the world is getting hotter. The weather turns cold and wet? It's global warming, they say. Weather turns hot? Global warming. No change? Global warming. More hurricanes? Global warming. No hurricanes? You guessed it.
Nothing can disprove their thesis. Not even the extraordinarily frigid weather now creating havoc across most of the Northern Hemisphere. The Los Angeles Times, in a piece on the region's strangely wet and cold weather, paraphrases Jet Propulsion Laboratory climatologist Bill Patzert as saying, "In general, as the globe warms, weather conditions tend to be more extreme and volatile."
Got that? No matter what the weather, it's all due to warming. This isn't science; it's a kind of faith. Scientists go along and even stifle dissent because, frankly, hundreds of millions of dollars in research grants are at stake. But for the believers, global warming is the god that failed.
Why do we continue to listen to warmists when they're so wrong? Maybe it's because their real agenda has nothing to do with climate change at all. Earlier this month, attendees of a global warming summit in Cancun, Mexico, concluded, with virtually no economic or real scientific support, that by 2020 rich nations need to transfer $100 billion a year to poor nations to help them "mitigate" the adverse impacts of warming.
This is what global warming is really about — wealth redistribution by people whose beliefs are basically socialist. It has little or nothing to do with climate. If it did, we might pay more attention to Piers Corbyn, a little-known British meteorologist and astrophysicist who has a knack for correctly predicting weather changes. Indeed, as London's Mayor Boris Johnson recently noted, "He seems to get it right about 85% of the time."
How does he do it? Unlike the U.N. and government forecasters, Corbyn pays close attention to solar cycles that, as it turns out, correlate very closely to changes in climate. Not only are we not headed for global warming, Corbyn says, we may be entering a "mini ice age" similar to the one that took place from 1450 A.D. to 1850 A.D.
We don't know if Corbyn's right or not. But given his record, he deserves as much attention as the warm-mongers whose goal is not to arrive at the truth but to reorganize society in a radical way.

The Looming Bond Crisis

from NYT:

The State of Illinois is still paying off billions in bills that it got from schools and social service providers last year. Arizona recently stopped paying for certain organ transplants for people in its Medicaid program. States are releasing prisoners early, more to cut expenses than to reward good behavior. And in Newark, the city laid off 13 percent of its police officers last week.
While next year could be even worse, there are bigger, longer-term risks, financial analysts say. Their fear is that even when the economy recovers, the shortfalls will not disappear, because many state and local governments have so much debt — several trillion dollars’ worth, with much of it off the books and largely hidden from view — that it could overwhelm them in the next few years.
“It seems to me that crying wolf is probably a good thing to do at this point,” said Felix Rohatyn, the financier who helped save New York City from bankruptcy in the 1970s.
Some of the same people who warned of the looming subprime crisis two years ago are ringing alarm bells again. Their message: Not just small towns or dying Rust Belt cities, but also large states like Illinois and California are increasingly at risk.
Municipal bankruptcies or defaults have been extremely rare — no state has defaulted since the Great Depression, and only a handful of cities have declared bankruptcy or are considering doing so.
But the finances of some state and local governments are so distressed that some analysts say they are reminded of the run-up to the subprime mortgage meltdown or of the debt crisis hitting nations in Europe.
Analysts fear that at some point — no one knows when — investors could balk at lending to the weakest states, setting off a crisis that could spread to the stronger ones, much as the turmoil in Europe has spread from country to country.
Mr. Rohatyn warned that while municipal bankruptcies were rare, they appeared increasingly possible. And the imbalances are so large in some places that the federal government will probably have to step in at some point, he said, even if that seems unlikely in the current political climate.
“I don’t like to play the scared rabbit, but I just don’t see where the end of this is,” he added.
Resorting to Fiscal Tricks
As the downturn has ground on, some of the worst-hit cities and states have resorted to fiscal sleight of hand to stay afloat, helping them close yawning budget gaps each year, but often at great future cost.
Few workers with neglected 401(k) retirement accounts would risk taking out second mortgages to invest in stocks, gambling that the investment gains would be enough to build bigger nest eggs and repay the loans.
But that is just what Illinois, which has been failing to make the required annual payments to its pension funds for years, is doing. It borrowed $10 billion in 2003 and used the money to invest in its pension funds. The recession sent their investment returns below their target, but the state must repay the bonds, with interest. The solution? Illinois sold an additional $3.5 billion worth of pension bonds this year and is planning to borrow $3.7 billion more for its pension funds.
It is the long-term problems of a handful of states, including California, Illinois, New Jersey and New York, that financial analysts worry about most, fearing that their problems might precipitate a crisis that could hurt other states by driving up their borrowing costs.
But it is the short-term budget woes that nearly all states are facing that are preoccupying elected officials.
Illinois is not the only state behind on its bills. Many states, including New York, have delayed payments to vendors and local governments because they had too little cash on hand to make them. California paid vendors with i.o.u.’s last year. A handful of other states, worried about their cash flow, delayed paying tax refunds last spring.
Now, just as the downturn has driven up demand for state assistance, many states are cutting back.
The demand for food stamps has been rising significantly in Idaho, but tight budgets led the state to close nearly a third of the field offices of the state’s Department of Health and Welfare, which take applications for them. As states have cut aid to cities, many have resorted to previously unthinkable cuts, laying off police officers and closing firehouses.
Those cuts in aid to cities and counties, which are expected to continue, are one reason some analysts say cities are at greater risk of bankruptcy or are being placed under outside oversight.
Next year is unlikely to bring better news. States and cities typically face their biggest deficits after recessions officially end, as rainy-day funds are depleted and easy measures are exhausted.
This time is expected to be no different. The federal stimulus money increased the federal share of state budgets to over a third last year, from just over a quarter in 2008, according to a report issued last week by the National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget Officers. That money is set to run out next summer. Tax collections, meanwhile, are not expected to return to their pre-recession levels for another year or two, given that the housing market and broader economy remain weak and that unemployment remains high.
Scott D. Pattison, the budget association’s director, said that for states, next year could be “the worst year of this four- or five-year downturn period.”
And few expect the federal government to offer more direct aid to states, at least in the short term. Many members of the new Republican majority in the House campaigned against the stimulus, and Washington is debating the recommendations of a debt-reduction commission. 

So some states are essentially borrowing to pay their operating costs, adding new debts that are not always clearly disclosed.
Arizona, hobbled by the bursting housing bubble, turned to a real estate deal for relief, essentially selling off several state buildings — including the tower where the governor has her office — for a $735 million upfront payment. But leasing back the buildings over the next 20 years will ultimately cost taxpayers an extra $400 million in interest.
Many governments are delaying payments to their pension funds, which will eventually need to be made, along with the high interest — usually around 8 percent — that the funds are expected to earn each year.
New York balanced its budget this year by shortchanging its pension fund. And in New Jersey, Gov. Chris Christie deferred paying the $3.1 billion that was due to the pension funds this year.
It is these growing hidden debts that make many analysts nervous. States and municipalities currently have around $2.8 trillion worth of outstanding bonds, but that number is dwarfed by the debts that many are carrying off their books.
State and local pensions — another form of promised debt, guaranteed in some states by their constitutions — face hidden shortfalls of as much as $3.5 trillion by some calculations. And the health benefits that state and large local governments have promised their retirees going forward could cost more than $530 billion, according to the Government Accountability Office.
“Most financial crises happen in unpredictable ways, and they hit you when you’re not looking,” said Jerome H. Powell, a visiting scholar at the Bipartisan Policy Center who was an under secretary of the Treasury for finance during the bailout of the savings and loan industry in the early 1990s. “This one isn’t like that. You can see it coming. It would be sinful not to do something about this while there’s a chance.”
So far, investors have bought states’ bonds eagerly, on the widespread understanding that states and cities almost never default. But in recent weeks the demand has diminished sharply. Last month, mutual funds that invest in municipal bonds reported a big sell-off — a bigger one-week sell-off, in fact, than they had when the financial markets melted down in 2008. And hedge funds are already seeking out ways to place bets against the debts of some states, with the help of their investment banks.
Of course, not all states are in as dire straits as Illinois or California. And the credit-rating agencies say that the risk of default is small. States and cities typically make a priority of repaying their bond holders, even before paying for essential services. Standard & Poor’s issued a report this month saying that the crises that states and municipalities were facing were “more about tough decisions than potential defaults.”
Change in Ratings
The credit ratings of a number of local governments have improved this year, not because their finances have strengthened somewhat, but because the ratings agencies have changed the way they analyze governments.
The new higher ratings, which lower the cost of borrowing, emphasize the fact that municipal defaults have been much rarer than corporate defaults.
This October, Moody’s issued a report explaining why it now rates all 50 states, even Illinois, as better credit risks than a vast majority of American non-financial companies.
One reason: the belief that the federal government is more likely to bail out a teetering state than a bankrupt company.
“The federal government has broadly channeled cash to all state governments during recent recessions and provided support to individual states following natural disasters,” Moody’s explained, adding that there was no way of being sure how Washington would respond to a bond default by a state, since it had not happened since the 1930s.
But some analysts fear the ratings are too sanguine, recalling that the ratings agencies also dismissed the possibility that a subprime crisis was brewing. While most agree that defaults are unlikely, they fear that as states struggle with their growing debts, investors could decide not to buy the debt of the weakest state or local governments.
That would force a crisis, since states cannot operate if they cannot borrow. Such a crisis could then spread to healthier states, making it more expensive for them to borrow, if Europe is an example.
Meredith Whitney, a bank analyst who was among the first to warn of the impact the subprime mortgage meltdown would have on banks, is warning that she sees similar problems with state and local government finances.
“The state situation reminded me so much of the banks, pre-crisis,” she said this fall on CNBC.
There are eerie similarities between the subprime debt crisis and the looming municipal debt woes. Among them:
¶Just as housing was once considered a sure bet — prices would never fall all across the country at the same time, conventional wisdom suggested — municipal bonds have long been considered an investment safe enough for grandmothers, because states could always raise taxes to pay their bondholders. Now that proposition is being tested. Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, considered bankruptcy this year because it faced $68 million in debt payments related to a failed incinerator, which is more than the city’s entire annual budget. But officials there have resisted raising taxes.
¶Much of the debt of states and cities is hidden, since it is off the books, just as the amount of mortgage-related debt turned out to be underestimated. States and municipalities often understate their pension liabilities, in part by using accounting methods that would not be allowed in the private sector. Joshua D. Rauh, an associate professor of finance at Northwestern University, and Robert Novy-Marx, an assistant professor of finance at the University of Rochester, calculated that the true unfunded liability for state and local pension plans is roughly $3.5 trillion.
¶The states and many cities still carry good ratings, and those issuing warnings are dismissed as alarmists, reminding some analysts of the lead up to the subprime crisis.
Now states are bracing for more painful cuts, more layoffs, more tax increases, more battles with public employee unions, more requests to bail out cities. And in the long term, as cities and states try to keep up on their debts, the very nature of government could change as they have less money left over to pay for the services they have long provided.
Richard Ravitch, the lieutenant governor of New York, is among those warning that states are on an unsustainable path, and that their disclosures of pension and health care obligations are often misleading. And he worries how long it can last.
“They didn’t do it with bad motives,” he said. “Ninety-five percent of them didn’t understand what they were doing. They did it because it was easier than taxing people or cutting benefits. We’re getting closer and closer to the point where we can’t do that anymore. I don’t know where that is, but I know we’re close.”

There's a Run on Bond Funds

from Bloomberg:


Bond mutual funds had the biggest client withdrawals in more than two years last week as a flight from fixed-income investments accelerated.

U.S. bond funds experienced withdrawals of $8.62 billion in the week ended Dec. 15, up from $1.66 billion the week before, according to a release from the Investment Company Institute, a Washington-based trade group. Last week's withdrawals were the largest since the week ended Oct. 15, 2008, when investors yanked $17.6 billion from bond funds.

Investors are retreating from bond funds after signs of an economic recovery and a stock market rally increased speculation that interest rates may rise. The selloff in Treasurys accelerated after the Federal Reserve last month pledged to buy $600 billion in assets to revive the economy. The 10-year note yields 3.35 percent, up from 2.49 percent Nov. 4, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Most of the money was probably pulled by institutional investors looking to lock in higher yields by buying bonds directly, rather than through funds, said Geoff Bobroff, a consultant based in East Greenwich, Rhode Island.

"I would guess most retail investors are staying put because you aren't seeing the money go anywhere else," he said in a telephone interview.

Vanguard, Pimco

Removals included $3.77 billion from taxable bond funds and $4.85 billion from municipal bond funds. U.S. stock funds had withdrawals of $2.4 billion while foreign equity funds attracted $2.24 billion in the week, ICI said.

Investors put $245 billion into bond mutual funds this year through November, bringing net deposits since the end of 2007 to $636 billion, according to data from Chicago-based Morningstar Inc. Vanguard Group Inc., based in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, had deposits of $33.4 billion into its bond funds through November while Franklin Resources Inc. of San Mateo, California got $23.7 billion, Morningstar data show.

Pacific Investment Management Co., the Newport Beach, California-based firm that runs the world's biggest mutual fund, attracted $57 billion to its bond funds in the first 11 months of the year.

The $250 billion Pimco Total Return Fund, managed by Bill Gross, had its first net withdrawals in two years in November as investors pulled $1.9 billion, Morningstar reported. Pimco Total Return this month said it is expanding its policy to allow investments in equity-linked securities for the first time since 2003.

"Fixed-income has been the lifeline for a lot of these firms," Douglas Sipkin, an analyst with Ticonderoga Securities in New York, said in an interview earlier this month.

Pimco this month raised its forecast for U.S. economic growth next year as policy makers pump a "massive amount" of stimulus into the economy, Chief Executive Officer Mohamed El-Erian said.

Meredith Whitney: Massive Bond Defaults Coming

from Newsmax' MoneyNews.com:

Meredith Whitney, the former Oppenheimer analyst whose dead-on predictions on the banking crisis vaulted her to fame, stands by her controversial new call: Massive unrest across the country as the municipal-bond market sells off.

Whitney appeared Sunday on “60 Minutes” to predict defaults in as many as 100 cities and towns, followed by European-style public demonstrations as cities slash budgets in response.

"States clearly have been funding municipal governments — for now up to 40 percent of their total expenditures," she tells CNBC

"As the states become more compromised from a fiscal standpoint, that funding is going to end."

She defended the reaction of ratings agencies and others, who called her predictions overblown.

"I didn't put the debt on these states. We're looking at the numbers. This is how it plays out,” she said, adding that the federal government is also unlikely to bail out broke states.

Hoping to get ahead of a ballooning public spending problem, Republican New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie has signed into law a cap on pay increases for firefighters and police in that state when contract negotiations break down.

Starting Jan. 1, the new law limits increases made by arbitrators to 2 percent.

"Everyone is going to have to make tough choices," Christie said at the law’s signing, reported The Star-Ledger.

"We are handing over a significant set of tools. That doesn’t mean their choices are going to be easy, it just means they’re going to have choices now."

© Moneynews. All rights reserved.

Greater Fools

Remember, the market is designed to fool most of the people most of the time.  ~ Jesse Livermoore

The Danger of Debt Default

John Mauldin explained the risks of EU debt default and/or restructuring in his latest newsletter:

How often did we as young kids go down the street kicking a can? "Kicking the can down the road" is a universally understood metaphor that has come to mean not dealing with the problem but putting a band-aid on it, knowing we will have to deal with something maybe even worse in the future.
While the US Congress is certainly an adept player at that game, I think the world champions at the present time have to be the political and economic leaders of Europe. Today we look at the extent of the problem and how it could affect every corner of the world, if not played to perfection. Everything must go mostly right or the recent credit crisis will look like a walk in the Jardin des Tuileries in Paris in April compared to what could ensue.
From the point of view of not wanting to so soon endure another banking and credit crisis, we must applaud the leaders of Europe. The PIIGS collectively owe over $2 trillion to European and US banks. German, French, British, Dutch, and Spanish banks are owed some $1.5 trillion of that by Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Greece by the end of June, 2010. That figure is down some $400 billion so far this year, which means that the ECB is taking on that debt, helping banks push it off their balance sheets. For what it's worth, the US holds, according to the Bank for International Settlements, about $353 billion, or 17%, of that debt, which is not an inconsequential number.
Robert Lenzner notes something very interesting about the latest BIS report, out this week:
"What's curious, though, is that for the first time the BIS has broken out a new debt category termed 'other exposures, which it defines as 'other exposures consist of the positive market value of derivative contracts, guarantees extended and credit commitments.' These 'other exposures' - quite clearly meant to be abstruse - amount to $668 billion of the $2 trillion in loans to the PIIGS.
"So, bank analysts everywhere; you now have to cope with evaluating derivative contracts that could expose lenders to losses on sovereign debt. Be on notice!"
What did I write just last week? That it is derivative exposure to European banks that is a very major concern for the world and the US in particular. It is not just a European problem. I predicted in 2006 that the subprime problem would show up in Europe and Asia. This time around, European banks present a similar if not greater risk to the US.
A collapse of a major European bank could trigger all sorts of counterparty mayhem in the US banking system, at least among our major investment banks. And then people would want to know which bank was next. This is yet another reason why the recent financial-system reform was not real reform. We still have investment banks committing bank capital to derivatives trading overseen by regulators who don't really understand the risk. Who knew that AIG was a counterparty risk until it was? Lehman was solid only a month before until it evaporated. On paper, I am sure that every one of our banks is solid - good as gold - because they have their risks balanced with counterparties all over the globe and they have their models to show why you should go back to sleep.

Kicking the Can Down the Road

And that is why I applaud the ECB for stepping in and taking some risk off the table. We do not know how close we came to another debacle. Does anyone really think Jean-Claude Trichet willingly said, "Give me your tired, your poor, your soon-to-default sovereign debt?" Right up until he relented he was saying "Non! Non!" He did it because he walked to the edge of the abyss and looked over. It was a long way down. Bailing out European banks at the bottom would have cost more than what he has spent so far. It was, I am sure, a very difficult calculation.
I remember writing a letter not so long ago, quoting Trichet on that very topic. He was vehemently opposed to any ECB involvement in something that looked like a bailout. And then he wasn't. I do hope he writes a very candid memoir. It will be interesting reading. The reality is that there was nowhere else to turn. There were no mechanisms in the Maastricht Treaty for dealing with this situation. What I wrote the following week (or thereabouts) still stands. This was and is a bailout for European banks in order to avoid a banking crisis. Many European banks, large and small, have bought massive sums on huge leverage of sovereign debt, on the theory that sovereign debt does not default. Some banks are leveraged 40 to 1!
The ECB is now earnestly continuing to kick the can down the road, buying ever more debt off the books of banks, buying time for the banks to acquire enough capital, either through raising new money or making profits or reducing their private loan portfolios, to be able to deal with what will be inevitable write-downs. It they can kick the can long enough and far enough they might be able to pull it off.
There is historical precedent. In the late '70s and early '80s, US banks figured out that if you bought bonds from South American countries at high rates of interest and applied a little leverage, you could practically mint money. And everyone knew that sovereign countries would not default. That is, until they did.
Technically, every major bank in the US was insolvent then. I mean really toes-up, no-heartbeat bankrupt. So what happened? Mean old Paul Volker - he who willingly plunged the US into recession to vanquish the specter of inflation - allowed the banks to carry those South American bonds on their books at full face value. He kicked the can down the road. And the banks raised capital and made profits, shoring up their balance sheets.
In 1986 Citibank was the first bank to begin to write down those Latin American bonds. Then came Brady bonds in 1989. Remember those? Brady bonds were as complicated as they were innovative. The key innovation behind their introduction was to allow the commercial banks to convert their claims on developing countries into tradable instruments, allowing them to get the debt off their balance sheets. This reduced the concentration risk to the banks. (To learn more about Brady bonds, and a very interesting period, go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brady_Bonds

and also google "Brady bonds.")
So it worked. Kicking the can down the road bought time until the banks were capable of dealing with the crisis.

Different Cans for Different Folks

The ECB has chosen a different way to kick that old can (and a large and noisy one it is!), but it is not without consequences. Trichet has let it be known that dealing with sovereign-debt default issues should not be the central bank's problem, it should be a problem for the European Union as a whole. And I think he is right, for what that's worth.
If the ECB were to keep this up, even in a deflationary, deleveraging world it would eventually bring about inflation and the lowering of the value of the euro against other currencies. That is not the stuff that German Bundesbankers are made of. So they have been pushing for a European Union solution.
At first, the political types came up with the stabilization pact in conjunction with the IMF. But this was never a real solution, other than for the immediate case of Greece ... and then Ireland. It has some real problems associated with it. It could deal with Portugal but is clearly not large enough for Spain. It is worth nothing that the political leaders of both the latter countries have loudly denied they need any help. Hmm. I seem to remember the same vows just the week before Ireland decided to take the money.
One of my favorite writers, Michael Pettis penned this note:
"Its official - Spain and Portugal will need to be bailed out soon. How do I know? In one of my favorite TV shows, Yes Minister, the all-knowing civil servant Sir Humphrey explains to cabinet minister Jim Hacker that you can never be certain that something will happen until the government denies it."
Ultimately, the EU has three options. But before they get there - or maybe better said, before there is a crisis that forces them to get there - they will continue to kick the can down the road. They are really very good at it. We will consider those options in a little bit; but first, let's look at just one aspect of the problem that will lend some context to the various paths among which they must choose. And that will take us on a detour back to our old friend Greece, where this all started.

More Debt is NOT the Solution to Too Much Debt

Greece is being forced into an austerity program in order to be able to continue to borrow money. But it has come with a cost. Unemployment is now at 12.6%, up from less than 7% just two years ago. And Greek GDP continues to slide. Let's look at some charts and data from my favorite slicer and dicer of data, Greg Weldon ( www.weldononline.com

for a free 30-day trial).
Notice that Greek GDP is down over 7% for the last 9 quarters, and there is no reason to believe there will be a reversal any time soon.

A declining GDP is just not good for the country, but it also makes it more difficult for Greece to get back into compliance with its EU fiscal deficit-to-GDP requirements. The problem is that GDP is declining faster than the fiscal deficit. Normally, a country would devalue its currency (and thus its debt), maybe restructure its external debt (or default), and then try to grow its way out of the crisis.
Let's go back and look at what Iceland did, as compared to Ireland, which is trying to take on more debt to bail out its banks, that is, to bail out German and French and British banks.
This is what I wrote a few weeks ago, and it bears repeating:
Look at how upset the UK got when Iceland decided not to back their banks. Never mind that the bank debt was 12 times Iceland's national GDP. Never mind that there was no way in hell that the 300,000 people of Iceland could ever pay that much money back in multiples lifetimes. The Icelanders did the sensible thing: they just said no.
Yet Ireland has decided to try and save its banks by taking on massive public debt. The current government is willing to go down to a very resounding defeat in the near future because it thinks this is so important. And it is not clear that, with a slim majority of one vote, it will be able to hold its coalition together to do so. This is what the Bank Credit Analyst sent out this morning:
"The different adjustment paths of Ireland and Iceland are classic examples of devaluation versus deflation.
"Iceland and Ireland experienced similar economic illnesses prior to their respective crises: Both economies had too much private-sector debt and the banking system was massively overleveraged. Iceland's total external debt reached close to 1000% of its GDP in 2008. By the end of the year, Iceland's entire banking system was crushed and the stock market dropped by more than 95% from its 2007 highs. Since then, Iceland has followed the classic adjustment path of a debt crisis-stricken economy: The krona was devalued by more than 60% against the euro and the government was forced to implement draconian austerity programs.
"In Ireland, the boom in real estate prices triggered a massive borrowing binge, driving total private non-financial sector debt to almost 200% of GDP, among the highest in the euro area economy. In stark contrast to the Icelandic situation, however, the Irish economy has become stuck in a debt-deflation spiral. The government has lost all other options but to accept the E85 billion bailout package from the EU and the IMF. The big problem for Ireland is that fiscal austerity without a large currency devaluation is like committing economic suicide - without a cheapened currency to re-create nominal growth, fiscal austerity can only serve to crush aggregate demand and precipitate an economic downward spiral. The sad reality is that unlike Iceland, Ireland does not have the option of devaluing its own currency, implying that further harsh economic adjustment is likely."
This is what it looks like in the charts. Notice that Iceland is seeing its nominal GDP rise while Ireland is still in freefall, even after doing the "right thing" by taking on their bank debt.

Greek five-year bonds are now paying 12.8%. It is hard to grow your way out of a problem when you are paying interest rates higher than your growth rate and you keep adding debt and increasing your debt burden.

Each move to deepen government cuts in Greece will result in further short-term deterioration of GDP, which makes it even harder to dig out of the hole. And Greece is a particularly thorny problem. The taxi drivers are outraged that they might have to use meters. Why? Because that means someone could actually track the amount of money they take in. Government workers are striking over 10% pay cuts. And on and on.
It is the same song but with a different verse for the rest of the countries in Europe that have problems. While Ireland is very different from Greece, assuming massive debt in a deflating economy will only turn Ireland into an ever-larger burden unless they can get on the path to growth again. Ditto for Portgual, Spain, and....

Et Tu, Belgium?

One country after another in Europe is coming under pressure. This week the debt of Belgium was downgraded, and the accompanying note from Standard and Poor's observed that:
"Belgian's current caretaker government may be ill-equipped to respond to shocks to public finances. The federal government's projected 2011 gross borrowing requirements of around 11 percent of GDP leaves it exposed to rising real interest rates."
At some point, if a country does not get its fiscal deficit below nominal GDP (and this is true for the US as well!) it will run into the wall. Credit markets will no longer lend to it. In Europe, the lender has become the ECB, but that may - and I emphasize may - change with the establishment of a new authority for the European Union to sell bonds and use the proceeds to fund nations in crisis. Under the proposal, each nation would assume a portion of the total debt risk. That may be a tough sale, as it appears there will need to be a treaty change and then country-by-country votes for such a change.
It will also mean that countries that accept such largesse will endure a very stern hand in their fiscal affairs. This is potentially a very real surrender of sovereignty. Some countries may decide it's worth the price. Others, on the funding side of the equation, may decide they have to "take one" for the good of the European team.
This fund is to be launched in 2013, which gives EU leaders some time to flesh out the idea and sell it.
A second choice is for some countries to leave the euro but stay in the EU. Not all members of the EU participate in the eurozone. Leaving would be hugely messy. It is hard to figure out how it could be done without serious collateral damage. Even if Germany were to decide to be the one to leave, which they actually could, as the new German currency would rise over time, it would also mean their exports would be less competitive within Europe.
A third choice (which could be combined with the first choice) is radical debt restructuring. Convert Greek bonds into 100-year low-interest bonds, giving the Greeks (or Irish or Portuguese ...) the time and ability to service the debt, along with real controls on their spending. Of course, that is default by another name, but it allows the fiction. Something like Brady bonds. You hit the reset button and kick the can a long way down the road.
That choice too has political and economic consequences. Someone has to cover the losses on the mark-to-market for those bonds. Who takes the hit?
Let me close with this bit of insight from one of my favorite analysts, MartinWolfe of the Financial Times (www.ft.com):
"This leads to my final question: could the eurozone survive a wave of debt restructurings? Here the immediate point is that the crisis could be huge, since one restructuring seems sure to trigger others. In addition, the banking system would be deeply affected: at the end of 2009, for example, consolidated claims of French and German banks on the four most vulnerable members were 16 per cent and 15 per cent of their GDP, respectively. For European banks, as a group, the claims were 14 per cent of GDP. Thus, any serious likelihood of sovereign restructuring would risk creating runs by creditors and, at worst, another leg of the global financial crisis. Further injections of official capital into banks would also be needed. This is why the Irish have been "persuaded" to rescue the senior creditors of their banks, at the expense of the national taxpayer.
"Yet even such a crisis would not entail dissolution of the monetary union. On the contrary, it is perfectly possible for monetary unions to survive financial crises and public sector defaults. The question is one of political will. What lies ahead is a mixture of fiscal transfers from the creditworthy with austerity among the uncreditworthy. The bigger are the former, the smaller will be the latter. This tension might be manageable if a swift return to normality were plausible. It is not. There is a good chance that this situation will become long-lasting.
"Still worse, once a country has been forced to restructure its public debt and seen a substantial part of its financial system disappear as well, the additional costs of re-establishing its currency must seem rather smaller. This, too, must be clear to investors. Again, such fears increase the chances of runs from liabilities of weaker countries.
"For sceptics the question has always been how robust a currency union among diverse economies with less than unlimited mutual solidarity can be. Only a crisis could answer that question. Unfortunately, the crisis we have is the biggest for 80 years. Will what the eurozone is able to agree to do be enough to keep it together? I do not know. We all will, however, in the fairly near future."
My only small disagreement is on whether it will be in the "near future." World champion can kickers can put off the day of reckoning longer than you might think. On the other hand, when that day does come, it will seem to have come so quickly and with so little warning. There is no way to know what the markets will do about this, so it pays to stay especially vigilant and flexible.

U.S. Treasury: $2 Trillion Single-Year Deficit

from Reuters:


WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. government fell deeper into the red in fiscal 2010 with net liabilities swelling more than $2 trillion as commitments on government debt and federal benefits rose, a U.S. Treasury report showed on Tuesday.
The Financial Report of the United States, which applies corporate-style accrual accounting methods to Washington, showed the government's liabilities exceeded assets by $13.473 trillion. That compared with a $11.456 trillion gap a year earlier.
Unlike the normal measurement of government intake of receipts against cash outlays, accrual accounting measures costs such as interest on the debt and federal benefits payable when they are incurred, not when funds are actually disbursed.
The report was instituted under former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, the first Treasury secretary in the George W. Bush administration, to illustrate the mounting liabilities of government entitlement programs like Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security.
The government's net operating cost, or deficit, in the report grew to $2.080 trillion for the year ended September 30 from $1.253 trillion the prior year as spending and liabilities increased for social programs. Actual and anticipated revenues were roughly unchanged.
The cash budget deficit narrowed in fiscal 2010 to $1.294 trillion from $1.417 trillion in 2009. But the $858 billion tax cut extension package enacted last week is expected to keep the deficit well above the $1 trillion mark for another year.
BUDGET CUT DEBATE
The latest Treasury report should fuel debate in Congress over spending cuts next year as a new Republican majority in the House of Representatives takes office.
The U.S. Senate on Tuesday approved a compromise bill to fund the government until March 4, 2011. After that, Republicans will have the chance to push through dramatic budget cuts.
"Today, we must balance our efforts to accelerate economic recovery and job growth in the near term with continued efforts to address the challenges posed by the long-term deficit outlook," Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said in a letter accompanying the report. "The administration's top priority remains restoring good jobs to American workers and accelerating the pace of economic recovery."
Among key differences between the operating deficit and the cash deficit were sharp increases in costs accrued for veterans' compensation, government and military employee benefits and anticipated losses at mortgage finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
The biggest increase in net liabilities in fiscal 2010 stemmed from a $1.477 trillion increase in federal debt repayment and interest obligations, largely to finance programs to stabilize the economy and pull it out of recession.
The federal balance sheet liabilities do not include long-term projections for social programs such as Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security, but these showed a positive improvement.
The report said the present value of future net expenditures for those now eligible to participate in these programs over the next 75 years declined to $43.058 trillion from $52.145 trillion a year ago -- a change attributed to the enactment of health-care reform legislation aimed at boosting coverage and limiting long-term cost growth.
The overall projection, including for those under 15 years of age and not yet born, is much rosier, with the 75-year projected cost falling to $30.857 trillion from last year's projection of $43.878 trillion.
The report noted, however, that there was "uncertainty about whether the projected reductions in health care cost growth will be fully achieved."

Fed Now Owns $1 Trillion of U.S. Treasuries

by Graham Summers at Phoenix Capital Research:

 We just hit another milestone in insanity.

I’ve written before that thanks to its QE lite and QE 2 programs, the Fed is now officially the single, largest owner of US debt. However, even that nonsense pales in comparison to the Fed’s latest accomplishment, that of owning over $1 TRILLION in US debt.

That’s right, as of yesterday afternoon the Fed now owns over $1 trillion in US debt. This amounts of over 7% of the US’s total debt, own by our central bank.

Now, many commentators have pointed out the various ways in which this policy has endangered the US’s balance sheet, economic clout, and currency. However, there’s one element that NO ONE seems to have picked up on. That is…

You, me, and everyone else in the US, is now PAYING the Fed for its insane, anti-Middle class policies.

Remember, we are continually paying the debt via interest payments drawn up from tax receipts. Thus, by buying up US Treasuries, the Federal Reserve is in effect reaping interest payments from the US populace.

Now, consider that none of us had any say in the Fed’s policies, nor the appointment of our esteemed Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke. None of us voted for him. None of us influenced his policies. And, at this point, virtually none of us approve of what he’s doing.

But ALL of us are NOW paying him and the Fed for doing it. In fact, because the Fed is officially the single, largest owner of US debt, the Fed is, in effect, raking in more money from our debt situation than ANYONE else on the planet.

Thus, we are paying LITERALLY for the insane policies of the US Federal Reserve. Never mind abstract arguments of “paying” for the Fed’s mistakes in the sense of the US Dollar collapsing or the US’s economy imploding. We are LITERALLY paying BILLIONS in interest payments to the Fed.

This in turn means we are:

1)   Helping the Fed to continue destroying the US Dollar

2)   Funding the Fed’s bubble-blowing efforts

3)   Financing the very same policies that have eviscerated the Middle class and retirees

Given that we have no vote or say in the Fed’s actions, I know of only one way to deal with this situation and that’s to buy assets that will maintain their purchasing power and produce REAL returns to counteract the Fed’s anti-Dollar policies.

Good Investing!

Graham Summers